COMNAVRESFORCOM INSTRUCTION 2280.3C

From: Commander, Navy Reserve Forces Command

Subj: EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN FOR CLASSIFIED MATERIAL AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY MATERIAL

Ref: (a) EKMS 1E
     (b) SECNAVINST 5510.36A
     (c) COMNAVRESFORCOMINST 2280.1E
     (d) DoD M-5200.01-V1 through V4, DoD Information Security Program: February 2012
     (e) COMNAVRESFORINST 5510.9A CH-1
     (f) COMNAVRESFORCOMINST 3300.2B

Encl: (1) Classified Material Emergency Destruction Plan
      (2) Fire Preparedness and Natural Disaster Plan
      (3) Hostile Action Emergency Plan
      (4) Removing Material to a Safe Place
      (5) Precautionary Destruction Priorities
      (6) Complete Emergency Destruction Priorities
      (7) KOA Vault Diagram (list building and space)
      (8) Methods and Location of Destruction
      (9) Emergency Destruction of STE/KSV-21 Assets
      (10) Sample Notification Message

1. Purpose. To issue policy and procedures for the protection, removal or destruction of communications security (COMSEC), and classified materials located in the Commander, Navy Reserve Forces Command (COMNAVRESFORCOM) key management infrastructure (KMI) Operating Account (KOA) vault, per reference (a) through (f). This instruction is a complete revision and should be read in its entirety.

2. Cancellation. COMNAVRESFORCOMINST 2280.3B.

3. Discussion. This plan will provide COMNAVRESFORCOM and other authorized personnel who have access to the COMNAVRESFORCOM KOA a means of securing the classified material, or destroy it to protect from compromise in the event of an emergency. Instructions contained herein are to be initiated upon direction by COMNAVRESFORCOM or the staff communication material system responsibility officer (SCMSRO).
4. **Responsibility.** COMNAVRESFORCOM is responsible for maintaining this instruction and shall ensure it is current and ready for execution. The KOA manager is responsible for the effective operation of this instruction and shall ensure key personnel are thoroughly indoctrinated, and trained in the action required of them in the event that an emergency action plan (EAP) is executed. The KOA manager is responsible for the destruction of all COMSEC material and serves as an advisor to COMNAVRESFORCOM on KOA matters. Enclosure (1) provides guidance for the protection of classified material in a way that will minimize the risk of personal injury or loss of life.

5. **Emergencies.** An emergency is defined as any unforeseen occurrence that results in a significantly increased danger of COMSEC/classified material being compromised by unauthorized personnel. This instruction will be used for different types of emergencies:

   a. The fire preparedness and natural disaster plan as per enclosure (2) provides guidance in the event of a fire, flood, typhoon, or other natural disaster, which threatens the security of COMSEC and other classified material or incidents affecting classified material storage areas.

   b. Hostile actions as per enclosure (3) provides guidance in the event of enemy attack, civil disturbance, riot, civil uprising and terrorist actions, which threaten the security of COMSEC and other classified material or incidents affecting classified material storage areas.

6. **Policy.** When an emergency occurs, it is assumed that classified material is a target and unauthorized disclosure must be prevented. There are 3 courses of action possible for the protection of classified material:

   a. Emergency protection action includes securing all classified publications and material in a safe.

   b. The emergency removal action as per enclosure (4) provides guidance regarding the relocation of classified material to a secure area provided time and safety of personnel permit.

   c. Emergency destruction actions are initiated when compromise of COMSEC material is imminent and sufficient time is not available to properly remove the COMSEC material to an alternate storage location. The KOA primary and/or alternate managers should be the ones to conduct emergency destruction whenever possible. These actions are broken into 2 phases, per enclosures (5) and (6).

   (1) Precautionary Destruction. Destruction of all material not essential to current operations. The primary value of this type of destruction allows total destruction and can be completed in a relatively short period of time if an overrun threat becomes imminent.

   (2) Complete Emergency Destruction. Destruction of all classified material. All reasonable efforts should be made to secure, or remove the classified material, and destroying the
material should be considered only as a last resort. During actual destruction the collection of accurate information concerning the extent of emergency destruction is second in importance only to the destruction of material itself.

(a) Detailed plans for emergency removal, partial precautionary destruction and complete emergency destruction cards are located in the COMNAVRESFORCOM KOA vault, room 114A. When word is given by the appropriate authority to initiate any of the 3 plans, the instruction cards will be followed. The individual responsible for executing the required emergency action will ensure the appropriate cards are obtained and each card is signed upon completion. If the material in the drawers being destroyed require 2 combinations to open, then ensure the 2 individuals accompany this material when it is destroyed. The same 2 individuals will sign the card upon completion to maintain “2 person integrity.” The responsible individual will retain the completed cards along with all emergency destruction cards, binders and logbooks.

(b) Enclosure (7) depicts the KOA vault with the approximate safe locations. A KOA personnel access roster is posted on the inside of the KOA vault door.

(c) When destruction is necessary, enclosure (8) will apply relative to the methods of destruction, with authorized areas designated for such destruction respectively. Enclosure (9) will apply for secure terminal equipment (STE)/enhanced crypto card destruction (KSV-21 card).

7. **Action.** The following officials are authorized to order the execution of the provisions of this instruction. When directed by the commander or SCMSRO, the following will be accomplished:

   a. **KOA Manager/Alternates.** If an emergency situation occurs, as defined in paragraph 5 arises, the KOA manager/alternates will take the prescribed course of action as indicated in paragraph 6. The course of action taken must coincide with the threat assessment.

   b. Ensure that a complete inventory is conducted both prior to and upon completion of the destruction of materials. Make all appropriate follow on reports to the commander and/or the SCMSRO. The reports should include adequate identification of the material destroyed, method and extent of destruction.

   c. If an emergency situation arises and the KOA manager/alternatives are unavailable, the commander or SCMSRO may designate members to perform an EAP/emergency destruction plan (EDP). Perform the following steps if that situation occurs:

      (1) Combinations for the KOA vault door and the safes inside the KOA vault are stored in the safe in the secret internet protocol router (SIPRNET) café.
(2) Once inside the KOA vault, pull out the EAP/EDP binder, located in the STE file cabinet within the vault, for the appropriate plan directed. Follow all the instructions as written on the cards.

(3) When all of the emergency action plan cards are complete, secure the office space. Return the acquired combinations to the SIPRNET café.

(4) Keep all of the completed emergency action plan cards, logbooks and binders and release them only to the commander, SCMSRO, and/or the KOA managers/alternates.

8. **Reporting.** A post inventory will be conducted upon conclusion of the EAP. All losses or unauthorized exposures to classified COMSEC material will be reported to the commander, SCMSRO, and KOA manager/alternates. An appropriate classified Naval message as shown in enclosure (10), will be drafted and released by the appropriate releasing authority. The KOA manager/alternates will provide assistance if required.

9. **Training.** Training will be conducted and documented on an annual basis to ensure that KOA manager/alternates are familiar with proper handling and destruction procedures. All COMSEC-related training will be documented and reported to the KOA manager.

10. **Safety.** Emergency protection, removal or destruction procedures for COMSEC and other classified material are secondary to the safety of personnel. Emergency actions should be taken only to the extent of practicality and when such actions do not pose an unreasonable threat to life.

11. **Records Management.** Records created as a result of this instruction, regardless of media and format, must be managed per Secretary of the Navy Manual 5210.1 of January 2012.

12. **Review and Effective Date.** Per OPNAVINST 5215.17A, COMNAVRESFORCOM will review this instruction annually on the anniversary of its effective date to ensure applicability, currency, and consistency with Federal, DoD, SECNAV, and Navy policy and statutory authority using OPNAV 5215/40 Review of Instruction. This instruction will automatically expire 5 years after effective date unless reissued or canceled prior to the 5-year anniversary date, or an extension has been granted.

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Releasability and distribution:
This instruction is cleared for public release and is available electronically only via COMNAVRESFOR Web site, http://www.public.navy.mil/nrh/Pages/instructions.aspx
COMNAVRESFORCOMINST 2280.3C
16 Apr 18

CLASSIFIED MATERIAL EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION PLAN

1. COMNAVRESFORCOM headquarters building NH-32 is a limited access area, restricted by badge access, force protection measures are established to minimize risk of loss or compromise of classified information in an emergency situation. Additionally, the force protection procedures in place will supplement the protection as required. COMNAVRESFORCOM risk posture is assessed as low as a result of the security procedures in place. In the event of an emergency situation, one of the following will designate that an emergency situation exists:

a. Commander.

b. In the absence of the commander, utilize the established chain of command.

2. Program managers, functional directors, and special assistants are responsible for initiating the protection of classified material within their directorate. He or she shall identify personnel who will be responsible for that protection in an emergency situation.

3. Anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) exercises per Naval Support Activity (NSA) Hampton Roads AT plan, COMNAVRESFORCOM does not specifically have a tenant responsibility aboard NSA in regards to AT/FP operations or exercises. COMNAVRESFORCOM shall comply with joint AT/FP operations and exercises as directed by NSA in accordance with the Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) AT plan.

4. Emergency Destruction Plan:

a. This section publishes procedures to be followed for safeguarding classified information and equipment during emergency situations. Emergency situations may be categorized as:

   (1) Natural emergency which results from a natural disaster such as fire, flood, or hurricane.

   (2) All bomb threats must be closely evaluated and reported to the regional operations center watch officer to prevent unacceptable disruption to normal operations.

   (3) Hostile or dissident action emergency which results from enemy action, hostile forces, mob, riot action.

b. Emergency destruction of classified material, including North Atlantic Treaty Organization classified material, held by COMNAVRESFORCOM will be executed per the following procedures and as directed by the commander or SCMSRO. The following procedures will be implemented:

   (1) During working hours (0730-1630), Monday-Friday:
(a) Under normal circumstances, COMNAVRESFORCOM will order the EDP implemented when it is considered that the forces and facilities at the command’s disposal are adequate to protect the subject materials from impending loss or capture. Should conditions prevent contact with the installation commander (NSA Hampton Roads), the commander, or SCMSRO will authorize the KOA manager/alternates to initiate the plan without awaiting specific orders. The exercising of individual initiative in preparing for emergency action at all levels of command is desired.

(b) The security watch will restrict access to the building closing off all but the main entrance. All personnel entering the building will be checked for proper identification.

(c) The KOA manager/alternates shall immediately notify all required individuals. If an individual cannot be contacted, the next ranking individual having access to departmental classified information will be notified of the need to prepare for the possible destruction of classified material held in the department.

(d) In an extreme emergency, anyone within the department having access to classified information can be directed to implement destruction procedures.

(e) COMSEC material emergency destruction procedures are covered separately under procedures developed in accordance with reference (a).

(2) During non-working hours, duty personnel will contact the commander for guidance:

(a) The commander or SCMSRO, if available, will direct the safeguarding and destruction of classified material.

c. Natural Disasters:

(1) Since emergencies of a natural nature would not normally subject the material to capture by enemy forces, the securing of classified material as directed should suffice.

(a) Protection. When ordered to secure classified materials, all hands will ensure that classified documents are immediately placed in security containers. Under ideal conditions, all classified material will be returned for stowage.

(2) Command instructions provide detailed procedures for personnel discovering, reporting, or combating a fire within the COMNAVRESFORCOM area. Upon notification of a fire, all personnel, prior to evacuation, will secure all classified material. If it is not possible to safely secure the classified material, it will be left in place. Under no circumstances will personnel risk death or injury to protect classified materials from fire. Base police will provide a perimeter guard for the building to control access to the area. This guard will continue until the fire has been extinguished and safety permits the SCMSRO and KOA manager/alternates to
ensure that all classified materials have been totally destroyed. In the event firefighters or subsequent investigative personnel enter a classified space with exposed classified material, it shall be the responsibility of the security manager of that space to ensure that those firefighters/investigators are debriefed in accordance with current Navy security instructions.

d. All personnel, military and civilian assigned or attached to COMNAVRESFORCOM receiving a bomb threat shall take the action prescribed in reference (f). Upon orders to evacuate the building, all classified material will be secured. The primary consideration is the safety and welfare of all personnel. If it is not possible to safely secure or remove the classified material, it will be left in place. During a bomb threat, under no circumstances will personnel risk death or injury to protect classified materials.

e. When hostile action occurs, it must be assumed that classified material is an objective and all actions must be directed at keeping the materials from unauthorized personnel by means of protecting or destroying as conditions dictate.
FIRE PREPAREDNESS AND NATURAL DISASTER PLAN

1. Accidental emergencies are emergencies that include fires, tornadoes, floods or other natural disasters. The following paragraphs list the procedures to be followed for each disaster. Check off each procedure after it is completed.

2. Fire Emergency Plan. Should a fire occur around or within building NH-32 on NSA Hampton Roads, the KOA manager/alternates will take the following steps:

   a. Under no circumstances will anyone subject themselves or their subordinates to possible death or injury to protect classified material from fire.

   b. If it is not possible to safely secure or remove the classified material, personnel will evacuate the area and the material will be left in place to be consumed by the fire.

   c. When fire fighters arrive, they will immediately be admitted to secure areas. Every effort will be made to get names and identification numbers of all fire fighters who were exposed, or had access to classified material, only after the emergency is over.

   d. If the KOA manager or alternates are not present, every effort will be made to contact them and provide them with all information pertaining to the emergency.

   e. To the maximum extent possible, ensure that only fire fighters are allowed into secure areas. When given the "all clear" signal from the fire department, a guard will be posted in the secure area until the KOA manager and/or alternate present can perform a post-emergency inventory and report any losses or unauthorized exposures to appropriate authorities.

3. The natural disaster emergency plan’s primary objective in case of a hurricane, flood, tornadoes, etc. is to secure all classified material so that it will not be damaged or destroyed.

4. Complete and initial the following actions:

   a. Enter the KOA vault and power down KMI client node management client (MGC)/advanced key processor (AKP), STE phone, and other associated classified devices.

   b. Remove KSV-21 from STE and KG-250 High Assurance Internet Protocol Encryptor (HAIPE) crypto-ignition keys (CIKs) from crypto-equipment.

   c. Remove the HAIPE from current location and store in secure safe along with KSV-21 and CIKs.

   d. Disconnect all cables from all devices and properly secure in KOA vault room 114A.
e. Move the KMI client node from the floor to the shelf and secure so that it is immovable.

f. Ensure the safes and vault are locked and leave the space.

g. Take necessary action to ensure optimal security is established and maintained until the threat of compromise is gone by arming security systems and performing periodic security checks. If applicable, contact local base security.

5. After the emergency has passed:

   a. Conduct a complete inventory of all COMSEC material held.

   b. Report the findings to Commander, Navy Reserve Forces (COMNAVRESFOR), commander, SCMSRO, and COMNAVRESFORCOM KOA manager.
HOSTILE ACTION EMERGENCY PLAN

1. Hostile emergencies pertain to enemy or terrorist attack, riots, or mob actions, civil uprisings, and in all cases the assumption will be made that classified material is the target. All actions must be directed at protecting the material from unauthorized personnel by means of securing, removing, or destroying as conditions dictate. Below are 3 stages of hostile emergencies and actions that should be taken:

a. Stage 1 - Potential Threat. In the event that internal or external situations pose a potential threat to the command's classified and cryptographic material, the commander, on the advice of the KOA manager and SCMSRO, shall determine if cryptographic material needs to be centrally stored under guard in the secure room and whether the command's communication material system (CMS) holdings should be decreased.

   (1) Threat source - operations in high risk environment.

   (2) Time frame - several days to several months.

   (3) Action - reduction in holdings via transfer, removal or destruction to include:

      (a) All superseded keying material.

      (b) All reserve on board keying material except what is needed to carry on present operational commitments.

      (c) All nonessential classified material.

b. Stage 2 - Probable Threat. When a hostile action threat to classified and/or cryptographic material becomes probable with or without the contributing occurrence of a natural disaster.

   (1) Threat source - probability of hostile attack.

   (2) Time frame - from one to several days.

   (3) Action - precautionary destruction as outlined in enclosure (5). The cards for precautionary destruction are located in the EAP/EDP binder in the KOA vault.

c. Stage 3 - Imminent Threat. In the event of an imminent threat of hostile action.

   (1) Threat source - attack by hostile forces.

   (2) Time frame - imminent.
(3) Action - complete destruction as outlined in enclosure (6). The cards for complete destruction are located in safe 1 in the KOA vault.

Note: If in the event of a chemical, biological, and or radiological (CBR) attack the space has become contaminated, do not remove any material. Evacuate, secure the space and contact the chain of command for further guidance.
REMOVING MATERIAL TO A SAFE PLACE

1. If it becomes necessary to relocate classified material due to damage of the KOA vault or other means of securing the classified material from compromise or destruction in the event of an emergency, one location is provided as an alternate storage site: Navy Operational Support Center (NAVOPSPTCEN) Roanoke, VA.

2. Transportation of material will require two individuals; preferably armed guards.

3. Material should be transported via a government vehicle if available.

4. Ensure that all KSV-21s, CIKs, and Key Storage Device (KSD)-64 CIK Keys are shipped separately from their respective devices.

5. Complete and initial the following actions:
   a. Enter the KOA vault and power down MGC/AKP equipment.
   b. Conduct a full inventory of all COMSEC material held. Utilize the most current change of account location (COAL) inventory report located in the KOA vault.
   c. Remove classified and controlled cryptographic item (CCI) elements (KSV-21s and HAIPE CIKs) from crypto-equipment and prepare them along with HAIPE for transport.
   d. Securely pack all material for transportation. Use shipping boxes, folders, or duffel bags.
   e. Contact the command en-route and relay tracking information for the material being transported. Federal Express (FEDEX) is the preferred method of shipment.
PRECAUTIONARY DESTRUCTION PRIORITIES

1. When precautionary destruction is necessary, destroy keying material, and non-essential manuals in the order of priority specified below.

2. Detailed precautionary destruction cards are in the EAP/EDP binder located in the KOA vault.
   a. Superseded keying material and secondary variables.
      (1) Secret, confidential, and unclassified primary keying material.
   b. Future reserve on board keying material for use 1 or 2 months in the future.
   c. Non-essential classified manuals:
      (1) Maintenance manuals.
      (2) Operating manuals.
      (3) Administrative manuals.

3. Once partial precautionary destruction is complete, send out an immediate message report using the format in enclosure (10).

Note: All emergency destruction messages are considered at a minimum classified confidential unless otherwise noted.
COMPLETE EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION PRIORITIES

1. Since personnel and/or facilities are limited, the following destruction priority list below is utilized for complete emergency destruction.

2. Detailed instructions for complete emergency destruction are in the EAP/EDP binder located in the KOA vault:

   a. All superseded and currently effective keying material marked cryptographic (including key stored electronically in crypto-equipment and fill devices), MGC/AKP, PYQ-10s, STE phones, HAIPEs, Tactical Local Area Network Encryption (TACLANE), and KSV-21.

   b. Complete COMSEC equipment maintenance manuals or their sensitive pages (simple key loaders, HAIPE, TACLANEs, secure network, and STE phones).

   c. Classified general COMSEC doctrinal guidance publications.

   d. Classified elements of COMSEC equipment (i.e. CIKs).

   e. Remaining COMSEC equipment maintenance manuals and classified operating instructions.

   f. Remaining classified COMSEC material.

Note: Unclassified chassis and unclassified elements do not need to be destroyed.

3. When complete emergency destruction is completed, send out an immediate message report using the format in enclosure (10).

Note: All emergency destruction messages are considered at a minimum classified confidential unless otherwise noted.
KOA VAULT DIAGRAM (LIST BUILDING AND SPACE)

VAULT SHREDDER

ENTRANCE DOOR

VAULT WORK TABLE

KOA VAULT

BLACK FILE CABINET

STE FILE CABINET

Enclosure (7)
METHODS AND LOCATION OF DESTRUCTION

1. Methods. The three approved methods of destruction of COMSEC material for COMNAVRESFORCOM are shredding, burning, and pulverizing. Use the most expeditious manner in a given situation.

   a. Shredding. The cross-cut shredded method is approved for paper COMSEC material. This method of destruction is slow for bulky documents. There are two locations that can be utilized for shredding destruction within the KOA area. Primary cross-cut shredder is located in KOA staging area room 114A. The secondary cross cut shredder is located in SIPRNET café room 115.

   b. Burning. Controlled burning is permitted when it does not threaten human health and the environment. Burning should be considered as a last resort. If burning is the only other option of destruction, then a single fire in a trash can may be utilized. The best way to go about burning the material is to loosely place the documents into a trash can and slowly move the material around with a broom handle to allow adequate burning of the material and to prevent smothering of the flames. Ensure that all material is destroyed prior to departing the area. Lighters are located in the KOA vault for the purpose of emergency destruction by means of burning. The burning should be conducted on the south side of the building located next to smoking area. Utilize a metal container trash can located inside the KOA vault.

   c. Pulverizing. The disintegrator, located in the N6 server room 114, is approved for the destruction of crypto equipment and chassis if necessary. The sledgehammer located in the KOA vault will be utilized for the destruction of small cryptographic devices and cryptographic device-associated materials (KSV-21s and CIKs).
EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION OF STE/KSV-21 ASSETS

1. Emergency destruction of STE (secure phone) assets will be completed only when complete emergency destruction is necessary. The following will be completed upon notification that complete emergency destruction is necessary:

   a. Zeroize all loaded KSV-21s held by the account in the following order (based on level of the keying material loaded into the terminal): Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential.

   b. If a lack of power prohibits keying material fill device (FD) or a loaded terminal from being zeroized, then ensure all keying material and CIKs/KSVs are physically removed from the area. In extreme emergencies, an attempt to physically destroy fill devices and CIKs/KSVs is allowed. Material can be burned or broken as much as possible to prevent unauthorized use.

2. If time allows, STE phones and CIKs/KSVs should be removed from the area. If adequate time is not available to complete the destruction, then CIKs and KSV-21s associated with configured terminals must be physically removed from the area or placed in secure storage container. If this is not possible, the following actions, listed in order of priority, must be taken:

   a. Use a STE to zeroize all unused KSV-21s. For a complete listing of all KSV-21s, use the running inventory located in the COAL binder located in the KOA vault STE file cabinet, room 114A.

   b. Zeroize the STE terminal. In order to zeroize the STE terminal, press the “menu” key then press “scroll” twice. The terminal will display “zeroize terminal”, next press “select” and the terminal will again display “zeroize terminal.” Press “confirm” and the terminal will prompt you to press “continue” when it has finished the zeroization process.

3. Reporting STE/KSV-21 terminals and CIK destruction is second only in importance to the destruction itself. All personnel must ensure that, when time allows, all destruction is conducted, documented and reported to the appropriate personnel.
SAMPLE NOTIFICATION MESSAGE

OTTSZYUW RHOIAAA000! XXXXXXX-XXXX—RHMCSSS.
ZNY XXXX
O XXXXXXXZ JAN XX
FM COMNAVRESFORCOM NORFOLK VA
TO CNO WASHINGTON DC//N614//
NCMS WASHINGTON DC//N5//
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//I9121//
INFO COMNAVRESFORCOM
CMS AA NORFOLK VA
BT
CLASSIFICATION //N02280//
MSGID/GENADMIN/COMNAVRESFORCOM//
SUBJ/PARTIAL PRECAUTIONARY DESTRUCTION (OR)
COMPLETE EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION//
REF/A/DOC/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC//
REF/B/DOC/NCMS WASHINGTON DC//
NARR/REF A IS SECNAVINST 5510.36A AND REF B IS EKMS 1B//
POC/NAME/GRADE/COMNAVRESFORCOM/-/TEL:757-XXX-XXXX/DSN XXX-XXXX//
RMKS/1. (S) PER REFERENCES (A) and (B), THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS
PROVIDED:
A. STATE THE MATERIAL DESTROYED
B. THE METHOD AND EXTENT OF DESTRUCTION
C. ANY CLASSIFIED COMSEC MATERIAL ITEMS PRESUMED
COMPROMISED (E.G., ITEMS EITHER NOT DESTROYED OR NOT COMPLETELY
DESTROYED).
DECL/XI//
BT