



# COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FLEET FORCES

## SERIAL 005 – Personnel

---



### I. Estimate of the Situation

1. The chaotic, complex, and ever-changing strategic and operational environment we find ourselves in will continue well into the foreseeable future – we will remain in “permanent white water.” To succeed in this environment, we cannot create confidence with readiness based on false standards. We are at war. Al-Qaida declared war on us – we are the target. Our approach must be disciplined; we must hold the line on time-tested, combat proven standards; and we must be able to adapt what we have for the fight we are in.

2. On the other hand, we cannot mandate success with inadequate resources – commanders are obligated to equip their subordinates for success. As an expeditionary force, we reset each inter-deployment period to ensure we can sustain the required level of operational activity required by our Combatant Commanders into the future. Reset not only maximizes the service life of our ships, aircraft, submarines, and equipment, it also provides our Sailors with the training and time needed to prepare them to deploy with confidence in their ability to accomplish the missions assigned. Providing forces ready for tasking is not only a commitment to the Combatant Commanders, but it is also a promise to our Sailors who see their entry into deployment marking the best material condition their unit will ever achieve, their overcoming the challenges of deployment to achieve mission success as the likely highlight of their careers, and the sustainment of high readiness on deployment as a significant contributor to our culture and ethos. So I strongly believe that matching the reality our Sailors will face to their expectations for deployed readiness is critical to retaining high-quality people and remaining a truly global and relevant force, regardless of the fiscal environment.

3. Previous Serials have identified critical factors associated with providing our people with the tools, training, and time needed to prepare them to deploy confident in their ability to accomplish the missions assigned:

Serial 002 Command and Control. Reestablish the conditions for a decentralized command and control structure that allows us to push decision-making to the lowest practical level, develop independent thinkers willing to act to the limits of their authority, and develop Officers and Sailors that can adapt what they have to win the fight they are in.

Serial 003 Fleet Sustainment. Reestablish stability in the inter-deployment period by creating regular, planned periods of “calm” to allow us to fully reset the force (complete all required maintenance to return material health to standard and complete formal training to reestablish a basic level of operational health following the transfer of the large percentage of personnel that normally occurs after a deployment). Validate the effectiveness of tools provided to the Fleet.

Serial 004 Force Generation. Match supply to demand in a sustainable force generation model that does not over-commit available forces.

This Serial builds on previous Serial initiatives by focusing on: Reducing Fleet overhead (shifting resources from “tail” to “tooth”); increasing Fleet manning; and improving Fleet training.

## **II. Guidance**

### 1. Reduce Fleet overhead

a. Tenaciously go after non-essential work to reduce cost, which includes our insatiable appetite for studies/assessments and endless processes at the expense of real output (impactful changes to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities - DOTMLPF).

b. Shift to a Command staff structure by stopping work on administrative tasks that are duplicative or not impactful, and shifting talent (people) to high priority tasks (match talent to task). A Command staff has the following attributes:

- Downward looking (focused on accountability).
- Hierarchical C2 structure (clear lines of responsibility/authority).
- Decentralized C2 structure (delegate/command by negation).
- Focus on output (decide, implement, verify)
- Strategic view

c. Ruthlessly prioritize requirements and fully fund in priority order.

2. Shift resources to the Fleet (fund “tooth” at a higher priority than “tail”). “Tooth” is defined as deployable units. “Tail” is defined as everything else.

3. Increase Fleet manning to both operate and maintain our platforms.

4. Reestablish a “virtuous cycle” between training (school house), tactical (platform), and technical communities (maintenance activities and program offices) with the focal point/end user being the deployable unit. Use Computer-Based Training (CBT) and Synthetic Training to complement (not replace) hands-on training.

## **III. Tasks**

A. OPNAVINST 5409.1 Navy Concept Generation and Concept Development Program

B. COMUSFLTFORCOM email Senior Staff Discussion 8 Jun 10 (NOTAL)

### 1. Reduce Fleet overhead

a. USFF Deputy Commander (DCOM). Complete the USFF staff reorganization directed 24 July 2009 by drafting a revision to the USFF Staff Organization and Regulation Manual (SORM) for my signature. Due: 27 Aug 10. The SSORM revision will:

- Establish a stand-alone N9 organization to implement the requirements of reference (a).
- Re-balance the staff (match talent to task) based on recommendations from DCOSs regarding which tasks USFF should stop working in order to shift from an Administrative Staff to more of a Command Staff (reference (b)).
- Ensure no overlap in responsibilities between USFF DCOM and Executive Director (ED).
- Establish a staff cost-control process led by the Director, Command Services (N01S) and supported by the Director, Contract Management (N01D), to track contract execution (cost,

schedule, performance) and staff travel for the year of execution. The product of this process will be a monthly report to me (data and trends).

- Establish the Comptroller, General Counsel, Judge Advocate General, Nuclear Propulsion Examining Board, and Public Affairs Officer as direct reports to me (N00 Codes). This shift does not relieve them of their obligation to support the staff.

b. USFF General Counsel. Lead the review of all FY10 contracts funded through BSO 60 that provide professional, administrative, and management support services to USFF staff and all subordinate commands. Generate a report that includes the following information for each contract and brief results and recommendations to me. Due: 27 Aug 10.

- Total contract value and contract expiration date.
- Labor value and number of Full Time Equivalents associated with the contract.
- Budgeted indirect costs (materials, travel, etc.)
- Contract deliverables.
- Whether the contract meets any of the following criteria:
  - (1) Was established to fill a short-term requirement (capability gap or capacity gap).
  - (2) Was established to fill a long-term requirement that cannot be provided by a military billet (AC or RC) or government civilian billet (capability gap).
  - (3) Was established to fill a long-term requirement that can be provided by a military billet (AC or RC) or government civilian billet (capacity gap).
- Recommendation on whether the contract should be terminated in FY11 based on the guidance in Section II and resources shifted to subordinate staffs and the waterfront.

c. USFF N1. Conduct a review of all FY10 RC Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW) billets funded through BSO 60 and generate a report that includes the following information for each billet. Due: 13 Aug 10.

- Billet location and cost.
- Billet approval authority.
- Recommendation on whether the billet should be continued or terminated in FY11 based on the guidance in Section II and resources shifted to subordinate staffs and the waterfront.

## 2. Fleet manning levels

a. USFF N1. Develop an action plan for my approval that accomplishes the following essential outcomes starting in FY11. Actions should reflect the full range of authorities I have as the Fleet Manning Control Authority. Ensure your action plan is integrated with USFF N4/7's response to Serial 003 Task #2. Due: 27 Aug 10.

- Increase manning on optimally manned platforms to establish >90% FIT.
- Increase I-Level maintenance manning as required to reestablish a sea-shore-flow to improve the maintenance experience for engineering rates (primarily HM&E), provide the on-the-job experience required to progress from apprentice to journeyman to master, and support geographic stability.
- Improve BMD proficiency by establishing a "virtuous cycle" between training (school house), tactical (platform) and technical (maintenance and program office) communities with the focal point/end-user being the ship.
- Increase manning on all platforms based on steady state maintenance requirements (TA-4 workload and corrosion control).

b. USFF N1. Reset Global Force Management (GFM) Individual Augmentee (IA) levels for Low Supply/High Demand (LS/HD) skill sets to Navy redlines to enable a reduction in “any officer/petty officer” requirements in the FY12 Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). Due: 30 Nov 10.

c. USFF N1. In coordination with the Fleet Readiness Enterprise (FRE) ED, establish Fleet policy to achieve personnel manning and readiness levels aligned to a sustainable force generation model (SERIAL 004 – Force Generation). Due: 15 Sep 10.

d. USFF N1. Establish Navy Enlisted Code (NEC) FIT entitlement levels for Fleet units. Codify these manning levels in policy. Due: 29 Oct 10.

### 3. Fleet Training

a. USFF N7. Conduct a review of Computer-Based Training (CBT) products used by the Fleet to determine which products are effective (perform to design and effectively train) and are not effective (do not perform to design, do not effectively train, should be replaced by hands-on training). Capture results and recommendations in a decision brief to the FRE EXCOMM. Due: 17 Sep 10.


b. USFF N1. Develop a plan of action and milestones to expand “A” and “C” school training to ensure Sailors have the technical expertise required to operate and maintain our platforms; increase throughput capacity for formal follow-on schools, and increase hands-on classroom instruction and “hot plant” training. Due: 22 Oct 10.

## IV. Summary

*"In the heat of battle you don't remember very much. You don't think very fast; you act by instinct, which is really training. In battle, if you're trained for it, you won't change. You won't do better and you won't do worse; you'll do just about what you do in actual training. Consequently both you and your people have got to be trained. You've got to know what you're going to do in any circumstances without stopping to think about it, and you've got to know what they're going to do. You've got to expect exactly the performance in battle you'd get on a drill – no better; no worse. So train your men and yourselves. That's what wins battles!"*

**(Commodore Arleigh Burke, Commander, Destroyer Squadron TWENTY THREE)**

The foundation for mission success is high-quality people – Sailors that can maximize the warfighting capability of their unit, and adapt what they have to win they fight they find themselves in. Which is why I strongly believe (regardless of the fiscal environment) that we have an obligation to set up our Sailors for success by providing them with the tools, training, and the time needed to deploy with confidence in their ability to accomplish their assigned missions. Keeping this foundation strong requires a steady investment in our people. But it is this steady investment that makes us the ready, responsive, and relevant Navy we are today and “unlocks” the future capabilities funded in the rest of our Navy program.

  
J. C. Harvey, Jr.  
Admiral, U.S. Navy