



COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FLEET FORCES

SERIAL 002 – Command and Control



I. Estimate of the Situation

1. Core Command and Control Principles. Navy mission accomplishment and our ability to provide forces ready for tasking given the operational and fiscal challenges ahead require unified action by all Commanders within the USFF chain-of-command and between USFF and USPACFLT Commanders. Achieving unified action requires strict adherence to time-tested, combat proven, Command and Control principles that include:

- Two Commanders may not exercise the same command authority over the same force at the same time (Unity of Command).
- Operational and administrative authority must be commensurate with responsibility.
- Command relationships must be:
 - Effective – facilitate mission accomplishment.
 - Unambiguous – emphasize clarity and simplicity.
 - Hierarchical – reinforce unity of command and the chain-of-command.
 - Documented – allow verification.

2. Decentralized Command and Control. Command is the authoritative act of making decisions and ordering action. Command is a function of responsibility, authority and accountability. Control is the act of monitoring and influencing action. Feedback is a vital element of control – it gives the Commander a way to monitor events, adapt to changing circumstances, change direction if entering assumptions did not hold true, and harmonize the efforts of the force. Two fundamental factors define the environment of command and control in every military operation and cannot be eliminated by technology: uncertainty and time. These fundamental factors and the distributed nature of naval operations have resulted in a culture where we push responsibility and authority to the lowest practical level – we decentralized the command of naval operations out of necessity. I strongly believe in our decentralized command and control system not only because it is fundamentally sound and has withstood the test of time, but also because it has allowed the Navy to develop independent thinkers willing to act to the limits of their authority to accomplish their assigned mission to the benefit of the Navy and the nation. However, I also strongly believe that a decentralized command and control system will fail if it does not incorporate and give life to the core Command and Control principles identified above.

3. Operational Control (OPCON) and Administrative Control (ADCON). OPCON provides the authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the Commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Tactical Control (TACON) is inherent in OPCON and provides the authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. ADCON provides authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.

4. Setting the Conditions for Mission Success. Although intended as behavioral models to promote communication, collaboration and coordination within existing command and control structures, the cumulative effect of Warfare Enterprise and Sea Power 21 initiatives over time has been to move us away from our core Command and Control principles. Fleet TYCOMs, CLASSRONs, Sea Power 21 Operational Agents and Warfare Centers of Excellence are some examples of organizations whose formation and operations have blurred the distinction between a Commander exercising ADCON authority over subordinates and a Commander overseeing Warfare Enterprise or Sea Power 21 business. **Reestablishing unambiguous and hierarchal lines of authority and accountability between Commanders down to the unit level** is necessary to set the conditions for mission success in an operational and budget environment that will require difficult decisions at every level. **Feedback is a vital element of control. We need to put as much emphasis on control as we do on command to sustain our forces so they are available for the future fight.** Accurate data / trend analysis (lagging indicators) and leading indicators (when available) ensure decisions and resulting orders do not result in any unexpected or unanticipated long-term problems.

II. Guidance

1. Establish unambiguous and hierarchal lines of OPCON/ADCON authority and accountability between USFF Commanders down to the unit level that reflect core Command and Control principles.

2. Direct your subordinates to act to the limit of their authorities to implement my “Commander’s Guidance”. Specifically:

- Provide forces ready for tasking to Combatant Commanders (CCDRs);
- Sustain our forces (ships, aircraft, equipment) so that they reach Expected Service Life;
- Generate forces in a sustainable model that achieves the above;
- Hold the line on time-tested, combat proven standards for how we operate, maintain, inspect, certify and command our Navy;
- Provide our people the tools, training, and time needed to prepare them to deploy with confidence in their ability to accomplish the mission assigned; and
- Stay within our budget controls.

III. Tasks

a. COMUSFLTFORCOM 131600Z JAN 10: Core Command and Control Principles

1. As directed in reference (a).

2. USFF DCOM. Coordinate with USPACFLT DCOM and DNS to revise USFF MFT to eliminate the term “Fleet TYCOM”, revise (or draft) Warfare Center of Excellence (WCOE) MFTs and submit Organizational Change Requests to establish unambiguous and hierarchal ADCON command-relationships based on defined WCOE outputs, not Sea Power 21 Operational Agent relationships. Due 30 Jun 2010.

3. USFF N8. Revise USFFINST 7100.1 “U.S. Fleet Forces Processes to Support NAVSO, NAVEUR/NAVAFRICA, and NAVCENT During Annual Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Cycles” in accordance with the following guidance. Due: 30 Sep 2010.

a. Reflect the fact that Warfare Enterprise leads and the Fleet Readiness Enterprise have no ADCON responsibilities and authorities.

b. Ensure tasking in support of Echelon 1 requirements are executed within proper ADCON responsibilities, authorities and command relationships.

c. Establish USFF N8 as the single Flag Officer responsible to the Commander for the coordination and integration of Navy Component Commander (NCC) warfighting, readiness and capability requirements to CNO in support of Navy’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution process.

4. USFF N3/5. Coordinate with NCCs to change doctrine and identify investments for PR13 that will optimize MOC-to-MOC and MOC-to-Service Operations Centers relationships in order to provide seamless, integrated and rapid flow of maritime information and intelligence to CCDRs. Due: 26 Nov 2010.

5. NWDC. Coordinate with NCCs to establish Navy Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) C2 doctrine to meet CCDR inter- and intra-theater BMD requirements. Due: 27 Aug 2010.

6. USFF N4/7. Coordinate with TYCOMs and 2nd Fleet to brief me monthly on unit readiness of USFF assigned forces. The two specific elements of unit readiness to be briefed are material health and operational health as outlined below. This monthly brief, along with regular ship/squadron/unit visits, will serve as my primary feedback loop for the decisions we make and the actions we direct to provide forces ready for tasking today, and to sustain the required level and duration of operational activity for our forces to achieve military objectives in the future. Briefs will begin in March 2010. The monthly brief will:

a. Review the material health of every unit assigned to USFF. The purpose of the material health review is to determine our ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of operational activity to achieve military objectives and to reach Expected Service Life. For surface ships and submarines, the Consolidated Ships Maintenance Project (CSMP) will be used as one of the primary sources of data. Identify similar CSMP-like data sources for other units.

b. Review the operational health of every unit assigned to USFF. Use SORTS/DRRS-N, EDVR / ODCR and the number of Temporary Standing Orders in effect as primary sources of data.

c. Review the operational schedules and certification status of every unit assigned to USFF.

d. Identify and brief leading indicators of material and operational health.


IV. Summary

1. There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that our Fleet is ready today. Our ability to respond on no notice to Haiti while continuing to meet the growing demands in CENTCOM and maintain other global commitments speaks to the current overall readiness of the Fleet and the extraordinary capability of our people. We are stressed and we are stretched, but we are nowhere near the point of impending mission failure.

2. On our watch, our challenge will be to sustain this level of readiness while dealing with known wholeness gaps in the Fleet. We have to do this with the understanding that our budget will contract, everything will get more expensive (ships, aircraft, maintenance, energy, people), operational demand for our forces will go up, and if we do not achieve Expected Service Life, the Fleet will shrink. A smaller Fleet will simply amplify the problems we have today and cause us to lose the most essential capabilities we offer the nation – the ability to project our power globally, whenever and wherever needed, and the ability to sustain that vital global presence indefinitely.

The Second in Command will in all possible things direct the movements of his Line, by keeping them as compact as the nature of the circumstances will admit. Captains are to look to their particular Line as their rallying point. But, in case Signals can neither be seen or perfectly understood, no Captain can do very wrong if he places his Ship alongside that of an enemy. - Horatio Nelson

3. “Nelson’s touch” was not his tactics or his understanding of his enemies, but his belief that the best way to achieve a decisive victory was to give his subordinates a thorough indoctrination before the engagement and near-total initiative once it had begun. He set the conditions for success in an environment dominated by two factors – uncertainty and time – with a decentralized command and control system that required his Commanders to operate to the limits of their authority to accomplish their assigned missions. We need to do the same by establishing unambiguous, hierarchal lines of authority and accountability that reflect core Command and Control principles (setting the conditions for success), then requiring our subordinates to act to the limits of their authorities to implement guidance.


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