

Remarks as written for Surface Navy Symposium

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GOOD AFTERNOON. IT'S A PRIVILEGE TO BE HERE WITH YOU TODAY TO ADDRESS A COMMUNITY VERY NEAR AND DEAR TO MY HEART. AND TO GIVE YOU MY THOUGHTS ON A SUBJECT OF SIGNIFICANT IMPORTANCE TO ALL OF US.

WHEN I SPOKE AT THE SNA WEST COAST SYMPOSIUM BACK IN AUGUST OF LAST YEAR, I FOCUSED MY REMARKS ON OUR NEED TO BE ABLE TO RAPIDLY ADAPT TO EMERGING AND CONSTANTLY CHANGING THREATS.

I SPOKE OF TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT AS ONE WHERE WE ARE FACED WITH A THOUSAND INDIRECT THREATS THAT ARE ALWAYS ACTIVE TO SOME DEGREE, NEVER OVER, AND THAT -AT ANY TIME - ANY ONE OF THEM CAN ERUPT LIKE A VOLCANO IN AN EXTRAORDINARILY VIOLENT SPASM THAT WILL CHALLENGE US IN VERY UNPREDICTABLE WAYS.

WHEN I COUPLED THAT DESCRIPTION OF TODAY'S THREAT ENVIRONMENT WITH OUR NATION'S ECONOMIC CRISIS, I CAUTIONED THAT WE WERE ALL DESTINED TO SPEND THE NEXT FEW YEARS IN PERMANENT WHITEWATER.

THIS TERM, PERMANENT WHITEWATER, IS A PRETTY GOOD METAPHOR FOR WHAT I BELIEVE MR. FRANK HOFFMAN WAS TRYING TO TELL US WHEN HE COINED THE TERM "HYBRID WARFARE."

HOFFMAN'S DEFINITION WAS THE BLENDING - THE CONVERGENCE IN TIME AND SPACE OF "THE LETHALITY OF STATE CONFLICT WITH THE FANATICAL AND PROTRACTED FERVOR OF IRREGULAR WARFARE."

GIVEN THIS CHAOTIC, COMPLEX, AND EVER-CHANGING STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT THAT IS OURS FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE - AND IF WE WISH TO SUCCEED IN OUR ENDEAVORS TO ENHANCE OUR NATION'S SECURITY AND NOT MERELY SURVIVE - IT IS VERY CLEAR TO ME THAT OUR GUIDING PRINCIPLE FOR THE FUTURE MUST BE RAPID ADAPTATION, A FINELY HONED ABILITY TO SENSE, SEE, UNDERSTAND, DECIDE, AND ACT - AS INDIVIDUALS, AS UNITS, AND AS AN ORGANIZATION - AT THE SPEED OF WAR.

AS WE LOOK DEEPER INTO THE IMPLICATIONS OF HYBRID WARFARE ON OUR NEED TO LEARN, ADAPT AND ACT, I'D LIKE TO BEGIN WITH A FEW EXAMPLES FROM OUR HISTORY, AND IF YOU WILL BEAR WITH ME, I PROMISE THESE WILL ACTUALLY HAVE SOMETHING TO DO WITH THE TOPIC I'VE BEEN ASKED TO ADDRESS.

AND I'D LIKE TO GO TO OUR NAVAL HISTORY FOR THESE EXAMPLES FOR THE CHALLENGES WE FACE IN THE NAVY TODAY ARE NOT ALTOGETHER NEW, JUST A LITTLE DIFFERENT FROM WHAT WE'VE FACED BEFORE.

A KEY ELEMENT OF THE UNION STRATEGY IN THE CIVIL WAR WAS BLOCKADING THE CONFEDERACY ALONG THEIR EXTENDED COASTLINE WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY ADVANCING DOWN THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER FROM THE NORTH.

THE UNION'S STRATEGIC GOAL WAS TO SPLIT THE CONFEDERACY IN TWO, GAIN CONTROL OF THE MISSISSIPPI FROM MEMPHIS TO NEW ORLEANS AND DEAL A DEATH-BLOW TO THE SOUTHERN ECONOMY, WHILE ENABLING FOLLOW-ON CAMPAIGNS INTO THE HEART OF THE DEEP SOUTH.

THERE WAS ONE PROBLEM WITH THIS STRATEGY:

AT THE TIME THE UNION NAVY WAS NOT MANNED, TRAINED, AND EQUIPPED TO CONDUCT RIVERINE WARFARE - MOST OF THEIR SHIPS WERE WHAT WE'D CALL TODAY SINGLE-PURPOSE, BLUE WATER CRUISERS - AND THEIR CREWS GENERALLY LACKED THE EXPERIENCE AND SKILLS TO CONDUCT COMBAT OPERATIONS IN SUCH CONFINED WATERS.

BY DOCTRINE AT THE TIME, THE NATION'S INLAND WATERWAYS BELONGED TO THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS OF THE ARMY.

TO DEVELOP THE NECESSARY CAPABILITIES REQUIRED TO SUPPORT GENERAL GRANT'S MISSISSIPPI CAMPAIGN, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY GIDEON WELLES ORDERED A RESOURCEFUL NAVY OFFICER, COMMANDER JOHN RODGERS (SON OF 1812 WAR HERO - COMMODORE JOHN RODGERS) TO GO OUT WEST TO SUPPORT THE ARMY AND GET THE NAVY READY TO FIGHT AND WIN IN A VERY DIFFERENT AND CHALLENGING ENVIRONMENT, THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER AND ITS TRIBUTARIES.

SECRETARY WELLES ALSO MADE CLEAR TO COMMANDER RODGERS THAT THE NAVY HAD NO DESIRE TO ACQUIRE RIVER BOATS FOR NAVAL PURPOSES.

WELL, SEEING THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION BEFORE HIM, COMMANDER JOHN RODGERS, QUICKLY DETERMINED AN ORGANIZED RIVER FLOTILLA WOULD GIVE GENERAL GRANT A DECISIVE STRATEGIC EDGE IN THE UPCOMING RIVER CAMPAIGN AND HE PROCEEDED ACCORDINGLY.

WITHIN MONTHS, HE HAD CONSTRUCTED AND ORGANIZED A CREDIBLE FLOTILLA - KNOWN AS THE "MISSISSIPPI RIVER SQUADRON" - COMPRISED OF MODIFIED STEAMBOATS OUTFITTED WITH GUNS AND PURPOSE-BUILT IRONCLAD SHIPS.

SIX MONTHS LATER, UNDER THE COMMAND OF FLAG OFFICER ANDREW FOOTE, THE SQUADRON SCORED ITS FIRST MAJOR VICTORY WITH GENERAL U.S. GRANT AT THE BATTLE OF FORT HENRY AND FORT DONELSON AND WAS LATER INSTRUMENTAL IN ENABLING THE GREAT UNION VICTORY AT VICKSBURG.

NOW, JUST THINK ABOUT ALL THIS FOR A MOMENT: NO INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT, STRICT LIMITS IMPOSED BY CHAIN OF COMMAND, AND NO CREWS EXPERIENCED WITH OPERATING COMBATANT SHIPS IN A VERY DIFFERENT AND CHALLENGING ENVIRONMENT.

RODGERS AND HIS SAILORS HAD TO TAKE ALL THIS IN, UNDERSTAND WHAT IT MEANT TO THE MISSION HE'D BEEN GIVEN, VERY RAPIDLY DEVELOP WHAT WE WOULD CALL TODAY THE DOTMLPF SOLUTION, AND SELL IT TO THE ARMY. HE HAD TO ACT DECISIVELY, IN REAL TIME.

PRESIDENT LINCOLN, CONVINCED OF THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THIS CAMPAIGN, TRANSFERRED CONTROL OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER SQUADRON TO THE NAVY.

THE SQUADRON WOULD GO ON TO HAVE A PROFOUND IMPACT ON THE WAR, WITH MAJOR VICTORIES AT MEMPHIS AND, UNDER REAR ADMIRAL DAVID PORTER, AT VICKSBURG THAT, ALONG WITH THE CONQUEST OF NEW ORLEANS, ENABLED THE UNION TO SEIZE CONTROL OF THE MISSISSIPPI AND PUT A STRANGLEHOLD ON THE SOUTHERN ECONOMY.

PRESIDENT LINCOLN WOULD LATER WRITE IN RECOGNITION OF THE NAVY'S UNIQUE AND VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN, "NOR MUST UNCLE SAM'S WEB FEET BE FORGOTTEN. AT ALL THE WATERY MARGINS THEY HAVE BEEN PRESENT. NOT ONLY ON THE DEEP SEA, THE BROAD BAY, THE RAPID RIVER, BUT ALSO UP THE NARROW

MUDDY BAYOU, AND WHEREVER THE GROUND WAS A LITTLE DAMP, THEY HAVE BEEN AND MAKE THEIR TRACKS."

OUR NAVY PREVAILED IN THE WESTERN RIVER CAMPAIGN BECAUSE THEY FIGURED OUT HOW TO USE WHAT THEY HAD IN NEW AND NOVEL WAYS TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES.

COMMANDER RODGERS RAPIDLY ADAPTED TO THE NEW ENVIRONMENT AND FORGED A VERY PRODUCTIVE AND ENDURING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ARMY, BUILT UPON TRUST AND A TRUE UNDERSTANDING OF HIS COMMANDER'S INTENT - THE ESSENCE OF JOINT OPERATIONS IN THE LITTORAL ENVIRONMENT.

IN SHORT, HE RAPIDLY RECOGNIZED THE CHANGED CHARACTER OF WAR ON THE RIVER, AND ADAPTED.

NOW, LET'S FAST FORWARD TO A VERY DIFFERENT TIME, WORLD WAR II, A VERY DIFFERENT PLACE, GUADALCANAL, AND A VERY DIFFERENT NAVY FACING AN EXTRAORDINARILY COMPLEX WARFIGHTING CHALLENGE ALSO IN THE LITTORALS - THIS TIME THE SOLOMONS ISLAND CHAIN IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.

IT'S D+1 ON 8 AUGUST 1942, AND THE AMERICAN FORCES HAVE JUST LANDED ON GUADALCANAL AND TULAGI. TASK FORCE 62, THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE LED BY REAR ADMIRAL RICHMOND KELLY TURNER, WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR OFFLOADING THE MARINES AND THEIR SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT FROM THE NAVY TRANSPORTS.

TURNER'S SCREENING FORCE, COMMANDED BY AUSTRALIAN REAR ADMIRAL VICTOR A.C. CRUTCHLEY AND COMPRISED OF EIGHT CRUISERS AND EIGHT DESTROYERS, WOULD SECURE THE AREA AROUND SAVO ISLAND TO SCREEN THE LANDING AREA AND PROTECT THE TRANSPORTS.

NOW SAVO ISLAND SPLITS "THE SLOT", THE BODY OF WATER THAT SEPARATES THE EASTERN AND WESTERN SOLOMON ISLANDS, INTO TWO LANES OF APPROACH TO GUADALCANAL AND TULAGI. TO COVER THE NORTH/SOUTH LANES, AND THE EASTERN APPROACH FROM INDISPENSIBLE STRAIT, CRUTCHLEY DIVIDED HIS SCREENING FORCE INTO THREE ELEMENTS:

TO THE NORTH, THERE WERE TWO DESTROYERS AND THREE HEAVY CRUISERS; TWO DESTROYERS AND TWO LIGHT CRUISERS COVERED AN EASTERN APPROACH; AND TO THE SOUTH HE POSITIONED TWO ESCORT

DESTROYERS AND THREE HEAVY CRUISERS, INCLUDING HIS OWN FLAGSHIP, THE HMAS AUSTRALIA.

IN ADDITION, CRUTCHLEY EMPLOYED TWO RADAR PICKETS TO THE WEST AS PART OF AN EARLY WARNING SYSTEM.

ON THE JAPANESE SIDE, VICE ADMIRAL GUNICHI MIKAWA, COMMANDER OF THE JAPANESE 8TH FLEET, HAD ALREADY ASSEMBLED A STRIKE FORCE OF SEVEN CRUISERS AND ONE DESTROYER TO RESPOND TO THE AMERICAN LANDINGS. MIKAWA'S 8TH FLEET WAS BASED OUT OF RABUAL, NEW BRITAIN, 1100 MILES TO THE NORTHWEST OF GUADALCANAL.

HIS ROUTE WOULD TAKE HIM OUT OF RABUAL, AROUND CAPE ST. GEORGE, THROUGH THE BUKA STRAIT, DOWN THE EASTERN COAST OF BOUGAINVILLE, AND INTO NEW GEORGIA SOUND, "THE SLOT".

MIKAWA WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN CARRIERS. HE KNEW THE CARRIERS HAD SUPPORTED THE PREVIOUS LANDINGS, AND SUSPECTED THEY WERE STILL THERE, BUT HE HAD NO CONFIRMATION OF THEIR POSITIONS. BEING SPOTTED BY ALLIED PLANES WOULD NOT ONLY DISRUPT HIS MISSION, BUT WOULD LIKELY PUT HIS SHIPS AT GREAT RISK OF BEING ATTACKED WITH NO JAPANESE AIR COVER AVAILABLE TO HIM.

FORTUNATELY FOR MIKAWA, THE ACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN COMMANDERS WERE POORLY COORDINATED. THEY WERE STILL NEW AT THIS BUSINESS AND NOTHING IN THEIR TRAINING BEFORE THE WAR PREPARED THEM FOR THE REALITY OF NAVAL COMBAT AS PRACTICED BY THE JAPANESE.

VICE ADMIRAL FRANK FLETCHER, COMMANDER OF THE ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, HAD LOST TWENTY-ONE AIRCRAFT FROM HIS CARRIERS DURING THE INITIAL LANDINGS AND FEARED THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANOTHER JAPANESE AIR RAID.

LOW ON FUEL AND WITH THE THREAT OF ENEMY TORPEDO AND DIVE BOMBERS ON HIS MIND, HE DECIDED TO WITHDRAW HIS CARRIER GROUPS FROM THE AREA AND HEAD FOR LESS CONFINED WATERS. BY THE TIME MIKAWA WAS ENROUTE TO GUADALCANAL, FLETCHER - ALONG WITH ALL U.S. AIR COVER - HAD DEPARTED THE SCENE.

WHEN TURNER LEARNED OF FLETCHER'S DEPARTURE, HE WAS UNDERSTANDABLY UPSET. DURING THE LANDING, THE JAPANESE AIRCRAFT

HAD ALREADY STRUCK THE ALLIED LANDING FORCE THREE TIMES AND TURNER FELT ACUTELY VULNERABLE TO FURTHER AIR RAIDS.

LEFT WITH NO AIR SUPPORT, TURNER FELT HE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO CUT THE OFF LOADING OPERATION SHORT. HE CONTINUED TO OFFLOAD SUPPLIES THROUGH THE NIGHT AND WOULD WITHDRAW THE REMAINING TRANSPORTS THE NEXT DAY - WITH FEWER THAN HALF THE SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT DELIVERED TO THE MARINES ASHORE.

MIKAWA, MEANWHILE, DID NOT GO UNNOTICED BY TURNER. RECONNAISSANCE FROM THE PREVIOUS DAY HAD REPORTED THE PRESENCE OF ELEMENTS OF A JAPANESE FORCE, BUT EACH REPORT WAS EITHER DISMISSED OR NEVER MADE ITS WAY TO TURNER.

ONE REPORT FROM A ROYAL AUSTRALIAN PILOT DESCRIBED THREE CRUISERS, TWO GUNBOATS, AND TWO SEAPLANE TENDERS.

ANOTHER REPORT FROM A B-17 DESCRIBED THE FORCE AS FOUR CRUISERS, ONE DESTROYER WHILE ANOTHER B-17 REPORTED IT AS SIX UNIDENTIFIED SHIPS.

GIVEN THE RELATIVELY SMALL SIZE AND SPOTTY COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE, TURNER DISMISSED THE SHIPS AS A CREDIBLE THREAT. TURNER FOCUSED ON THE TWO SEAPLANE TENDERS AND ASSUMED THE JAPANESE WERE GATHERING THEIR FORCES IN THE NORTH FOR ANOTHER AIR RAID.

TURNER AND CRUTCHLEY ALSO THOUGHT IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THE JAPANESE WOULD RISK A NIGHT ATTACK WITH SUCH A SMALL FORCE.

CONFIDENT THE ASSAULT AREA WAS SECURE FROM A SURFACE THREAT, TURNER RELAXED HIS FATIGUED CREWS TO CONDITION TWO AND WOULD RELY ON THE SCREENING FORCE TO PROTECT THE TRANSPORTS WHILE THEY CONTINUED TO OFFLOAD THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT.

BY THE TIME OF TURNER'S DECISION, NIGHT HAD FALLEN AND MIKAWA'S STRONG CRUISER FORCE WAS ALREADY IN THE SLOT. BOTH RADAR PICKETS HAD FAILED TO DETECT MIKAWA AS HE COOLLY STEAMED PAST THEM TOWARD SAVO ISLAND. WITH HIS SHIPS ARRANGED IN COLUMN FORMATION, AND BATTLE STATIONS MANNED, AT 0131 9 AUGUST, MIKAWA GIVES THE ORDER "EVERY SHIP ATTACK".

MIKAWA'S FLAGSHIP, THE CHOKAI, LAUNCHED ITS FIRST TORPEDO. WITHIN FIVE MINUTES THE CANBERRA WAS STRUCK AND THE BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND WAS UNDERWAY.

THE CANBERRA COULD BARELY REACT BEFORE SHE WOULD BE STRUCK AGAIN BY ANOTHER TORPEDO. IN THE NEXT FIVE MINUTES SHE WOULD BE HIT OVER TWENTY TIMES AND EVENTUALLY SINK THE NEXT MORNING.

DURING THE ATTACK ON THE SOUTHERN GROUP, CRUTCHLEY WAS AWAY FROM HIS FLAGSHIP. TURNER HAD SUMMONED CRUTCHLEY AND MARINE MAJOR GENERAL ALEXANDER VANDEGRIFT TO TURNER'S FLAGSHIP TO DELIVER THE NEWS OF THE NEXT DAY'S DEPARTURE AND DISCUSS THE OVERALL SITUATION.

CRUTCHLEY, NOT WANTING TO RISK A NIGHT TRANSIT BACK TO HIS POSITION IN THE SOUTHERN GROUP, HAD DECIDED TO KEEP HIS FLAGSHIP IN COMPANY WITH TURNER'S FORCES. HE HAD LEFT CAPT BODE OF THE USS CHICAGO IN CHARGE AS THE TASK GROUP COMMANDER OF THE SCREENING FORCE.

BODE AND THE CHICAGO WERE NOT SPARED BY MIKAWA. AFTER STRIKING THE CANBERRA, MIKAWA'S SHIPS ZEROED IN ON THE CHICAGO WITH DEADLY ACCURACY.

PRE-OCCUPIED WITH FIGHTING THE DAMAGE TO HIS SHIP, CAPT BODE STEAMED OUT OF THE FIGHT AND FAILED TO ALERT THE OTHER GROUP COMMANDERS OF THE ATTACK THAT WAS NOW UNDERWAY - A FATAL MISTAKE.

WITH THE SOUTHERN GROUP IN DISARRAY AND LARGELY DISABLED, MIKAWA TURNED HIS FORCES TO DEAL WITH THE NORTHERN GROUP, POSITIONED TO THE EAST OF SAVO ISLAND.

HIS SHIPS FIXED THEIR SIGHTS ON THE VINCENNES, ASTORIA, AND QUINCY AND WITHIN MINUTES THE UNALERTED SHIPS WERE SLAMMED WITH A BARRAGE OF TORPEDOES AND GUNFIRE. LIKE THE SOUTHERN GROUP, THESE SHIPS WERE OVERCOME WITHIN MINUTES, AND ALL THREE WOULD BE SUNK.

DURING THE ENGAGEMENT ON THE SOUTHERN GROUP, MIKAWA'S FORCE HAD BECOME DIVIDED. CONCERNED ABOUT THE LENGTH OF TIME IT WOULD TAKE TO REGROUP, AND HAVING EXPENDED ALL HIS TORPEDOES, MIKAWA ABANDONS HIS OBJECTIVE OF DESTROYING THE ALLIED TRANSPORTS AND AT 0220 DEPARTS THE AREA.

BY THE END OF THE FIRST BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND, THE JAPANESE WOULD SINK FOUR ALLIED CRUISERS - THE CANBERRA, VINCENNES, ASTORIA AND QUINCY -SERIOUSLY DAMAGE A NUMBER OF DESTROYERS, AND KILL OVER 1,000 SAILORS. CONVERSELY, FIVE JAPANESE SHIPS ARE SLIGHTLY DAMAGED WITH LESS THAN 100 KILLED.

IN LESS THAN ONE HOUR THE JAPANESE INFLICTED THE WORST DEFEAT AT SEA THE U.S. NAVY HAS EVER EXPERIENCED.

HOW DID THIS HAPPEN?

ADMIRAL RICHMOND KELLEY TURNER, IN HIS POST-BATTLE REPORT, WROTE, "THE (U.S.) NAVY WAS STILL OBSESSED WITH A STRONG FEELING OF TECHNICAL AND MENTAL SUPERIORITY OVER THE ENEMY. IN SPITE OF AMPLE EVIDENCE OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES, MOST OF OUR OFFICERS AND MEN DESPISED THE JAPANESE AND FELT THEMSELVES SURE VICTORS IN ALL ENCOUNTERS UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. THE NET RESULT OF ALL THIS WAS A FATAL LETHARGY OF MIND WHICH INDUCED A CONFIDENCE WITHOUT READINESS, AND A ROUTINE ACCEPTANCE OF OUTWORN PEACETIME STANDARDS OF CONDUCT. I BELIEVE THAT THIS PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR, AS A CAUSE OF OUR DEFEAT, WAS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE."

THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER SQUADRON AND THE DEFEAT AT SAVO ISLAND - ONE, AN EXAMPLE OF THE SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS THAT CAN BE ACHIEVED THROUGH THOUGHTFUL INNOVATION AND ADAPTATION, AND THE OTHER - THE SIGNIFICANT FAILURE THAT ACCOMPANIES CONFIDENCE WITHOUT READINESS, REDUCED STANDARDS, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, A FATAL LETHARGY OF THE MIND - A FAILURE TO ADAPT TO THE GRIM REALITY THE ENEMY BRINGS WITH HIM.

TO REFRESH YOU ON MR. FRANK HOFFMAN'S DEFINITION; "WE DO NOT FACE A WIDENING NUMBER OF DISTINCT CHALLENGES BUT THEIR CONVERGENCE INTO HYBRID WARS. THESE HYBRID WARS BLEND THE LETHALITY OF STATE CONFLICT WITH THE FANATICAL AND PROTRACTED FERVOR OF IRREGULAR WARFARE."

HYBRID WARFARE CONCEPTUALIZES TODAY'S THREAT ENVIRONMENT WHERE NUCLEAR TERRORISM IS A REAL POSSIBILITY, WHERE A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION LIKE HEZBOLLAH CAN EFFECTIVELY LAUNCH CRUISE MISSILES - A CAPABILITY ONCE THOUGHT THE PRESERVE OF ORGANIZED

NATION STATES - AND SIMULTANEOUSLY WREAK HAVOC WITH IEDS AND SOPHISTICATED CYBER ATTACKS.

THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF WARFARE HAS NOT CHANGED, BUT THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HYBRID WARS CAN BE VERY DIFFERENT - MULTIPLE FORMS OF WARFARE CONVERGING IN TIME AND SPACE - CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT WHERE EVERYTHING IS IN PLAY, ALL AT ONCE, WITH VARYING DEGREES OF INTENSITY AND VIOLENCE.

HYBRID WARFARE IS REALLY, AT ITS HEART, A STRONG REMINDER THAT OUR ENEMIES WILL BE THINKING ENEMIES. WHETHER WE'RE TALKING ABOUT MAO TSE TUNG, VO NGUYEN GIAP, OR OSAMA BIN LADEN, THE ENEMY DOESN'T THINK IN TERMS OF HOW TO EXECUTE AN IRREGULAR, CONVENTIONAL OR HYBRID WAR AGAINST US - HE USES EVERYTHING HE HAS AVAILABLE TO BE AS EFFECTIVE AS POSSIBLE AT ACHIEVING HIS GOALS - WITH HIS ACTIONS LIMITED ONLY BY HIS MORALS AND CREATIVITY.

A LOT OF ENERGY HAS BEEN EXPENDED IN DEFINING AND PLANNING FOR IRREGULAR OR HYBRID WARFARE. UNDERSTANDABLY, MANY PEOPLE HAVE TRIED TO FIGURE OUT WHAT IT MEANS FOR OUR FORCE STRUCTURE - WHAT WE BUILD AND HOW MANY WE BUILD, WHAT WE MODERNIZE, AND HOW WE MODERNIZE.

BUT, I BELIEVE THAT FAR MORE IMPORTANT THAN WHAT WE BUILD IS HOW WE THINK.

SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR, THE TENDENCY HAS BEEN TO EXPECT THE NEXT CONFLICT TO BE MUCH LIKE THE LAST ONE, SO WE JUST EXTRAPOLATE TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES INTO THE FUTURE AND FOCUS ACCORDINGLY.

BUT THE FUTURE GENERALLY REFUSES TO UNFOLD THE WAY WE THINK IT WILL. THE FACT THAT WE ARE DISCUSSING HYBRID WARFARE AND ASKING WHAT IT MEANS TO US IS A COMPELLING EXAMPLE OF THIS FACT.

WE HAVE TO FIGURE OUT HOW TO BEST USE WHAT WE HAVE, TO DEAL WITH THE WORLD AS IT IS - AS OUR ADVERSARIES DO - INSTEAD OF WORRYING ABOUT WHETHER AN ARLEIGH BURKE DESTROYER IS A CONVENTIONAL, IRREGULAR, OR HYBRID WARFARE PLATFORM. THAT'S AN EMPTY DISCUSSION.

AN ARLEIGH BURKE DESTROYER IS WHAT I HAVE NOW AND IT'S WHAT I'M GOING TO HAVE FOR A VERY LONG TIME. AND I THANK GOD FOR THAT. THE KEY FOR US IS THAT IT'S AN EXTRAORDINARILY CAPABLE AND ADAPTABLE PLATFORM THAT SUPERBLY SUPPORTS AN EXTRAORDINARY ARRAY OF MISSIONS.

THE SAME DDG THAT CAN ENGAGE EXO-ATMOSPHERIC BALLISTIC MISSILES CAN ALSO - WITH THE EXPERT ASSISTANCE OF A FEW NAVY SEAL SNIPERS - TAKE OUT SOMALI PIRATES.

ALSO, IN A LARGER SENSE, WE HAVE TO BE VERY CAREFUL ABOUT FOCUSING SO ACUTELY ON THE TERM "HYBRID WARFARE."

AS THE STRATEGIC THEORIST COLIN GRAY WARNS US, "THE PROBLEM IS THAT THE REASONABLE ARGUMENT BEHIND THE RECENT DISCOVERY, EPIPHANY PERHAPS, OF HYBRIDITY, MAY OBSCURE THE EVEN BETTER ARGUMENT FOR RECOGNIZING THE ONENESS OF WAR AND WARFARE. WE SHOULD BE VERY CAREFUL ABOUT THE ADJECTIVES WITH WHICH WE DECORATE THE PHENOMENA OF WAR AND WARFARE."

WAR IS SIMPLY WAR - ITS FUNDAMENTAL NATURE - THE REALM OF FEAR, HONOR, AND INTEREST; VIOLENCE, UNCERTAINTY AND CHANCE - IS ETERNAL AND UNCHANGING. THE CHARACTER OF WARFARE, THOUGH, IS TEMPORAL AND REFLECTS THE REALITY OF TODAY'S TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, RELIGIONS, AND POLITICS. IT IS WAR'S CHARACTER THAT CAN CHANGE RAPIDLY, HYBRIDIZE, AND WE MUST BE READY TO CHANGE WITH IT.

THE CONCEPT OF HYBRID WARFARE FORCES US TO RECOGNIZE THAT WE NOW LIVE IN A WORLD WHERE TERRORISTS ARE ABLE TO STEAL A VIDEO FEED FROM A MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR UAV USING SOFTWARE YOU CAN BUY ON THE INTERNET FOR LESS THAN \$30.

SO WHAT MUST WE DO?

FIRST, WE MUST - REPEAT MUST - BE READY TO ADAPT TO WHAT WE SEE, AND DO IT IN REAL TIME. WHEN WE'VE PREPARED TO FIGHT USING A PARTICULAR THEORY OF CONFLICT AND THEN FIND OURSELVES IN A CONFLICT WHERE OUR THEORIES ARE OUT-OF-DATE / IRRELEVANT / INADEQUATE (AS AT SAVO ISLAND), WE ADAPT OR DIE.

IN THE SOLOMONS, WE EVENTUALLY ADAPTED - WE GOT OUR HEADS INTO THE FIGHT AT THE SAME LEVEL AS THE JAPANESE, AND, INDEED, OUT-ADAPTED THEM.

BY THE END OF THE SOLOMON ISLANDS CAMPAIGN, OUR FORCES WERE FAR SUPERIOR IN EXECUTING NIGHT COMBAT OPERATIONS. WE HAD DEVELOPED SUPERIOR RADAR WHICH ENABLED SUPERIOR COMBAT TACTICS. WE LEARNED THE HARD WAY ABOUT COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE LITTORAL. WE LEARNED TACTICS AND DOCTRINE. WE USED OUR HEADS.

AND DURING THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. GEORGE - THE FINAL ENGAGEMENT OF THE SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN, CAPTAIN ARLEIGH BURKE ENGAGED A JAPANESE FLOTILLA OF FIVE DESTROYERS WITH AN EQUAL FORCE OF FIVE FLETCHER CLASS DESTROYERS - THE CHARLES AUSBURNE, CLAXTON, DYSON, CONVERSE, AND SPENCE. HE ENGAGED THE JAPANESE AT NIGHT: SINKING THREE OF THE FIVE JAPANESE DESTROYERS WITH NO AMERICAN CASUALTIES. BURKE HAD TRAINED HARD AND NOT ONLY DID HE OUT-FIGHT THE JAPANESE AT CAPE ST. GEORGE, HE OUT-THOUGHT THEM AS WELL.

BURKE AND THE US NAVY ADAPTED IN THE SOLOMONS JUST AS CDR RODGERS AND THE UNION NAVY DID ON THE MISSISSIPPI.

SECOND, WE MUST TRANSITION AWAY FROM AN ALMOST EXCLUSIVE FOCUS ON LEARNING AS INDIVIDUALS AND BECOME, AT OUR CORE, A LEARNING ORGANIZATION WHERE CURRENT AND FUTURE LEADERS CAN CREATE, ACQUIRE, AND TRANSFER THEIR KNOWLEDGE THROUGHOUT OUR NAVY. OUR NAVY MUST LEARN, ADAPT, AND GROW; WE MUST ENCOURAGE INNOVATION AND UNLOCK THE LATENT POTENTIAL OF OUR PEOPLE, OUR GREATEST AND BY FAR OUR MOST POWERFUL RESOURCE, IN ORDER TO OVERCOME THE VAST ARRAY OF CHALLENGES THIS ERA OF HYBRID WARFARE PRESENTS US.

THIRD, WE CANNOT FALL PREY TO THE WHAT ADMIRAL TURNER CALLED "A ROUTINE ACCEPTANCE OF OUTWORN PEACETIME STANDARDS." WE ARE AT WAR. AL-QAIDA DECLARED WAR ON US, AND THEY SEE OUR SHIPS, SUBMARINES, SQUADRONS, UNITS AND SAILORS AS TARGETS.

WE CAN NEVER FORGET THIS FUNDAMENTAL FACT AND MUST, REPEAT MUST, ENSURE WE HAVE THE RIGHT MINDSET EACH AND EVERY DAY.

REAR ADMIRAL AUSTIN M. KNIGHT, A PAST PRESIDENT OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, SAID IT BEST IN 1915, "THE NAVY IS NEVER PREPARED, BUT ALWAYS PREPARING; AND ITS PERSONNEL CAN NEVER RELAX FROM ITS ATTITUDE OF AIMING ALWAYS AT SOMETHING JUST A LITTLE BETTER THAN WHAT IT HAS AND IS."

THE CHALLENGE WE FACE IS NOT NEW - THIRTY YEARS AGO, DURING THE HEIGHT OF THE COLD WAR, WHO WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT THE UNITED STATES TODAY WOULD BE HEAVILY ENGAGED IN TWO MAJOR GROUND CONFLICTS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN?

BUT WE INVESTED IN MULTI-MISSION, FLEXIBLE PLATFORMS MANNED BY ADAPTIVE, INTELLIGENT SAILORS THAT ARE PROVING VERY EFFECTIVE FOR MISSIONS WE DID NOT CONCEIVE AT THE TIME WE WERE DESIGNING THEM.

OUR P3'S ARE PROVIDING CRITICAL ISR SUPPORT OVER LAND, OUR SSNS, AND SSGNS ARE PROVIDING REAL TIME INTEL TO TACTICAL COMMANDERS AND CONDUCTING PROMPT STRIKES ON INLAND TARGETS. WE BUILT AEGIS FOR THE OUTER AIR BATTLE ONLY TO REALIZE WE COULD LOOK INTO SPACE AND PROVIDE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND EVEN SHOOT DOWN A SATELLITE.

WE ARE INDEED IN THE ERA OF HYBRID WARFARE - THE CONVERGENCE IN TIME AND SPACE OF MULTIPLE TYPES OF CONFLICT.

TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN THIS NEW ERA, WE MUST BE FLEXIBLE AND BE ABLE TO RAPIDLY ADAPT TO MEET EMERGENT THREATS WHILE STILL MAINTAINING OUR CORE COMPETENCIES OF SEA CONTROL AND POWER PROJECTION - SOME THINGS ARE NOT GOING TO CHANGE - THE OCEANS COVER 72% OF THE EARTH'S SURFACE AND THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE WORLD'S POPULATION LIVE WITHIN 200 MILES OF THE COASTLINE.

WE WILL FOREVER BE A MARITIME NATION, THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATION FOR THE LIFEblood OF OUR ECONOMY WILL NEVER DIMINISH, AND THE SECURITY OF THE GREAT GLOBAL MARITIME COMMONS WILL FOREVER BE THE FOUNDATION FOR OUR NATION'S SECURITY.

IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, HYBRID WARFARE IS NOT SO MUCH ABOUT WARFARE AS IT IS ABOUT YOU - YOUR ABILITY TO THINK, YOUR ABILITY TO ADAPT, AND YOUR ABILITY TO PREVAIL, DOING WHATEVER IT TAKES - NOW, AS YOUR PREDECESSORS HAVE ALWAYS DONE AND AS WE WILL ALWAYS DO.

THANK YOU.