

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

SPRING 1995

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Our cover is a portrait of Tasker A. Bliss, who, as a member (when a lieutenant) of the original faculty, represented the start of the U.S. Army's contribution to the Naval War College—a tradition amply sustained by Walter Krueger, the subject of Major George Eaton's article in this issue. (For more on the Army at the College, Tasker Bliss, and this painting, see page 134.)

The Secretary of the Navy has determined that this publication is necessary in the transaction of business required by law of the Department of the Navy. Funds for printing this publication have been approved by the Navy Publications and Printing Policy Committee.

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"A true learned journal can be an important source of information for those who have heavy demands on their time. From my experience, such a journal is no better than its reviews; and institutions are no better than their journals."

Hyman G. Rickover



"I take pride in reporting that the [ethics] conference met these goals very well: its proceedings were vigorous, wide-ranging, and hard-hitting."

President's Notes

ETHICS IS AN INTEGRAL, ESSENTIAL ASPECT of naval and military service. Our profession demands the highest standards of behavior as well as a competent grasp of the intellectual discipline that supports right action. Toward those ends, for the past seven years the Naval War College has sponsored an annual conference on ethics. Supported in part by the generosity of the Naval War College Foundation, these conferences have brought together senior civilian and uniformed leaders, distinguished academics, and outstanding citizens with appropriate experience in our conference's focus, whether that be "The Ethics of International Intervention" (our 1993 theme) or "Ethics Revisited: The Individual and the Organization" (our most recent topic). All of our students in the College of Naval Warfare and the College of Naval Command and Staff participate in the conference's two days of seminars, lectures, and panel discussions.

Admiral Strasser holds a B.S. from the Naval Academy, two master's degrees from The Fletcher School, Tufts University, and from the same school a Ph.D. in political science. He graduated from the command and staff course at the Naval War College in 1972. He commanded the USS *O'Callahan* (FF 1051), Destroyer Squadron 35, Cruiser-Destroyer Group Three, and Battle Group Foxtrot. His seven years in Washington included two years in the office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Of course, ethical topics are regularly addressed throughout the Naval War College's various curricula; in addition, several electives allow officers to reflect at length on ethics in theory and in practice. But our annual conference is an opportunity to focus collectively on questions of moral right and wrong, from the routine choices we make each day to the dramatic decisions we face in time of war.

This year we were fortunate to have the Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable John H. Dalton, as our opening speaker, and the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, Admiral Charles R. Larson, for the evening address. We also had several active and retired flag and general officers in attendance and participating, as well as other officers, professors, and leadership experts who helped us to think about our responsibilities as leaders in our services and our nation.

As members of the military, we are entrusted with remarkable responsibility in the performance of our duties, including the prudent stewardship of great human and financial resources, and—when required—the application of lethal force in the protection of our nation's interests. To meet these responsibilities, military leaders are ceded extraordinary privileges of duty, granted considerable latitudes of choice, and blessed with levels of public trust accorded only a chosen few of our citizens.

The military career is a life of service, a commitment to place the needs of the nation before those of self. For that very reason, it requires each of us to perfect our character, to adopt a way of life in which self-discipline, integrity, and courage are part of "the job description." As we know, character is formed and set by decisions, some large, most small. It is cumulatively developed and continually tested; when the prominent decisions of high command must be made, they are the visible heirs of thousands of earlier, perhaps unnoticed, but no less important formative choices.

In this development of our own characters, we are the beneficiaries of those who have worn the uniform before us. They have provided a legacy of heroism, integrity, and achievement that we draw upon for inspiration, mutual trust and respect, and standards of honor. We also live and work in the organizations they built—the armed forces of the United States.

At the same time we acknowledge our heritage, we recognize that we must contribute each day to strengthening that inheritance and preparing our organizations as well as ourselves for new challenges in the future. This means that in their structures, regulations, practices and procedures, our services must be made to conform with our ideals and effectively promote our finest goals. Leadership—particularly by graduates of the Naval War College and comparable service institutions—will determine whether that responsibility is met.

The objective of this year's ethics conference was to assist our officers to reflect on how their personal commitment to serve the nation can and must be

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manifested in leadership at sea, in the air, and ashore. We strove to renew awareness of ethical principles, to remind ourselves of the privilege we have in serving the American people in our profession, and to inspire present and future leaders to make their services even better organizations in which individuals' highest moral aspirations contribute directly to mission accomplishment. I take pride in reporting that the conference met these goals very well; its proceedings were vigorous, wide-ranging, and hard-hitting.

These matters, in fact, are too important to be simply left off "until next year." Therefore I call upon readers of the *Naval War College Review* to sustain the discussion. We welcome and invite letters, comments, and papers (to be circulated, considered for publication in these pages, or used in our courses) that address ethical concerns, issues, and dilemmas. Likewise, we would appreciate recommendations for thematic topics for future Naval War College ethics conferences. Finally, I exhort every reader to join us in pausing from time to time to reflect on moral verities, the importance of character, and one's inescapable personal and professional ethical responsibilities.

Of the many activities I have directed at this command, none has mattered more to me than the College's attention to individual integrity and moral leadership in our naval and military services. We can be technically skilled, operationally superior, and strategically astute; but if we are not ethically guided, we will fail. Our annual ethics conference, the College's several electives in this field, and our continual concern with moral aspects of professional military education are vital aspects of the Naval War College experience. I encourage readers of this *Review* to contribute to our effort and to join us in pursuing right and honorable ends.



JOSEPH C. STRASSER
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

The Littoral Arena

A Word of Caution

Rear Admiral Yedidia "Didi" Ya'ari, Israel Navy

THE SHIFT OF NAVAL FOCUS TOWARD the littoral arena that has resulted from the dramatic changes in the geostrategic environment reflects a major rethinking of the role and objectives of sea power in the foreseeable future.¹ Clearly these fundamental changes will result in an adjustment of the relative weight of "green water" and "brown water" missions on one hand and the high seas, which have been dominant in naval strategic thinking throughout this century, on the other. This article raises the question, however, of whether the process of transformation is taking fully into account the scope of the adjustment, particularly the implications it has for prevailing concepts of ship design.

If it is not, it should. The movement into the littoral is much more than a mere change of mission. The constraints in that "ballpark" are quite different from the ones that shaped the development of most current naval force structures. In particular, the level of threat against surface ships—which has become significantly higher in general because of a number of developments of recent decades—has become especially high in the littoral.

This article isolates the case of the surface ship in that arena. It does so at the risk of apparent oversimplification; the factor of air support, for example, is deliberately set aside and barely touched upon. The intention, however, is to preclude any presupposition of synergism. I argue that when warships designed for the high seas enter the confined waters of the littoral arena, the fundamental

Rear Admiral Ya'ari is the Commander, Haifa Base. A member of the Israeli navy since 1965, his operational background includes special operations (SEALs) and missile boats; he is a former Director of Naval Intelligence. Rear Admiral Ya'ari holds a bachelor's degree in the history of the Middle East from Haifa University and a master's in public administration from the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He is a 1988 graduate of the Naval Command College of the U.S. Naval War College.

The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the author and do not reflect any official position held by the Israeli Navy.

relationships of maneuverability and firepower are upset, and the very notion of synergism comes into question.

If the ships we intend to deploy there are to be sufficiently survivable, we must revisit all our assumptions, starting with the most basic ones. Such a review yields some very interesting insights.

The Littoral Arena

Compared to the open ocean, the littoral is peculiar in a number of ways, most of which result from its geographical characteristics. The spatial nature of this arena's waters—relatively narrow, often very shallow and confined by the shoreline—dictates constraints on the employment of ships, sometimes so severe that certain types of vessels cannot be used in a given area. The limitations on the use of submarines inside the Persian Gulf is one example. Since by definition the rationale for staying in these confined waters is to exert influence over the coast and perhaps its immediate environs, most missions, to be quickly effective, require a constant and visible presence close to the shore.

The shore, however, is not a passive entity. In fact, in this regime the opponent on land enjoys quite significant advantages. One of them is the modern coastal defense system, comprising radar, electronic surveillance (known as "electronic support measures," ESM), antisurface missiles, high-speed surface combatants, and aviation. These defenses, constituting in effect a land-based fleet, are a new phenomenon; their strength matches, in principle, that of their opponents offshore without sharing the latter's inherent vulnerability. Further, the short distances within the littoral arena create for warships acute problems of reaction time and "threat bearing." That is, at any given moment the ship is deep inside at least one of several coastal weapon "envelopes." At the same time, the small size of the battle space enables the defender on the coast to coordinate and concert his various options—missiles, mines, special forces, and gunnery. INS *Eylat*, sunk in October 1967 by Egyptian Styx surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) launched practically from within the harbor of Port Said, offers a perfect example of the relative advantage the defender holds in these circumstances. USS *Stark*, hit by an Iraqi Exocet in the Persian Gulf in 1987, is another. As for mines, Desert Storm provided a fresh reminder of how effective that measure can be, both in direct damage and in deterrence.²

The question, then, is not only of the *intensity* of the threat; in the littoral the threat is also peculiar in its *density*. Coastal defenses have the ability, simply by tracking the patrolling ship by radars and passive ESM, to target it without giving away any warning. The coastal defender's wide range of options and his freedom to initiate a strike practically any time he chooses to do so create a threat that is both continuous and immediate. In turn, an attack that could come at any

moment, around the clock, forces the ship to maintain a constant, all-dimensional state of alert, one much in excess of that required in any other operational environment. The closest equivalents that come to mind are from the Second World War—the Battle of the Atlantic, with its intense submarine threat, and the Okinawa campaign, with its kamikazes—and they were far less unremitting and less demanding of resources in their need for quick reaction and variety of means.

Moreover, unlike these cases, because perimeter defense has limited effectiveness in the littoral (as will be discussed), more is hardly better. Another factor is the “bystander” problem that is so typical of low-intensity conflicts in the littoral. Civilian tankers, freighters, fishing boats, and aircraft going about their daily business constantly clutter the situation. They make identification harder and more time-consuming, add more uncertainties to the process of building the tactical “picture,” and impose constraints upon rapid engagement of suspected targets.

The overall result is a degradation of crews, equipment, and readiness that makes the ship particularly vulnerable. One of the major difficulties reported by units sweeping and hunting for mines in the Gulf war was a continuous and prolonged regime of battle stations.³ Even more important is the effect that the littoral’s special circumstances have on the commanding officer’s decision making. The ship’s lack of reaction time and the opponent’s variety of options dramatically narrow the commanding officer’s practical courses of action. USS *Vincennes* (CG 49), in mistakenly downing an Iranian Airbus over the Strait of Hormuz in July 1988, offers a prime example of this effect. The commanding officer—having too much data with too many ambiguities to evaluate in the little time in which he had to react, and probably having in mind the hit that USS *Stark* had received a year earlier in the same waters and similar circumstances—had no real option but to shoot at the incoming contact.⁴

Yet none of these general characteristics is necessarily new or even unique. Some singular properties aside, most points on the list of the littoral’s difficulties can to a certain extent be attributed to other naval environments as well; and one might argue that the differences are a matter of degree rather than essence. Moreover, most maritime engagements fought since the end of World War II have been fought near to shore. The littoral *is already* where things are happening, and has been for quite a long time now.

Is, there, then, cause for alarm? Has the vulnerability of surface forces deployed in the littoral risen so sharply that the lessons of at least a half-century of operational experience must now be revised? If so, how?

The Maneuverability Problem

Two major factors are at the core of the new realities in the littoral. The first is the dramatic increase in the ranges at which targets can be located—that is, in

the size of search and detection envelopes. A navy's starting point in day-to-day operations is the spatial expanse within which it knows with immediacy, in "real time," the exact state of affairs. That expanse today is larger by an order of magnitude than it was for navies in World War II. The tactical picture available to the German defenses at Normandy, for instance, is an illuminating example; the surprise achieved on D-Day would have been impossible in the presence of a single, and quite simple, modern coastal defense radar, detecting the assembly of the huge landing fleet on the British side of the Channel.

The second factor is the entrance of the guided, or homing, missile into the maritime battlefield. World War II was essentially a gun battle, whether the guns were on the ground, seaborne, or airborne. Torpedoes and bombs, though heavier in explosive capacity, were essentially just slower bullets. The maneuverability in combat of a fleet or single ship, therefore, was a crucial element in every dimension of battle. The right maneuver would deceive enemy aircraft, lead them to miss their targets, or, often, contribute to their being shot down. Submarines were compelled to abandon attacks and run for safety or be chased and trapped by the much faster antisubmarine escorts. On the surface, maneuvering was the key to reducing the enemy's hit probability and enhancing one's own. The entrance of the homing missile totally changed things.

The surface ship is confronted now with a universal "smart" weapon, one that is so much faster and more agile than the ship—at least twenty or thirty times—that it is virtually unaffected by the ship's movements. The missile has practically annulled the surface ship's maneuverability.

Unlike the air battle, in which the aircraft (itself subject to continuous improvement) has until very recently maintained reasonable platform-to-threat speed and maneuverability ratios, the surface ship has remained essentially the same in these respects for the last fifty years. Thus, compare a Mustang or Spitfire of the 1940s to an F-15 or F-16. Then take a Second World War destroyer or frigate and compare its speed and maneuverability to what similar types offer today; they were no worse then, perhaps better. Oddly enough, this remarkable freeze in performance has never been made an issue. Throughout the last half of this century, the underpinning assumption has been that through the synergistic effect of combining several types of ships, with the capabilities of one compensating for the deficiencies of others, a balanced and survivable force could be created. The expanse of the open ocean, in which the main exemplar of this concept, the aircraft carrier battle group, would operate, and the maneuverability of its air assets, would offset the depreciated maneuverability of its surface ships. The battle group could establish surveillance and defensive barriers at great distances; its ships accordingly would have time to establish their tactical plots and calculate responses to possible threats. The ships' loss of maneuverability was

not on the agenda of force planners because it was masked by the idea of "defense in depth."

Even before the focus shifted from the open-ocean battle group to the expeditionary force in the littoral, however, a great deal of that compensating effect had been lost. An array of tactical and theater SSMs and ASMs had created what is in many situations essentially a one-on-one confrontation between the incoming missile and the ship in which no synergism can significantly offset the disadvantage of the latter.

Where missiles are concerned, the contest between the offense and defense is marked by a serious differential in starting points. In practical terms, the offense has a huge and nearly motionless target to hit and needs to hit it only once. One large missile warhead is equivalent to something like five or ten direct hits by a sixteen-inch gun.⁵ The defense, on the other hand, is required to intercept an extremely fast and quite agile flying object, sometimes hardly detectable in the various phases of its trajectory, which can be launched from any operational dimension and often—for design purposes, *every time*—completely by surprise. The defense must deal with a weapon that can perform deceptive terminal maneuvers intended to outmaneuver hard-kill means (those attempting actually to destroy the missile); with a weapon equipped with any, or a combination, of a variety of guidance systems and homing devices designed to outperform a ship's "soft-kill" protective measures (which attempt, actively or passively, to cause the missile to miss); with a weapon that can be launched in salvos on multiple approach paths to saturate countermeasures of whatever kind.

Above all, the defense must constantly perform without error and without defect in an electronic environment so densely charged and a tactical situation so cluttered that they cannot be fully simulated. Uncertainties regarding the actual performance of defensive suites in a full-blown modern engagement are a cause for concern. Even limited experience has established, however, that whereas for the offense a mistake or malfunction means the loss of a missile, for the defense it means at least the disablement, and probably the loss, of a ship.

To be sure, defenses have certainly come a long way since the sinking of *INS Eyalat* in 1967. Only six years later, during the Yom Kippur War, Israeli missile boats were able to survive more than fifty attacks by SS-N-2s without being hit even once. With the subsequent introduction of hard-kill systems—both guns and antimissile missiles—the defense has generated a very impressive set of capabilities. But so has the offense. The new generation of antiship missiles is very far from the primitive SS-N-2 of the 1960s. The Exocet Block II, for instance, is almost immune to current soft-kill means and poses a highly challenging interception and destruction problem.⁶ The Russian SS-N-22 "Muskit" (or "Sunburn," as Nato knows it) is an operational Mach 2-plus sea-skimmer with a quirky (and at present incompletely known) maneuver in

its terminal phase that can probably penetrate any existing defense system, hard or soft-kill, especially when launched in salvos.⁷ Optical guidance and laser beam-riding missiles require a whole new family of defenses for soft kill, which are only now emerging as prototypes, some ten years behind the threat they are designed to counter.

This gap is no accident. The difference in magnitude of the design problems and the fact that the defense is essentially reacting to innovations by the offense mean that the defense has no option but to make do with generic solutions. To produce a tailor-made response to a specific threat, that threat must itself be fully developed and real, and then be thoroughly studied, with all the typical intelligence uncertainties resolved—only *then* can design and testing get underway. Almost by definition, therefore, the defense lags behind. Moreover, as a practical matter, for each upgrade of its systems the defense must refit all affected vessels, whereas the offense has a much simpler task of implementation, sometimes the mere changing of missiles in the canisters. The gap in real life, then, is even larger than in theory. In the littoral the disparity between offense and defense is further amplified, to the great disadvantage of the ship. The constraints upon coastal defense are much less critical in terms of vulnerability than are similar constraints on the surface ship. The defender ashore has more redundancy; he can easily replace, resupply, and reinforce his assets—and his “platform” cannot sink. By contrast, to offset the fundamental imbalance of risk, the ship’s capabilities must be pushed to their uttermost limits.

Take once again the example of the SS-N-22. In a coastal configuration, the missile, cruising at a speed of 720–740 meters per second, covers the distance of, say, fifteen miles to an offshore target in something like forty seconds.⁸ Assuming that the ship is constantly tracked by coastal radar or ESM, targeting—that is, precise locating and aiming—can be done internally, without any emission detectable by the ship’s sensors. The combatant, therefore, if it is to react effectively while the weapon is still a safe distance away, must be ready not only to detect it the instant it is launched but to have every countermeasure operating within the *first thirty seconds*. Setting aside the first five or ten seconds for resolving ambiguity in identification (due mainly to the missile’s sea-skimming flight), the reaction time is reduced to some twenty seconds. Such a defensive posture must be maintained constantly, as long as the ship is within search and weapon range from the coast—and in the littoral, it practically always is.

This state of affairs is reason enough, in my view, for a major reevaluation of the most basic concepts of force structure and ship design, at least as far as the littoral is concerned. The scenario above is an extreme one, yet it is reasonable for a number of likely future theaters, the Middle East and the China seas in particular. It is a level of threat we cannot afford to accept, and should not, even

if ships' defenses had better probabilities of kill than they do. The problem lies in the simple fact that the surface ship is a constant target in the littoral. The surface ships now in commission were designed with the open ocean and distant defensive perimeters in mind; to keep deploying them to a playing field where, under the most optimistic assumptions, their survival requires as a normal operating mode the highest level of *everything, all the time*, is unhealthy and unrealistic in the long run.

Alternative Manœverability

Though the decline in maneuverability as such has hardly been addressed in the naval community, the increase in vulnerability has been too obvious to miss, and quite serious efforts have been made in the last few years to meet it. The major direction of these efforts—apart from improvements to active electronic countermeasures, or ECM, and to the firepower and interception probabilities of hard-kill systems—has been in signature management. The idea is to reduce the vessel's "visibility" to enemy radar, thermal, and noise sensors in order to shorten the range at which they can detect the ship and make it easier for ECM suites to prevent an incoming weapon from locking on. So far, it appears, the results have been both too little and too late. The multitude of homing methods already available—specifically dual-mode guidance and target-verification technology—creates continual tradeoffs and contradictions for the defense that make matters, in both design and practice, highly problematic.

For instance, against radars, "stealthy" design conflicts with sensor and weapon system installation; that is, the very existence of antennas and topside launchers makes the vessel, however stealthy otherwise, more detectable.⁹ The ship's own sensors, needed for its defense, are also the largest contributors to its radar cross-section (RCS). Thus the costly and difficult reduction of the ship's RCS is practically annulled by the use of radars to detect and track an incoming missile—at the very moment when that reduction is needed the most.

The same is true for thermal signature reduction, where a great deal is lost when the first barrage of chaff is fired and the canisters on the deck and superstructure become hot. As a matter of fact, any thermal-signature reduction will be worthless when the guns or missiles are used, and that, in the littoral, is common. USS *Vincennes* was chasing and shooting at Iranian fast attack boats just before the ill fated airliner appeared on its radars. Suppose the contact had actually been what the cruiser thought it was, or worse, an Iranian ASM? The ship would have had to counter it with no hope of lowering its thermal profile.

Dual-mode guidance, for example, is specifically designed to take advantage of such conflicts, capitalizing upon the defense's efforts to deal with one prong of its dilemma at the expense of the other. A salvo of two or more missiles with

different homing systems creates in essence the same effect. Combinations of active and passive radar seekers, infrared (IR) and IR imaging, and antiradiation and optical guidance are in various phases of development around the world, and the multi-type salvo was in the Soviet missile doctrine for decades.¹⁰

The advantage the offense has here is a substantial one. The measures the ship takes to counter one type of threat are used by the missile's secondary guidance system as homing inputs. Thus in every phase of the encounter the ship is exposed to at least one type of guidance or homing device, and in most practical cases in which something other than active radar is involved the crew will operate under significant uncertainty as to what type of homing it faces or will face. Finally, even if these design conflicts are resolved for the defense, the probability of visibility in daylight at close ranges in the littoral will remain. Optical guidance and laser beam-riding can be used by day, and at night there is IR imaging.

It is no wonder, therefore, that more and more resources are being put into the hard-kill approach, into designing guns and missiles to shoot down incoming missiles. The weapons of this type already in use, such as the Sea Sparrow missile, the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM), and the Goalkeeper close-in gun system, are outstanding achievements of research and development, but because of the fundamental disparities involved, anything the defense can do the offense can do better. The technology for high-velocity interceptors, for instance, is already employed by the *offense*—it is in use today in the SS-N-22 and is being applied to the French-German ANS supersonic surface-to-surface missile now under development. The same can be said of “stealthy” design; “low-observable” threats will require yet another major upgrade for the hard-kill side, and it is an open question whether any nation will be able to afford the costs involved.

Signature management does have its benefits for short-term and specifically defined missions that require surprise and are aimed to create local advantage. A great deal of signature management's effectiveness, however, will be lost in long-term, routine presence in confined waters. By contrast, a coastal defender employing modern systems has all the time he needs to wear out the offshore targets, let them make mistakes, use up their limited magazine capacity, and make themselves more and more vulnerable. A ship's signature makes little difference to him.

If signature management does not take us far enough, what else is left to rebalance the situation in the littoral? We could certainly consider the costly and protracted process of developing a new generation of defensive suites. But this equipment would be installed on decks and masts that are already crammed, and as we have seen, it is likely to be out of date on arrival. Given the fundamental offensive advantage in this contest, the best we can expect is to freeze the current situation, hardly to achieve a substantial improvement. Again, and with the existing fleet, we can *outsmart* the coast in the short run, capitalizing on the

deficiencies of specific coastal defense systems. We can use massive ECM to neutralize their search and detection capabilities, for example, or sometimes simply destroy them altogether—and so on. But these are isolated cases; they might become rarer, and violently “outsmarting” them will not be so simple in the future. Political constraints and the proliferation of sophisticated weapon systems and technologies can combine to create situations in which such options might not be available. For low-intensity conflict an immediate clash is certainly not the rule; that environment requires a broad and flexible palette of means, some of which are less bold and nonprovocative, others clearly forceful enough to project power. One can certainly carry a big stick with today’s surface ships; it is hard to walk softly, harder still to walk safely.

It appears, therefore, that not much can be done to change this state of affairs fundamentally unless we are willing to consider bold conceptual steps to regain maneuverability in the littoral. We must start to focus upon how we can adjust the surface fleet to these specific circumstances. Thinking in terms of the 2000s, the current exposure of surface forces must be addressed from much broader perspectives than it has been. These perspectives, however, require us to question one of the most basic tenets of naval philosophy in this century—the division between surface and subsurface.

Bidimensional Maneuverability

Submarines are essentially immune to most of the threats that surface ships face, in particular to current SSMs and ASMs. It is interesting how different the evolution of the submerged platform has been from the direction taken on the surface. Two elementary differences are very illuminating:

- Submarine design has focused primarily on optimizing the hull to increase speed, the essential part of maneuverability in the general sense. Indeed, since World War II, performance in these respects has advanced remarkably in the case of nuclear propulsion, and conventional boats have also improved dramatically. While the surface fleet, at least for littoral operations, has lost entirely its effective maneuverability and has been forced to rely solely on firepower and electronic warfare to survive, submarines have developed their maneuverability to the ultimate level, counting on it—quietness being another component of their maneuverability—almost exclusively.

- While the surface fleet has become, and has accepted being, a constant target, submarines have allowed themselves to be targets hardly at all, and ever more rarely. Surface warfare has become an extreme case of dependence upon firepower, electronic countermeasures, and split-second reaction. The submersible, on the contrary, has developed into an untraceable platform that uses its

weapons sparingly, reserving them for either the tactically or strategically optimal moment of kill, dropping back into silence immediately thereafter.

If what the surface fleet has become is an inevitable result of entry into the missile age, for the subsurface side it has been much more a matter of choice and philosophy. Modern trends in submarine development were first and foremost the creation of the Cold War, its bipolar geopolitical structure and its unique strategic circumstances. Submarines have been designed having in mind on one hand the strategic balance of mutual destruction, and on the other their ability to avoid and outmaneuver surface and airborne antisubmarine, or ASW, forces. Refraining from using firepower to confront the adversary's ASW assets—allowing him the option of a practically unhindered hunt—was essentially a choice based on that philosophy. Now that fundamental elements and assumptions of these Cold War realities are no longer relevant, however, anomalies are beginning to show up.

For example, it is considered perfectly ordinary for a P-3 maritime patrol aircraft, or a small ASW helicopter, to drive more than a billion dollars' worth of war machine into hiding, deep down, for hours. Looked at from a viewpoint innocent of the circularities of the Cold War's strategic sophistication, this is a striking absurdity. Even more astonishing is the complete difference in scales of risk and of operational standards that the two dimensions of naval warfare have come to accept. On the surface in the littoral, certainty that we are visible to the enemy is an unquestioned and inherent property of everyday operational reality; by submarine standards, the mere *possibility* of having been detected calls for immediate emergency procedures. For a surface ship, being detected means, in the worst case, the opening of a fight; for the submarine, it is an imperative to break off contact and hide.

These conventions, which are remnants from farther back than the Cold War, in fact from World War II, are so deeply rooted in our conceptual framework that we never stop to think about how valid they still are. Desert Storm was the first instance of submarine firepower being used against the land as an integral part of a campaign; all was done, however, as if the whole former Soviet ASW fleet were hovering above. Why cannot a platform that is in essence a submerged missile launcher—tactical, theater, or strategic—be fitted with additional anti-aircraft means and play a more active role on the congested surface of the littoral? The farther we get from World War II and the Cold War conventions, and the closer the littoral realities become, this question gains more and more relevance.

On one hand there is the surface fleet, pushing itself to the limit in confronting a level of threat that renders nugatory the very notion of calculated response. Commanding officers who operate under constraints of reaction time and vulnerability that force total dependence upon automation find that their control over their ships' reactions is diminished and that they are continually uncertain

of the quality and adequacy of its defensive performance. Such a state of affairs essentially forces them to make the convulsive and hysterical the norm. Captain Will Rogers of the *Vincennes* and his innocent victims could have been luckier, perhaps, but he had an impossible decision to make. Overloaded with data he had no time to check, and lacking the option of maneuver-and-see, he did what the captains of HMS *Sheffield* (in the Falklands-Malvinas War) and USS *Stark* should have done—and “when in doubt, push all the buttons” was the only valid lesson one could draw from their tragedies. Indeed, what other choices are there for a surface ship in the littoral?¹¹

On the other hand, submarines' inherent qualities make them essentially unaffected by the above constraints. Save for depth limitations, they can operate there remarkably more safely than surface ships can—and right here lies the focal point of the opportunity.

By simply making a *choice* to design submarines to confront ASW with firepower rather than improving their capability to hide from it, we can gain a whole new range of options for the littoral. Once this design choice is made, water depth, for example, is no longer a limitation—this new submerged ship has no particular need for it. On the contrary, its optimal operating niche is just below the surface, with sensors just above it and weapon systems ready to engage ASW patrols, air or seaborne. In this position, nearly hidden by the coastal radar's sea-clutter, it has the best signature management a surface combatant can ever hope to get. Too small in RCS for most missiles' seeker to lock onto, it also enjoys in effect the best ECM possible. In fact, with the option to dive once an incoming missile is detected, the submersible is, in general, indifferent to the current missile threat altogether. Submarines, confined until Desert Storm to minelaying, reconnaissance, and other “World War III” missions, have a tremendous potential for the littoral—once this mental change is made—and could make a major difference there. Used *bidimensionally*, their unique maneuverability can reduce their exposure dramatically while they maintain a constant, effective presence offshore, thus bringing the risk imbalance back to a workable equilibrium.

Bidimensional maneuverability looks like the most fertile and promising direction for closing the gap in this crucial arena. (It also has a great potential for the high seas, but that is a matter beyond the scope of this discussion.) It is possible, without too much difficulty, to merge relevant portions of the firepower of the surface ship with the excellent maneuverability of the submersible to produce a new breed of fighting ships designed for the next century. For some large navies, bidimensional maneuverability would be an avenue for reviving an extremely costly asset that is looking for a post-Cold War mission; for others, it reopens operational options that have ceased to be relevant due to the current state of vulnerability in the littoral. If indeed we are heading toward

a century in which the littoral is the primary playing field, few arguments for the current total split between surface and subsurface remain valid. As I hope the foregoing shows, there are quite a few good ones to be made to the contrary.

A Note on Airpower

One key factor of the littoral equation has been kept in the background of this discussion, and that is the role of naval airpower. Command of the high seas has been based, at least since World War II, on seaborne airpower. The aircraft carrier battle group, or CVBG, is surely the ultimate form of maritime might. It dominates the operational environment, and it is the conceptual basis for force-structure and ship-design assumptions—assumptions that affect every navy in the world, including those that have no carriers. However, the CVBG has never been tested against a modern, thoroughly professional, coastal defense system. None of the instances, including Desert Storm, in which this floating airfield with its powerful escort has been put into action since World War II give us a real appreciation of its ability to fight in the littoral. How would a combination of, say, SS-N-22 SSMs and SA-10 antiaircraft batteries on the defender's perimeter affect the carrier's performance? That specific instance might become the actual case, in fact, on the Iranian side of the Persian Gulf in the not too distant future; a determined defender there with such armament would be able to track and intercept air and surface targets within a span of more than a hundred kilometers, thereby simultaneously affecting both the carrier and its aircraft. What might be the cost of defeating such a system?

We are beginning now to face the results of the huge research and development effort first generated in the 1980s, on both sides of the bipolar world, by concepts associated with the Strategic Defense Initiative. SDI's last phase focused intensely upon the concrete problem of intercepting Scud-like ballistic weapons and cruise missiles. A product of that effort, for use against targets either in space or within the atmosphere, was the hypervelocity interceptor; with its introduction the manned aircraft faces, perhaps for the first time, a problem similar to that of the surface combatant operating close offshore. That is, it loses, in practical terms, its maneuverability. The effectiveness of the CVBG in the littoral might be an early victim of this development—which might, in fact, see the effectiveness of manned air platforms, as a whole, significantly reduced.

With such question marks, it is necessary for the planner to treat the surface problem in isolation. The range of uncertainty in planning for the 2000s requires a clear vision of how things stand with each and every element of the equation, alone, before we get to the business of putting them all together.

To Regain Maneuverability

An important fact to keep in mind about sea power generally is that it has not been truly tested since World War II. We have for evidence the few clashes of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War and of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, both of which essentially involved random missile boat engagements without substantial use of airpower. We have a few instances of maritime aviation in action on a wide range of intensity levels: Vietnam, the Falklands, individual raids on Libya and Lebanon, and the massive coalition operations of Desert Storm. There are quite a number of assault landings, from Korea on, and there are a number of single actions (some of them in the campaigns mentioned) that can stand alone. However, we do not have, to serve as a test case, a single instance of a large-scale maritime battle fought between substantial adversaries employing a full range of modern means. For the surface world, the paradigm is still the historic battles of the forties in the Atlantic and Pacific.

There exists, then, the quite peculiar situation in which nothing can be properly substantiated—neither commonsense-based adherence to the experience and convictions of sea power that we have long had, nor the intuitive feeling that the cumulative change is now of such magnitude that a radical rethinking of these convictions is of crucial importance. Yet the latter is a matter of more than intuition, at least in one sense—we are entering the next century, and also a dramatic transition from the open ocean to the shallow seas, with a severe lack of relevant experience. Too often in military history, at such moments of uncertainty old principles have hardened into beliefs that have been, among other things, the grounds for rejecting new, more adequate ones.¹² We have no option but to rely on an analytical process that subjects every conviction of the past, including the most fundamental ones, to unconditional examination.

The white paper “. . . From the Sea” marks a turning point in a century of world wars—a historic shift from the one-global-conflict model to that of two or more small-scale ones, and from the high seas to the littoral. It would be a mistake to assume that global conflict is no longer a valid scenario; the twenty-first century could be just as problematic in that sense as the present one has been. The capacity to gain control of the open ocean and the choke-points on its periphery is certain to remain a prerequisite of naval strategy.¹³ It would be just as erroneous, however, to ignore the disturbing signs of inadequacy, as regards the littoral arena, in present ship-design philosophy. We have a fundamental problem in the balance of maneuverability and firepower: submarines that use only a small portion of their capability, and surface combatants that operate like the town sheriff of the nineteenth-century American West, walking the street and ignoring the riflemen on the roofs.

We must regain maneuverability if we are to be able to dodge the incoming missile instead of having to destroy or deflect it. We have to cease being a constant target, in order to regain control over the man-machine relationship in threat evaluation and response; we cannot allow to continue the present state of affairs, in which commanding officers must either expose their ships to a fatal hit or shoot at every unidentified contact. With so many new threats in the littoral, it is an open question whether even that gives sufficient protection.

A merger of surface and subsurface capabilities in a bidimensional fighting vessel has the potential to meet these requirements. It can combine the effective properties of each, while losing mostly those which the end of the Cold War and the transition to the littoral have rendered excess. For example, diving depth and silent operation could be traded for more firepower. There is no question of doing away with existing forces, certainly not in the short run. Bidimensionality does, however, imply the beginning of a new planning phase.

We must realize that dividing between surface and subsurface is, after all, a very costly *double* investment. In the littoral, it is also losing its operational rationale; in the Gulf war, for instance, the mission profile of submarines was essentially identical to that of the surface fleet, the carriers aside. This trend can and should be pushed farther, optimizing in favor of firepower options on the surface and trading off some of the more exotic capabilities of the subsurface.

There are no perfect solutions in our trade, but some are better than others. The basic concept of bidimensional maneuverability, with its commonsense rearrangement of existing capabilities in a new package, is in my view among the better and more promising ones. It opens a real avenue for development but is responsive and adaptable to the new realities of the littoral. In any case, we will probably have to make do with less in the 2000s. The next generation of ships is certain to be extremely expensive, whatever direction ship design takes. To continue risking them in an environment in which they do not belong will be even more problematic, politically and militarily, than it already is. Bidimensional maneuverability might be not only the preferable solution for the littoral, but the only one.

Notes

1. U.S. Navy Dept., "... From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century," Navy and Marine Corps White Paper (Washington: September 1992), esp. pp. 1-5.

2. The American warships USS *Tripoli* (LPH 10) and USS *Princeton* (CG 59) were each removed as fighting units for the entire Persian Gulf War by one mine. Just how much the random Iraqi mining affected the decision about landing from the sea on the northern flank of the coalition forces is still somewhat a matter of speculation—but it certainly did not help.

3. Captain (now Rear Admiral) Pieter C. Kok, commander of the group that the Royal Netherlands Navy deployed to Desert Storm, discussing lessons of the war in conversation with the author.

4. However, see John Barry and Roger Charles, "Sea of Lies," *Newsweek*, 13 July 1992, pp. 29-39.

5. This figure is based upon a rough estimate of the differences in warhead payloads. The sixteen-inch gun's armor-piercing round carries 18 kg of high explosive, while high-capacity ammunition has some 70 kg. Large Soviet-designed missile payloads begin at 500 kg (for the SS-N-2) and go up to some 1,000 kg (in the SS-N-19 Shipwreck). The SS-N-22 has 340 kg. Even Western missiles carrying payloads in the 200-kg range but employing delayed fusing are considered to double or even treble their effect by exploding inside the ship's hull.

6. The Block II family (the AM-39 and the MM-40 SSM) is reportedly equipped with a digital processing capability immune to current active electronic countermeasures. It offers a reduced radar cross-section during mid-course flight and a sea-skimming terminal phase, adaptable to sea state. Its sophisticated trajectory capabilities include "angular evasions" to deceive medium-range surface-to-air missiles and terminal agility against close-in weapon systems. It also provides a variety of salvo combinations for saturation attack.

7. The SS-N-22 has a range of 100 to 120 kilometers and a sophisticated guidance system. It is operational in a surface-launched version and has been shown in an air-launched version as well.

8. So far the only indications of the existence of such a configuration are brochures with artist's conceptions of the system. In light of 1993 Russian tests of the ASM variant, however, and the rather small modification required to produce a land-based version, we can safely treat a coastal SS-N-22 as a valid option for this analysis. See *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 22 August 1992, and *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 24 August 1992, p. 64.

9. For a more detailed discussion of the design issues, see John W. McGillvray (Captain, USN), "Stealth Technology in Surface Warships," *Naval War College Review*, Winter 1994, esp. pp. 30-6.


10. Open-source references are scarce. The RAM is the first for which a true dual-mode design has been acknowledged; an upgrade has already been announced. See *Naval Forces*, no. 4, 1994, pp. 48-54. The AGM-119 Penguin Mark 4 and the Otomat 2 programs are also believed to be dual-mode weapons; see *Forecast International/DMS Market Intelligence Report* (Conn.: 1991), Tab E, s.v. "AGM-119," p. 3, and "Otomat," p. 5. The AGM-84 Harpoon home-on-jam option and the SS-N-22's active-passive guidance are designed to achieve essentially the same effect.

11. See Barry and Charles.

12. For examples see Sir John Winthrop Hackett, "Society and the Soldier, 1914-1918," Malham M. Wakin, ed., *War, Morality, and the Military Profession* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 86-8.

13. For the views on this subject of the drafters of "... From the Sea," see Edward A. Smith (Captain, USN), "What '... From The Sea' Didn't Say," *Naval War College Review*, Winter 1995.

Ψ



Naval Perspectives on Military Doctrine

James J. Tritten

IN ITS FULLY ELABORATED FORM, doctrine is somewhat new for the U.S. Navy, and naval officers have a good deal of catching up to do. It is not new for some other services (to say nothing of other nations), however, and in the near future formally promulgated doctrine will constitute the fundamental guidance and direction for the American armed forces as a whole. Right now, at the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, overarching—"keystone" and "capstone"—doctrinal publications are being prepared, and their organizing, rationalizing effect will rapidly be felt through all the services. Very soon, approved military doctrine—of various kinds and at various levels, but all of it consistent in content and compatible in form—will constitute a basic tool and standard for every military—and every naval—officer. Unless naval officers understand doctrine, they will find themselves unable to lead effectively or even understand operations, whether naval, joint, or multinational. It is time for all of us to become comfortable with doctrine.

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The purposes of this article, then, are primarily to explore military doctrine, review its definitions, and set specifically *naval* doctrine in context. The discussion will consider the influences upon doctrine, and what it in turn influences; it will exclude, for clarity, certain matters from the doctrinal rubric; and, after addressing the question of standardization, will conclude by examining the imminent use of doctrine by the Navy and Marine Corps. These purposes are important for a naval audience (largely unfamiliar with the term and unsure of its implications) and for writers of other categories of military doctrine, and they should assist both groups to understand how the U.S. naval services will operate in the future.

From an organizational perspective, doctrine comprises those shared beliefs and principles that define the work of a profession.¹ It is the codification of what the members of a profession believe and practice in the normal course of their functions. The military profession, like others, has always had doctrine to define how its job is to be done. Unlike that of some professions, however, military doctrine does not have a common element unifying the armed forces of all nations and all the military services of each. As regards form, the doctrine of some armed forces has been written and centralized, and of others it has been informal, traditional, and diffuse. Doctrine in the military profession, then, is an extremely complex concept.

Properly developed doctrine strengthens the professional aspects of the military calling but does not diminish the freedom of judgment and individual initiative that commanders and others must exercise in battle. While we must be specific as to types of military doctrine and the levels of warfare to which it applies, there are two essential elements common to all its forms: how the military profession thinks about warfare, and how it acts. Without each element, doctrine would be incomplete. A doctrine reflecting only thought about war would be merely the unfulfilled wishes of the leadership; doctrine that is simply the codification of behavior is ultimately random, and therefore useless.

Types of American Military Doctrine

In the U.S. military, doctrine has been deliberately made a province of the uniformed services rather than of the civilian leadership (specifically the Secretary of Defense). In 1992 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered issuing a document to be entitled *Basic National Defense Doctrine*, Joint Publication 0-1; it would have defined doctrine as "an accepted body of professional knowledge."² The Joint Chiefs of Staff do provide, as the official basis for definition of doctrine, the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02.³ This authoritative publication defines

doctrine as “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”⁴ This language is consistent with that used by the U.S. Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy.⁵

The definition implies that doctrine applies at every level of warfare, from the tactical and the operational to the strategic. Hence—although at the tactical level it may have a purely military perspective—military doctrine can interact with policy. As warfare issues exceed that of the immediate battle area and become important to an entire campaign or war, it becomes difficult to separate the “purely” military aspects. In addition to the level of warfare being discussed, doctrine also can be considered with regard to the activity to which it pertains. Let us examine these aspects, with reference to four kinds of forces.

Joint Doctrine. Joint Publication 1-02 offers, in addition to the general definition of doctrine, another specifically for joint doctrine: “fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, services, and Joint Staff.” That is, just as nothing becomes Marine Corps doctrine until it is promulgated by the Commandant, no proposal is joint doctrine until it is issued by the Chairman. Further, and according to a different Joint Staff publication, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces*, “Joint doctrine deals with the fundamental issues of how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends. . . . Joint doctrine offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate, and fundamentally shapes the way we think about and train for war.”⁶ There is, then, a hierarchy. Joint doctrine applies only to that level of warfare—generally the strategic or operational—which can achieve strategic ends; by implication, the tactical level remains the province of the individual services.

Multiservice Doctrine. To allow military services to cooperate outside the direct purview of the Chairman, the Joint Staff, and the unified commanders in chief, provision has been made for multiservice doctrine: “fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It is ratified by two or more services, and is promulgated in multiservice publications that identify the participating services, e.g., Army-Navy doctrine.” Multiservice doctrine is primarily designed for the operational and strategic levels of warfare; an example is the Air-Land Battle concept. Institutionally, in 1975 the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Air Force Tactical Air Command (TAC) founded the Air-Land Forces Applications Agency (ALFA), which expanded into the current Air-Land-Sea Application (ALSA) Center.⁷ Another agency for multiservice doctrinal is

the Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC), the Army and Air Force focal point for certain categories of military operations other than war.⁸

The present tendency is for this kind of doctrine, which dates largely from before the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, to be subsumed by joint concepts; it is possible that such organizations will be absorbed by the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC). There are, however, counterarguments on that point.⁹ The joint and multiservice categories can coexist and benefit from each other. Certainly the Navy, a service still new to the formal development of doctrine, might well find the process more congenial in the familiar context of the Navy-Marine Corps team than it might otherwise.

With the formation of the Naval Doctrine Command (NDC), the Navy now has, for the first time, a single agency responsible for the publication of doctrine for the fleet and fleet Marine forces. Interestingly, NDC is a multiservice command, and a significant part of its product is multiservice doctrine. Its Naval Doctrine Publications, in fact, bear the signatures of both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Service Doctrine. There are many documents that promulgate doctrine for service-specific tasks and missions. If only by default, the individual services have primary responsibility for tactical doctrine, but the dividing lines can be somewhat blurred. For example, the commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command generates tactical-level doctrine for his forces; also, the Atlantic Command is developing tactical concepts for joint task forces. Conversely, services, as they attempt to fulfill their roles in training and equipping forces, naturally extend their influence into the operational and even strategic realms; accordingly, service doctrine must be recognized in the preparation of joint doctrine.

Combined Doctrine. Besides its multiservice dimension, doctrine is also needed for multinational operations—bilateral, regional, global, ad hoc, alliance, etc. Multinational doctrine, in fact, is long established. During the Cold War, campaigns in and around Europe would have been conducted primarily under Nato, rather than national, doctrine. Today, the importance of multinational operations is reflected in the separate chapter devoted to the subject in U.S. Joint Publication 3-0.¹⁰ Combined doctrine comprises “fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more nations in coordinated action toward a common objective. It is ratified by participating nations.” The emphasis here is on formal promulgation by the participating nations. On the other hand, combined doctrine is but one type of multinational doctrine, although it is the most common, and it is associated with entities other than Nato. Indeed, combined doctrine exists for multinational defense arrangements outside of the Nato umbrella, such as with South Korea.

Nato doctrine is especially significant in that within the alliance arena its doctrine is binding; national forces operating under alliance command operate under that

command's, rather than national, doctrine. The United States largely assumes, in fact, that in warfare in and around Europe, U.S. forces will be part of a Nato rather than a national command structure. Where the alliance lacks doctrine for a specific task, a national approach is used until combined doctrine is promulgated.

Military doctrine also exists or is being planned for use in ad hoc multinational contexts. Nato material is being applied outside of the Nato area and by command structures not having doctrine of their own; the most prominent example, of course, is the United Nations. It is also the case for the operations of the Western European Union (WEU) in the Adriatic, with the WEU coming to recognize the need for its own peacekeeping doctrine.¹¹

Multinational doctrine, in its many possible forms, has an extremely important role to play for the American armed forces. As U.S. forces respond to crises under the auspices of an international organization, alliance, or ad hoc coalition, they will need some form of multinational doctrine to guide naval and military actions. In the absence of formal multinational doctrine, it is entirely permissible to substitute some form of national military doctrine, including U.S. joint doctrine, as a temporary surrogate.

Functional Doctrine. In addition to categorization by the kinds of forces involved, doctrine has been officially prescribed for specific types of activities. For example, both the U.S. and Nato recognize tactical air doctrine: "fundamental principles designed to provide guidance for the employment of air power in tactical air operations to attain established objectives." Although omitted from Joint Publication 1-02, functional doctrine exists in written form for basic warfare disciplines (e.g., amphibious, air, and space) as well as supporting functions (medical, logistics, intelligence, etc.). This body of doctrine, however, is gradually being replaced by joint documents, so that what now remains should be seen as amplification of the joint formulation.

Within each service, individual combat arms have their own individual doctrine, e.g., submarines. Combined arms doctrine integrates the different combat arms within a single service, e.g., the air, surface, and subsurface elements of antisubmarine warfare. The Navy is making NDC the coordinator for such matters, while the Marine Corps has a separate doctrine division in the Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

What Influences Military Doctrine?

Concepts applicable to military doctrine can come from policy, available resources, strategy and campaigns, preexisting doctrine, threats, and such other influences as historical lessons, strategic culture, technology, geography and demographics, and government.

Policy. National policy at any one time derives (at least in theory) from overarching national goals and objectives, and it in turn affects military doctrine. Yet it does so in complicated ways. For example, the 1992 *National Military Strategy of the United States*, not having been superseded, may appear to constitute the standing policy that underlies military doctrine.¹² This document, however, was issued by the previous administration; subsequent publications (such as the October 1993 *Report of the Bottom-Up Review*, the 1994 *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, and the July 1994 *National Security Strategy of the United States*) establish that much of that seeming "standing policy" is no longer in effect. Other published policies, however well thought out (as, for example, some consider the Weinberger Doctrine to have been), may represent the views of only one administration or its secretary of defense.¹³ In the absence of promulgated official national policy, officers who devise doctrine must search for guidance among the hints and clues in the public and private comments of senior government figures.

Similarly, the policies influencing a military's doctrine may be those of other nations; services need also to be alert to international sources. For instance, U.S. armed forces operating in a multinational environment need policy guidance from the international organization, alliance, or ad hoc coalition under whose rubric they act. The war-termination phase of Operation Desert Storm provides ample illustration.

Resource Restraints. Further complicating the policy input to military doctrine is the relationship of policy to planning of future forces. Many policy publications are issued in a programming context; writers of doctrine must separate the programmatic (and thus future-oriented) aspects of such papers from those applicable to present-day doctrine. For example, in the February 1984 *Annual Report* the secretary of defense was much concerned with providing for the defense of the United States by space-based systems;¹⁴ no doctrine was in effect, however, for these weapons did not exist. To the contrary, the defense of the United States was governed by doctrine that was in itself primarily offensive.

Nonetheless, it is sometimes necessary and proper to develop doctrine for weapons for which resources are unavailable at the time. For example, although the U.S. Army no longer has tactical nuclear weapons in its operational inventory, as long as such weapons exist in the arsenals of any nation the Army must maintain a doctrine for fighting on a nuclear battlefield—albeit perhaps with a priority significantly less than that of the effort associated with current planning and anticipated campaigns.

Strategy. Strategic and campaign concepts should certainly have a major influence on military doctrine. One of the clearest examples is the development of amphibious warfare in the 1920s and 1930s, when the Joint (i.e., Army-Navy) Board was exploring contingency plans for the relief of the Philippines.¹⁵ The

Navy's General Board suggested that as part of such plans the Marine Corps could be assigned to seize unoccupied islands, so as to support the forward movement of the fleet. Major Earl H. Ellis, USMC, went further, developing a concept for seizing occupied islands as well. This concept was approved by General John A. Lejeune, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and over the next thirteen years it was integrated into war plans. Eventually, conducting opposed landings became an element of force structure programming.

The U.S. military today faces large-scale doctrinal changes, necessitated by a host of new (and newly important) tasks, many to be performed through existing or ad hoc coalitions. Accordingly, there is particular need for strategic and campaign input and for the full benefit of exercises, games, and simulations. On the other hand, current strategies tend to reflect programming concerns in a way that may actually preclude doctrinal development. For example, current national policy virtually discounts the possibility of a new, or resurgent, global threat, and accordingly any need for reconstitution and global warfare strategies previously advanced.¹⁶ It could be argued, however, especially in view of the high stakes involved, that the very absence of programming for such capabilities makes it incumbent on the military to continue to develop doctrine for them.

As doctrinal development matures, existing campaign concepts should have less impact on new doctrine. In a perfect world, strategy would guide military doctrine, which in turn would drive campaign planning. For the time being, though, in view of the need to produce whole bodies of new doctrine, it is likely that existing campaign concepts will be a major resource.¹⁷

Existing Doctrine. Another component of doctrinal development is current doctrine itself. In writing its first systematic, service-wide doctrine, the Navy benefited from the existing doctrine of the U.S. Marine Corps. Also, certain naval forces exist principally to support Marine Air Ground Task Forces; just as the Navy is likely to take particular account of Army doctrine (inasmuch as it has been a major influence in joint and combined doctrine, which, presumably, will be reflected in naval doctrine), the Navy's doctrine involving another service draws on, and strives to be compatible with, that service's existing doctrine. Correspondingly, joint and combined doctrine having a maritime character will obviously impinge on Navy doctrine. Where service practice conforms to joint and combined doctrine, we should expect to see identical service doctrine—where, indeed, there is any need for a service-specific or multiservice doctrine at all. If one service possesses doctrine in a functional area that meets the needs of another service, the latter ought to adopt it *en toto*, sponsor it as multiservice doctrine, or at least borrow heavily from it. An example is the Army's chemical warfare doctrine, which has generally been recognized by the other services.

For the U.S. Navy, new doctrine is naturally much affected by the informal doctrine that, by and large, preceded it.¹⁸ When Navy ships form into battle

groups and forces, they inherit customary (and frequently written, though not centralized) doctrine upon which their tactics, techniques, and procedures are based. Indeed, the very assembling of ships into such groups and forces is a matter of existing naval doctrine.

Threats. Threats tend to drive force programming, strategy, and campaign planning, but today the threat has become more difficult to visualize than in the Cold War, when the military focused on operations against the Soviet Union and considered others "lesser included cases." One result was little interest in developing doctrine for limited war and military operations other than war. Today the focus has shifted to precisely those areas, with the ironic upshot that it has become difficult to write doctrine for general war. Also, the United States has now to address simultaneously a number of different threats and types of threat—there may be no single military doctrine valid for all of them. Hence, while some doctrinal interest in general war would seem advisable, the recognition of possible threats that are both more numerous and lower in the spectrum of conflict than the American armed forces have been accustomed to deal with can be expected to lead to a substantial upsurge, perhaps a renaissance, of doctrine.

Other Influences. A major factor in any sound, carefully thought-through presentation of doctrine must be a considerable input from history. Since most of the new tasks the Navy will be asked to perform will be executed in a multinational and joint context, lessons must be drawn from outside the individual service perspective. Such lessons can come only from the historical experience of actual combat and operations other than war, from major exercises, and from simulations and games (the last two constituting the "history" of wars and campaigns not yet fought).¹⁹ Moreover, the historical record allows lessons to be learned from all nations and all times.²⁰ In addition, distillations or abstractions of military history (e.g., the principles of war) are a major input into doctrine. The insights and discoveries of scholars, analysts, and practitioners when they study history need to be reviewed continually to ensure that better understandings of past events are incorporated into planning for tomorrow's operations.²¹

Sometimes limiting military doctrine, but always influencing it, is the strategic culture of a nation and a military service. Nations and services develop specific styles; the discipline of operations research has long recognized these differences and often assigns in its calculations weightings to account for them.²² An example is a nation that in military terms has generally been ranked highly, Israel. That nation's doctrine emphasizes the offensive, which might prove disastrous for another nation of similar size; but Israel's strategic culture and military traditions have allowed such a doctrine to work well in most cases. Contrarily, Switzerland's military doctrine is an excellent model for states that must defend

themselves on their own soil and whose only strategic capability is defensive. Among U.S. services, the past employment (and accordingly the traditions) of the U.S. Marine Corps makes it amenable to tasks that are atypical of many "naval infantries."

Another influence upon military doctrine is current technology; immediate intentions must remain firmly rooted in present capabilities. For instance, the advent of modern aircraft with extremely accurate delivery systems has removed the need of doctrine for massed bomber formations attacking city-size targets; in fact, a better resource for future bomber doctrine than its own history might be that of submarines searching for high-value, defended targets. On the other hand, a related and equally important source for military doctrine is the area of future weapons, because doctrine can be arranged to capitalize on breakthroughs and it can be used to focus scientific efforts on anticipated requirements. One approach—a discovery-based system—is for industry and the research community to offer technological opportunities to the military, which then considers doctrine for their employment. The military thereby reaps the benefit of visionary thinking (although it also subjects itself to intense and conflicting advocacy as it attempts to identify those few proposals that might be fruitful). The other approach is to begin by conceiving doctrine for modes of warfare the nation would like to be capable of undertaking and then refining specific requirements for which innovations would be sought—a concept-based system. The risk here is that innate bureaucratic conservatism—the difficulty many organizations (including military services) have in conceiving radical alternatives—might result in missed opportunities. In reality, of course, both approaches have been used, and doctrine has been pulled along by, as it has also pushed, revolutionary technological advances.

Underlying most apparent influences upon doctrine, and therefore themselves not to be overlooked, are geography, demographics, and government. The classic historical example is Great Britain, whose insular location preordained the importance for it of sea power. Another is Russia, for which not only the extent of its borders but the distribution of its population have mandated a point-defense approach to air defense. Also, cultural and educational traditions have made some populations more amenable to high-technology solutions than others. Finally, the type of a nation's government—more specifically, the nature of its polity—influences its military doctrine. Whether or not, as is widely argued, democracies as such are disinclined to go to war, it is demonstrable that their publics are reluctant—certainly the U.S. public is—to countenance the possibility of lengthy military involvement and the loss of lives. The militaries of democratic states must respond with doctrine that minimizes such risks. (On the other hand, prudence suggests preparation of doctrine for operations that do

extend beyond the originally envisioned period and that result in more than the predicted casualties.)

In summary, the major sources of and influences on military doctrine are topical in nature rather than enduring: current policy, resources, strategy, campaign concepts, existing doctrine, threats, and technologies. There are topical factors that should *not* influence doctrine: such things as repudiated policies (e.g., of a former government), resources that can never be expected to become available, strategies and concepts deemed outdated, former threats, and obsolete technology. There are, however, doctrinal lessons to be learned from history and the factors of strategic culture, geography, demographics, and government. Inputs to doctrine from these sources are much less volatile than those of the topical influences, though they do change. The importance of geographic factors is reconsidered, demographic trends alter, history is revisited, new lessons are learned, and strategic cultures of a nation or service are changed by reorganization or re-equipment. Also, as much as Americans take for granted their type of government, some other nations cannot do so.

What Does Military Doctrine Influence?

Simply put, military doctrine affects how one fights, trains, exercises, and plans, and it organizes what one buys. Military doctrine influences some of the higher-level concepts driving doctrine itself, and it affects a number of subordinate concepts as well. Among them are tactics, techniques, procedures, rules of engagement, training and education, organization and force structure, analysis, programming, campaign planning, strategy, and policy. Of these concepts, doctrine has a particular impact upon three: tactics, techniques, and procedures. Prescribed tactics, techniques, and procedures establish, in effect, *how* forces will be employed, and they constitute the bulk of the written combat direction available to the fleet officer.²³ They conform, of course, to overarching doctrine (here, tactical doctrine), which is the “play book” from which tactics, techniques, and procedures are chosen and ordered by organizations at the multinational, joint, multiservice, or service level.

Let us make these concepts a little more concrete by considering a set of publications familiar to many seagoing naval officers, one relating to antisubmarine warfare. Above all is the functional doctrine, found in the *Allied Antisubmarine Warfare Manual*, ATP (Allied Tactical Publication) 28; next down, intra-battle group command relationships (in a U.S. context) are established by the *Composite Warfare Commander's Manual*, NWP (Naval Warfare Publication) 10-1; finally, signals for use in the conduct of antisubmarine tactics are found in the *Allied Maritime Tactical Signal and Maneuvering Book*, ATP-1, Volume II. As we know, the tactical commander employs forces in modes selected from these

three “play books”—regulating task groups in accordance with the general antisubmarine guidance of ATP-28, signalling their movement and actions in accordance with ATP-1, and employing a command structure described in NWP 10-1.

Doctrine bears directly upon standing orders, operations orders, tactical memos, and similar local directives issued by commanders to supplement those provided by their services. These directives are based upon the “first principles” found in doctrine, the demands of local conditions, the tools of tactics, techniques, and procedures, and the desires of particular commanders. These local directives may introduce new tactics that exploit previously unused capabilities of equipment or forces.

Particularly important in this connection are rules of engagement (ROE), which regulate and limit the use of force. They are orders having the force of law, and they draw legitimacy from the authority of national or international law and that of the commander who issues them. Though the point has been questioned, ROE must be influenced by doctrine. They are derived from national (or multinational) political guidance and are rendered into military terms by senior military commanders who (when current military doctrine would be severely affected by the proposed ROE) request reconsideration of the guidance. ROE do not constitute fundamental, enduring principles; ROE are not doctrine, but they must be supported by it. The need to establish ROE, on the other hand, is itself a matter of doctrine.

One of the most important functions affected by doctrine is initial, or basic, training.²⁴ Though advanced training and education may encourage exploration beyond current doctrine, forces must have at the outset some basis for understanding what they are expected to do. Indeed, this is made evident by the fact that the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command has cognizance over both areas.²⁵ Military doctrine will also affect exercises, games, and simulations developed in support of training and education. Further, it is disseminated among the services by educational facilities, primarily the various war and command and staff colleges. In general, then, doctrine influences training and education, which in turn influences the development of future doctrine.

One of the major inputs to military doctrine, campaign planning, also must be affected by tactical doctrine. Planners naturally apply their individual service or combat arms doctrines, and joint and multinational doctrines form the basis of joint and multinational campaign planning. In turn, strategy must be affected by campaign planning. Strategy for armaments such as intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles will be affected by the military doctrine for their employment. Indeed, the 1993–1994 Nuclear Posture Review represents the basis of a new U.S. military doctrine for nuclear weapons, which will prompt a revised declaratory policy.²⁶ It might be noted that this is a case of current

policy being affected by a revised strategy which was itself influenced by military doctrine. The implication is that in some cases military doctrine—which represents the capabilities of the military—can stabilize policy, even inhibit a government from making radical departures.

Finally, each different type of military doctrine affects other types of military doctrine. As long as military formations normally operate in conjunction with other types of formations, they cannot help affecting each other. Planning combined arms activities within one service, joint interactions between services, and operations on a multinational basis all require that each branch of the military know how the others plan to act.

What Naval Doctrine Is *Not*

The use of the term “doctrine” in what are properly local, tactical, or functional connections blurs its meaning. For example, one publication set out local air base “doctrine” governing the use of afterburners and high engine power.²⁷ The U.S. Army tends to use “doctrine” even for the tasks of an individual soldier. We have characterized what doctrine is and how it behaves; long-standing ambiguity in usage—anyone who develops doctrine can define its content and level—requires us now to urge the exclusion of specific matters and issues from this rubric.

Because the vast majority of campaigns in the future will be joint or multinational, *naval* doctrine is not a substitute for joint or multinational doctrine. Service and multiservice doctrine should be seen as an “input” to joint and multinational doctrine or as a guide for operations when joint and multinational doctrine are nonexistent or inappropriate.

Tactics, techniques, and procedures are not doctrine. Multiservice naval (i.e., Navy and Marine Corps) doctrine will be the bridge between higher-level policy documents, strategy, and tactics, etc.; it will concern itself primarily with the operational level of warfare. “Doctrine” will not replace the term “tactics,” and naval doctrine will not extend into the tactical level except to shape multiservice or Navy and Marine Corps individual-service tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Is Doctrine Authoritative?

Doctrine is a form of policy—less perishable than current policy, but policy nonetheless. While policy in general is not designed to standardize behavior, military doctrine *is*. One implication is that the creation of new doctrine must itself be regulated to ensure consistency. As formal military doctrine rapidly

evolves within the naval services, we can expect the consistency issue to arise in some acute forms.

One specific question that has given trouble in other countries is that of whose doctrine should dominate when one service supports another. In the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s, there was a major literature debate over the role of Long-Range Aviation in support of the Navy. The essential problem was whether Long-Range Aviation's "operational art" (that is, doctrine) or "naval art" would govern these specialized aircraft when they were acting on behalf of the navy.²⁸ Although mature joint doctrine should preclude such problems, they are likely to be contentious as long as that body of doctrine is under development. Nato has addressed the doctrine standardization issue with two concepts, commonality (the use of "common doctrine, procedures, or equipment") and standardization (the process of achieving that state). Doctrine provides the basis for both, enabling different types of forces to work together, building a common understanding and approach to their tasks.

The degree of standardization and consistency desired between service and national doctrines depends upon the degree of integration involved. Where two services routinely operate together, such as the Navy and Marine Corps or the Army and Air Force, one would expect a high level of doctrinal standardization. Multinational units, however, do not necessarily fight together as an integrated whole. For example, in the Pacific theater of World War II, the British Pacific Fleet was given its own area of operations, in which it could operate in accordance with its own doctrine. In Operation Desert Storm, of course, the American ground forces operated in one area and multinational formations in others.

Some commanders are concerned that once written doctrine exists they will be held accountable for deviations that fail. The same kind of fears were expressed decades ago among naval aviators when "Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization" (NATOPS) was introduced. Like NATOPS procedures, military doctrine is authoritative but not dogmatic—that is, it does not dictate action. In a given instance one may find it necessary to reject a doctrinal application if specific conditions differ from those for which it was developed. Also like NATOPS, however, doctrine should not be discarded without careful consideration of the consequences. If it is set aside, subordinates must be given the principles that are to be applied instead. A commander deciding to depart from doctrine must ensure that his revisions, and their results, are evaluated for possible incorporation into improved doctrine.

Military doctrine offers standardization without loss of freedom of judgment or initiative in battle. A doctrinal document should indicate the degree of latitude it envisions. If it is directive, then its policies govern as written. If it is guidance, it must be so identified. *Naval doctrine is authoritative but not directive.*²⁹ In short,

there is no ground for concern that Army doctrine will be forced on the Navy or that joint doctrine will force naval doctrine into "ideological" conformity.

As for joint doctrine itself, however, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, responsible for developing joint doctrine, has appointed an "evaluation agent," the Joint Warfighting Center (formerly known as the Joint Doctrine Center). The Joint Staff also sponsors a Joint Doctrine Working Party, comprising service and combat command representatives, which systematically examines joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Joint doctrine is written primarily for the combatant commanders, the unified commanders in chief. The services play a vital role, though they have no veto power over joint doctrine. Setting aside the unique functions that the Atlantic Command and the Special Operations Command play in training and equipping forces, the services man, train, and equip forces, whereas the unified commanders in chief employ those forces. Therefore, the Chairman is the final arbiter of joint doctrine; service input is offered during the development process, either directly or by means of either service components of the unified commands or officers assigned to the staffs of unified commanders or of the Joint Chiefs. Service and multiservice doctrine commands and centers play an important role in that process.

Shared, Harmonious Thinking

The primary attribute of military doctrine is that it comprises the fundamental principles, not specific procedures, that guide the employment of forces. Military doctrine defines, in general terms, the nature of forces, and it establishes a rational basis for their use. It is a commonly understood and shared framework upon which specific operations can be planned and executed. It represents a carefully considered body of structured thought meant to guide all forces in effective action. Military doctrine is not a set of orders that govern operations; it provides a commander the experiences and best professional judgments of others confronted with similar situations. In other words, military doctrine is a bridge from the past and future to the present. It is a shared mode of harmonious thinking.

Well developed military doctrine lessens the need for operational commanders to communicate detailed instructions. In the absence of orders and in the absence of communications, subordinates who act in accordance with military doctrine are very likely to be conforming with their superiors' wishes. In a chaotic combat environment, doctrine has a cohesive effect; it offers mutually intelligible terminology, relationships, responsibilities, and processes, thus freeing the commander to focus on the real job—combat itself.

Notes

1. In general usage, "a principle or body of principles presented by a specific field, system or organization for acceptance or belief." *Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary* (Boston: Riverside, 1984, 1988). The lack of a universally accepted definition of doctrine was addressed by Dr. Donald S. Marshall in his essay "Doctrine" in the *International Military and Defense Encyclopedia*, Trevor N. Dupuy, ed. (Washington, D.C., and New York: 1993), v. 2 C-F, pp. 773-5.

2. Joint Staff, Proposed Joint Publication 0-1, *Basic National Defense Doctrine*, 27 January 1992, p. iv. This publication was never issued, perhaps on grounds of apparent intrusion into governmental policy.

3. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off. [hereafter GPO], 23 March 1994). This document will be used herein for all definitions unless otherwise noted. It is important to note that the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) is routinely used to update the paper edition of this publication. The CD-ROM version of the JEL is more current than the paper; the on-line version of the JEL is even more up to date. Unfortunately, one needs to consult the electronic version to ensure currency of terms.

4. Theoretically, the definition in Joint Publication 1-02 has been accepted by all services. The use of other definitions in individual service publications indicates an attempt to translate that definition into more familiar terms.

5. For the Army: "Doctrine—fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives. Doctrine is authoritative but requires judgment in application." (U.S. Army Dept., *Operations*, FM [Field Manual] 100-5 [Washington: GPO, 14 June 1993], p. 3.) This definition is also used in the draft revision of the *Dictionary of United States Army Terms*, Army Regulation 25-X, which also defines "doctrinal and tactical training" as "training provided to commanders, staffs, leaders, and operators on how to employ a new system. It is a component of both new equipment training and displaced equipment training. Tactics and techniques are covered through battle drills and situational training exercises which embody the 'how to fight' doctrine."

For the Air Force: "Aerospace doctrine is, simply defined, what we hold true about aerospace power and the best way to do the job in the Air Force." (U.S. Air Force Dept. *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force*, AFM [Air Force Manual] 1-1, v. 1 [Washington: GPO, March 1992], p. vii. Interestingly, in the formal glossary found in vol. II, p. 282, doctrine is defined using the Joint Pub 1-02 definition along with definitions attributed to specific individuals. The previous edition of AFM 1-1 had several Air Force-approved definitions of doctrine, such as: "Aerospace doctrine is a statement of officially sanctioned beliefs and warfighting principles which describe and guide the proper use of aerospace forces in military action." Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force*, AFM 1-1 [Washington: 16 March 1984], p. v. Doctrine is not defined in the *Air Force Glossary of Standardized Terms*, AFM 11-1, of 29 September 1989.

For the Marines: "Doctrine is a teaching advanced as the fundamental beliefs of the Marine Corps on the subject of war, from its nature and theory to its preparation and conduct. Doctrine establishes a particular way of thinking about war and a way of fighting, a philosophy for leading Marines in combat, a mandate for professionalism, and a common language. In short, it establishes the way we practice our profession." Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, *Warfighting*, FMFM [Fleet Marine Force Manual] 1 [Washington: 6 March 1989], p. 43. Doctrine is not defined in the *USMC Supplement to DoD Dictionary of Military Terms*, FMFRP [Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication] 0-14, 27 January 1994.

For the Navy: "The doctrine defines standard concepts and terms for execution of current operations, and for the derivation of operational planning factors which are required for the formulation of programs and the analysis of readiness." Department of the Navy, *Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy*, NWP [Naval Warfare Publication] 1 (Rev. A), May 1978. Doctrine is not defined in *Naval Terminology*, NWP 3 (Rev. E).

6. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington: National Defense Univ. Press), 11 November 1991, pp. 5-6.

7. John L. Romjue, *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982*, TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command] Historical Monograph Series (Washington: GPO, June 1984), p. 65; and Richard G. Davis, *The 31 Initiatives* (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1987), pp. 2, 25-33.

8. Davis, pp. 81-2.

9. There is obvious concern at multiservice doctrine centers about their role and long-term viability. There are benefits in retaining such organizations. For example, sponsoring services retain direct control over their operations—generally outside of the formal, joint process and without the required participation of the Joint Staff and the staffs of the joint commanders in chief. Multiservice doctrinal activities offer sponsoring services the ability to coordinate directly their input, generally at a lower level of activity. Also, a multiservice doctrine offers a mechanism for coordinated doctrinal development in support of the participating services.

10. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington: The Joint Staff, 9 September 1993), pp. VI-1 through VI-16.

11. Discussed by a number of European participants at the "Role of International Navies after the Cold War Symposium," sponsored by the Naval War College and Georgetown University at Georgetown University, Friday, 25 March 1994. Specifically, the war colleges of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom were collectively preparing such a military doctrine during 1994.

12. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States* (Washington: GPO, January 1992).

13. For the Weinberger Doctrine, see "The Uses of Military Power," Remarks Prepared for Delivery by the Honorable Casper W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., Wednesday, 28 November 1984, distributed by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) News Release No. 609-84. A slightly modified version appears in Casper W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1987* (Washington: GPO, 5 February 1986), pp. 78-81. For an analysis, see Alan Ned Sabrosky and Robert L. Sloane, *The Recourse to War: An Appraisal of the "Weinberger Doctrine"* (Washington: GPO, for the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1988). For an example of how preliminary statements can serve as "trial balloons," see the author's *Our New National Security Strategy: America Promises to Come Back* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992), pp. 1-16.

14. See Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report of the Bottom-Up Review* (Washington: GPO, October 1993), p. 9, and *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington: GPO, January 1994), pp. 65-6, for Les Aspin's political-military "doctrine" (much like Weinberger's) for peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions. This "doctrine" has apparently been codified as Presidential Decision Directive 25. The New York Times Service, "Clinton sets rules for U.S. involvement in U.N. peacekeeping," *The Virginian Pilot and Ledger Star*, 6 May 1994; and U.S. Department of State, *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations* (Washington: May 1994).

15. Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1991), pp. 66-7, 80-5.

16. Barton Gellman, "Pentagon War Scenarios Spotlight Russia," *The Washington Post*, 20 February 1992, p. 1, citing a 4 February 1992 "1994-1999 Defense Planning Guidance Scenario Set for Final Coordination."

17. I am indebted to Colonel John Collins, USA, Ret., of the Congressional Research Service, for discussing this point with me. Colonel Collins feels strongly that military doctrine should drive campaign plans. Although I agree, I argue that in doctrinal voids, one must start somewhere: prepared campaign concepts are excellent inputs to blank sheets of paper (and computer screens).

18. This view is in specific disagreement with that of Lt. Cdr. Scott A. Hastings, USN, expressed in his prize-winning essay "Is There a Doctrine In the House?," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, April 1994, on p. 35. The form in which current naval doctrine exists is the subject of a series of Naval Doctrine Command technical papers, some of which are to be collected in a projected Naval War College Press "Newport Paper."

19. Dennis M. Drew, "Of Trees and Leaves: A New View of Doctrine," *Air University Review*, January-February 1982, p. 42.

20. In his prize-winning essay "The Rôle of Doctrine in Naval Warfare" (U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, March-April 1915, pp. 325-54), Lt. Cdr. Dudley W. Knox, USN, used British, French, and German historical examples in his call for doctrine.

21. [Irving] B[rinton] Holley, Jr. (Major General, USAFR), "The Doctrinal Process: Some Suggested Steps," *Military Review*, April 1979, pp. 5-8. The influence of secondary literature on official doctrine is significant but difficult to prove. On the one hand, we have the case of the writings of experts as an acknowledged source of international law. At the other extreme there is the creation within the military itself of operational war and contingency plans. Yet even where the military works without formal external interaction, it cannot help but be influenced by its own education and training, and by exercises, which have themselves been shaped by doctrine. Many of these latter factors have themselves been influenced by classic works of history and theory, such as the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian Stafford Corbett, and Raoul Castex.

22. Before the battle of Trafalgar, Napoleon Bonaparte reportedly instructed his admiral, the Comte de Villeneuve, to count two Spanish ships as equivalent to one French. See Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968 [reprint of Little, Brown & Co. edition of 1892]), v. I, p. 78.

23. While we have taken "tactics, techniques, and procedures" together for the present purpose and have referred to them generally as "tactics," there are, of course, distinctions. Techniques are typically more specific than tactics, possibly involving detailed equipment operating instructions; they apply to individual systems and forces in particular functions. One technique may support one tactic, or many; necessarily, techniques conform to tactics. Procedures, on the other hand, are detailed instructions for equipment; aimed at the operator, they are inevitably fairly rigid and directive in nature. One set of procedures may support many techniques or tactics; procedures, accordingly, conform to techniques.

24. A British Army publication commences by defining doctrine as "put most simply . . . what is taught." Chief of the General Staff, *Design for Military Operations—The British Military Doctrine*, Army Code No. 71451, D/CGC/50/8, 1989.

25. TRADOC, as it is known, recently produced a visionary pamphlet that attempts to set forth future doctrine, technology, and resultant training. See *Force XXI: A Concept for the Evolution of Full-Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-first Century*, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 (Fort Monroe, Va.: 1 August 1994).


26. Les Aspin, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington: GPO, January 1994), pp. 62-3.

27. Joint Publication 1-02, s.v., "gate."

28. Soviet (and now Russian) "Military Doctrine," *voennaia doktrina*, was and is not equivalent to military doctrine as discussed here, but rather a political document that stated the relation of warfare and the military with the highest aims of the state.

29. The commander of the Naval Doctrine Command, responding to an article in the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, recently characterized naval doctrine as neither prescriptive nor directive. See Frederick Lewis (Rear Admiral, USN), "Is There a Doctrine in the House?" Comment and Discussion, U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, June 1994, p. 24. The current head of TRADOC has also emphasized that Army doctrine is not prescriptive. The complexities of an uncertain future appear to make the U.S. Army unwilling to consider its doctrine as anything more than "as 'nearly right' as it can be." See Frederick M. Franks, Jr. (General, USA), "Army Doctrine and the New Strategic Environment," *Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability: Implications for U.S. Policy and Army Roles and Missions*, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Richard H. Shultz, Jr., eds. (Washington: GPO, for the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), pp. 275-80.

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The Evolving Missions and Forces of the JMSDF

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THE JAPANESE MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE (JMSDF) of today is a proud, highly trained, and professional organization. It is generally well equipped and is in certain aspects—notably antisubmarine warfare and mine countermeasures—one of the most capable forces in the world. While some of its equipment is approaching obsolescence, the JMSDF possesses some of the most modern warships available, incorporating the latest technologies. The purpose of this article is to offer, on the basis of historical patterns and anticipated security needs, a plausible forecast of the force structure and missions of the JMSDF. The establishment of the JMSDF and its subsequent progression to the force that it constitutes today can be dealt with here only in general terms (see table 1). However, a basic knowledge of that development in the context of the world events and political realities of the time is essential if one is to theorize about the future of the JMSDF.

The History of the JMSDF

Japan's unconditional surrender at the end of the Pacific War occasioned calls for its total disarmament. This policy, articulated in the Allies' Potsdam

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Proclamation and accepted by Japan on 14 August 1945, was carried out under the auspices of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur. The Japanese Second Demobilization Ministry, formed on 1 December 1945, was given responsibility for executing the demobilization. This is not to say, however, that following the disestablishment of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) on 10 October 1945 absolutely no naval forces existed under central Japanese authority. Several organizations ensured the safety of shipping in Japanese waters and enforced maritime regulations before the founding of the JMSDF as we know it today on 1 December 1954. These pre-JMSDF forces, limited as they may have been, were used to sweep mines, provide for maritime safety, and counter threats from outside Japan, specifically illegal entry and smuggling.

Minesweeping. At the end of hostilities in the Pacific, there were thousands of antishipping mines scattered around the coastal approaches and harbors of Japan. Although the Potsdam Proclamation called for the complete disarmament of all Japanese military forces, and notwithstanding the demobilization then in progress, a former Imperial naval officer, Captain Kyuzo Tamura, began minesweeping operations under U.S. direction on 15 August 1945. His force initially consisted of 350 small ships, 773 officers, and 9,227 enlisted men, all formerly of the Imperial Japanese Navy. This force was gradually reduced as the demobilization continued and by 1952 contained only 91 officers and 1,324 enlisted men. The minesweeping force, stripped of all rank insignia and officially not a military organization, had operated first under the Second Demobilization Ministry and then under successive agencies given responsibility for demobilization. Due to the importance of sweeping the coastal approaches and the Inland Sea for mines laid during the war, the minesweeping force was exempted from restrictions placed upon the rest of the former Imperial armed services. In fact, it remained lightly armed throughout the Occupation.

By 1952 Tamura's force had lost nineteen ships and seventy-seven lives. The remainder would eventually become part of the JMSDF; Tamura himself was to retire as a vice admiral. It is worth noting that as early as 1949, with the reduction of the Allied occupation forces, Japan possessed the largest and most capable minesweeping force in the western Pacific.

The outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula in the summer of 1950 caught the United States and the United Nations unprepared in many areas, one of them mine warfare. The United States no longer possessed the capability to counter the threat that mines presented in Korean waters. In fact, the entire U.S. minesweeping force in the Pacific consisted of only ten ships: four 180-foot steel vessels, three of which were out of service, and six wooden auxiliary minesweepers. This number was clearly inadequate; extensive mining had cost the

Table 1
Force Composition
(As of 31 March 1993)

Ship Class		Number		
Principal Surface Combatants		62		
Submarines		15		
Mine Warfare Ships		38		
Patrol Combatant Craft		8		
Landing Ships		10		
Auxiliary Ships		31		
Total		164		

Aircraft Type	Purpose	Number	
P-2J	Patrol	6	
P-3C		87	
SH-2B	Antisubmarine helo	75	
SH-60J		26	
MH-53E	Minesweeping helo	10	

Performance Data				
Type	Class	Standard Displacement (tons)	Maximum Speed (knots)	Main Equipment
Destroyer	<i>Kongo</i>	7,250	30	127mm guns, 2 CIWS Aegis, vertical launch SAM (SM-2 MR) SSM 2 triple torpedo tubes
	<i>Shirane</i>	5,200	32	2 127mm guns, 2 CIWS Short-range SAM, Asroc 2 triple torpedo tubes, 3 ASW helos
	<i>Hatakaze</i>	4,600	30	2 127mm guns, 2 CIWS SAM, 2 triple torpedo tubes SSM, Asroc
	<i>Asagiri</i>	3,500	30	76mm gun, 2 CIWS, Asroc Short-range SAM, ASW helo SSM 2 triple torpedo tubes
	<i>Abukuma</i>	2,000	27	76mm gun, CIWS, Asroc SSM 2 triple torpedo tubes
Submarine	<i>Hamushio</i>	2,450	20	6 torpedo tubes Underwater-to-surface guided missiles
Minesweeper	<i>Uwajima</i>	490	14	20mm machine gun
Landing ship	<i>Miura</i>	2,000	14	76mm gun, 40mm machine gun

CIWS: Close-in Weapon System (20mm)	SSM: Harpoon Surface-to-Surface Missile
SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile	Asroc: ASW Rocket

Source: *Defense of Japan 1993*

United States command of the sea around Korea.¹ It was obliged to request minesweeping assistance from Japan. After considerable thought as to the legality of such action, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida authorized the deployment of minesweepers to support the U.S. landings in Korea. Yoshida felt that since the request had been supported by the Occupation commander, Japan could not very well refuse. Led by Captain Tamura, forty-six Japanese minesweepers and 1,200 personnel swept over three hundred kilometers of channels between 2 October and 12 December 1950. Two ships were lost, one sailor was killed, and eight others were injured. This was the first postwar deployment (as is not commonly known) of Japanese forces outside territorial waters in support of United Nations operations.

Maritime Safety. In late 1945 and early 1946, Japan faced increasing black market smuggling and illegal immigration (primarily from Korea) as well as capture of its fishing vessels by the Soviet Union, China, and Korea. In response, Japan sought either authority from SCAP to protect threatened vessels and defend its coastline or provision of such protection by the occupation forces. SCAP directed Japan on 12 June 1946 to establish an emergency illegal entry control center on Kyushu, the focus of illegal immigration and smuggling activity at the time. Shipping found entering the country illegally was to be intercepted and turned over to U.S. forces. To accomplish this task, three ships and thirteen smaller vessels were dispatched; they proved totally inadequate, due to poor communications, lack of weapons, and insufficient funding. However, no further forces or actions were authorized until a U.S. Coast Guard representative, Captain Frank M. Meals, was sent to Japan to study its maritime defense and safety needs, made his report to SCAP.

Captain Meals recommended that a central organization be established "for the purpose of protecting life and property and preventing, detecting, and suppressing violation of law at sea."² Twenty-eight former IJN auxiliary subchasers were transferred on 28 August 1947 from the Demobilization Board to the Ministry of Transportation for use as coastal patrol ships. Only after overcoming considerable opposition from China, Russia, and the United Kingdom, in both the Allied Council and the Far Eastern Commission, was the United States able to obtain approval of the Maritime Safety Board bill, which officially established the Maritime Safety Agency (or MSA, a Coast Guard-type force) on 1 May 1948. The law imposed several restrictions: that total personnel were not to exceed ten thousand, total vessels were not to exceed 125 ships or fifty thousand tons, vessels were not to exceed fifteen knots in speed, weaponry was to be small arms only, and the operating area was limited to the seas adjacent to Japan. MSA functions were to include protecting coastal areas, establishing and enforcing maritime safety standards, suppressing smuggling, and clearing

marine obstacles, including mines. The Agency was defined as “non-military,” and it incorporated the minesweeping forces led by Captain Tamura.

An External Threat. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 was followed shortly by a call from General MacArthur for Japan to form a National Police Reserve Force of seventy-five thousand personnel and expand the MSA by eight thousand. While this plan, designed to offset the deployment of U.S. troops to Korea, is usually considered the beginning of the rearmament of Japan, for naval forces the case is not clear. It can be argued that because the new policy authorized only an increase of personnel and gross tonnage for the previously established MSA and did not affect its mission, “rearmament” of the naval forces had actually commenced with the formation of that agency in 1948. What is not debatable is that MacArthur had acknowledged Japan’s need to help provide for its own defense against current and future external threats to its security.

The Korean War and the rapid deployment of U.S. forces in Japan to Korea seems to have left SCAP and most Japanese officials convinced that Japan would be required to assist in its own defense following the end of occupation. Early in 1951, the Soviet Union and China were harassing Japanese fishing vessels in the waters off Hokkaido and the East China Sea respectively. Korean smuggling was still a major problem around Kyushu and in the Sea of Japan. Additionally, with events in Eastern Europe, Germany, and Korea clearly indicating that the Cold War had begun, the threat to Hokkaido of invasion from the Soviet Union was a matter of increasing concern.³

In January of that year, SCAP recommended that the Demobilization Bureau search for “ten of the very best” former IJN officers available, to found a new naval force. SCAP proposed as its nucleus eighteen patrol frigates recently returned to the U.S. by the Soviet Union and located in Yokosuka harbor, and fifty Large Support Landing Ships (LSSL) that could be transferred from the United States. This was an easy task for the Demobilization Bureau, which had been confidentially examining the possibility of rearmament since 1946. At that time a decision had been made to conduct such studies “after normal working hours” in order to be prepared to deal with any situation that might develop once Japan was again independent. These preparations had included keeping track of former Imperial Japanese Navy personnel.

The official word came in March 1951. SCAP formally requested the Bureau to provide information on former naval personnel and their potential for remobilization. Amid debate concerning the composition and mission of any new naval force, the National Safety Agency Law was promulgated 31 July 1952, and the Coastal Security Force was inaugurated on 1 August. The only ships transferred from the U.S. at this time, however, were for training purposes—two frigates and one landing craft. The only missions specified were maintaining

peace and stability, defending the citizenry, and administering and supervising its own forces.

The Birth and Evolution of the JMSDF. On 14 January 1953 six frigates and three landing craft were formally transferred to Japan, and by 23 December all eighteen frigates and fifty landing craft previously envisioned had been delivered. Japan was told, however, that before the United States could legally offer more assistance, Japan would have to commit itself to provide more for its own security against external aggression. Japan was expected to state as official policy that it would counter external aggression and establish a defense force for such a purpose. It was not an easy course for the Japanese government to take.

Prime Minister Yoshida had said in 1952 that Japan "will not rearm. To rearm we must ask the consent of the people and revise the constitution."⁴ In 1953, however, he maintained that the constitution did not prohibit military power for self defense, and he concluded an agreement with opposition leader Shigemitsu Mamoru. The agreement read: "In consideration of the present international situation and the spirit of national independence which is arising within our country, we will clarify the policy of increasing our self-defense strength and establish a long-range defense plan in response to the gradual reduction of U.S. armed forces stationed in our country and in proportion to our national power. Together with this measure, as a first step, we will amend the Safety Agency Law in order to reorganize the Safety Forces into the Self-Defense Forces and to add the mission of defense of our country against direct aggression to the former's mission."⁵

In early 1954, the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed. In return for U.S. aid, Japan undertook to "make, consistent with the political and economic stability of Japan, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities, and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength" and to "take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its defense capabilities."⁶

On 9 June 1954 the Defense Agency Establishment Law and the Self-Defense Force Law were passed, effective as of 1 July 1954. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force was born.

For nearly three years the MSDF operated within the Defense Agency, with no clearly defined guidelines. On 20 May 1957 the Cabinet finally approved the "Basic National Defense Policy." That document set forth that the purpose of national defense was to prevent direct or indirect aggression, and, if necessary, to repel invasion in order to preserve for Japan the blessings of independence, peace, and democracy. The Self-Defense Forces were also:

- to support the activities of the United Nations in its promotion of international cooperation, thereby contributing to the cause of world peace;

- to promote the national welfare and enhance the spirit of patriotism, thus laying a sound basis for national security;
- to develop effective defensive power within the bounds of national capabilities and to the extent necessary for self defense; and,
- to cope with aggression by recourse to a joint security arrangement with the United States, pending effective functioning of the United Nations in preventing and reversing aggression.

On 14 June 1957 the first long-range defense buildup plan was approved.⁷ The plan was devised with “a view to the build up of the minimum requirement of a self-defense potential in accordance with the Basic National Defense Policy and in keeping with national resources and conditions.” At a time when the United States was encouraging Japan to perform more of its own defense, even this vague declaration was enough to allow significant U.S. troop reductions to proceed, yet it enabled the Japanese Finance Ministry to meet its goal of limiting defense spending for economic reasons. (See table 2 for a summary of the First Defense Buildup Program, 1958–1960.)

The Second Defense Buildup Program (1962–1966), approved on 16 July 1961, was delayed more than a year by disagreement between the Finance Ministry and the Defense Agency over funding and mission requirements. The draft of the Second Defense Buildup Program Outline described the goal of defense as the ability to cope with localized wars and lesser conflicts, through antisubmarine warfare (ASW) in cooperation with the U.S. to control the Sea of Japan and block the Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya straits.

The Third Defense Buildup Plan (1967–1971) was the most specific up to that point in terms of goals and priorities. Its very first priority was to strengthen maritime defense. The plan called for increased capability to safeguard maritime transportation and strengthen the defense of waters off Japan’s coasts and in the adjacent straits. However, consensus did not exist concerning the force structure required to achieve this goal. Consequently, after three defense buildup programs, the MSDF still lacked a capability to monitor or control the straits effectively.

On 9 October 1972 the cabinet decided upon the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan; it gave the goal of the MSDF as being “to improve defense capabilities in the sea areas around Japan, and the ability to ensure the safety of the sea lanes in those areas. . . .” However, the program was never fully realized, either as to capability or numbers, due to the budget restraints imposed upon the Defense Agency by severe inflation during the oil crisis of 1973. Acquisition of seventeen vessels (including five destroyers, two submarines, and ten other vessels) was eventually canceled or postponed.⁸

By 1975, as a result of the four Defense Programs, and in spite of the absence of clear consensus as to the mission or final structure of the MSDF, Japan had

Table 2
Defense Buildup Programs

	First Defense Buildup Program (1958-60)	Second Defense Buildup Program (1962-66)	Third Defense Buildup Program (1967-71)	Fourth Defense Buildup Program (1972-76)															
Approved by NDC	453.2 billion yen	1,163.5 billion yen	2,340.0 billion yen	4,630 billion yen															
Actually Authorized	407.4 billion yen	1,142.5 billion yen	2,281.0 billion yen	5,905.8 billion yen*															
MSDF budget share	23.2 percent	22.9 percent	24.9 percent	23.2 percent															
MSDF goals	124,000 tons 222 aircraft	143,000 tons 235 aircraft	142,000 tons 200 aircraft	214,000 tons 200 aircraft															
MSDF actual	99,000 tons	116,200 tons 228 aircraft	144,000 tons** 270 aircraft	193,000 tons 190 aircraft															
Construction starts	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Helicopter Destroyers (DDH)											1		1				1		1
Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG)			1													1			
Destroyers (DD, DDA, DDK)	2				1	2	2	2	1	1		1		2			1	2	1
Destroyer Escorts (DE)		2		2						1	2	1	2	1	3	1	1	1	
Submarines (SS)		2	2	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Patrol Craft (PC)	2	3		1		1	1	1											
Minesweepers (MSC, MSO)	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	4	4	5	4	3	3
Minelayers/Tenders												2							
Torpedo Boats (PT, PTM)			1									1	1	1	4	2	1	1	1
Support Ships/Auxiliaries	1	1	1					1	1	3				4	2			1	2
Landing Ships (LST)														1		2	2	1	

* Due to inflation, even this outlay fell far short of the original program cost estimate.

** The number of MSDF aircraft exceeded the target due to the extension of the lifespan of antisubmarine S2F-1 planes, which had been intended to reach the end of their service in the latter part of the Third Defense Buildup Program.

Sources: Linton Wells II, *The Sea and Japan's Strategic Interest, 1975-1985* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975); and Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1976* (trans. by The Japan Times, Ltd., 1976).

gone from a state of near-total disarmament to a point where its naval forces ranked fifth in the world in tonnage (as seen in table 3). The MSDF had limitations, however, that reduced its true operational capability, notwithstanding the size of the force. In 1975 they included a lack of logistical support, poor antiair warfare capability, and weak anti-invasion defenses. On the other hand, MSDF minesweeping was probably the best in the world, and its escort capability was impressive.

Table 3
Comparison of "Blue-Water" Naval Strengths in 1974

	Britain Nr/Tonnage	France Nr/Tonnage	Japan Nr/Tonnage	PRC Nr/Tonnage	Spain Nr/Tonnage
Aircraft Carriers	1/ 43,060	2/ 54,600			1/ 13,000
Cruisers/DLG	11/ 68,170	4/ 28,680			1/ 10,282
DDG/DEGs	1/ 3,500	4/ 11,000	1/ 3,050	4/ 6,628	2/ 6,000
Helo Destroyers*		2/ 9,160	1/ 4,700		
Destroyers/DDM		14/ 39,300	27/ 56,850	5/ 16,250	13/ 31,847
Frigates/DD escorts	58/139,900	27/ 38,250	16/ 21,950	9/ 9,800	14/ 22,251
Attack sub (Nuclear)	7/ 24,000				
Attack sub (Conv.)	22/ 34,930	19/ 17,341	14/ 19,810	45/ 48,030	8/ 10,010
Minelayers	1/ 1,375		2/ 2,780		
Minesweepers	39/ 14,130	59/ 24,918	40/ 15,640	16/ 8,000	24/ 12,387
Amphib. Assault	4/ 69,320	2/ 11,600			
Amphib. Warfare	7/ 21,120	18/ 11,007	12/ 9,772	4/ 6,000	17/ 34,031
Corvettes		25/ 8,595	20/ 7,690	30/ 11,200	4/ 4,124
Total	151/419,505	176/254,451	133/142,242	113/105,908	84/143,932

* Those carrying two or more helicopters

Source: *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1974-75.*

In 1977 the National Defense Program Outline was adopted, and the goal of Japan's defense buildup was made clear. The program identified two "Basic Defense Concepts" for Japan:⁹

- *Prevention of armed invasion.* "Japan's basic defense policy is to possess an adequate defense capability of its own while establishing a posture for the most effective operation of that capability to prevent aggression. In addition, a defense posture capable of dealing with any aggression should be constructed, through maintaining the credibility of the Japan-U.S. security arrangement and insuring

the smooth functioning of that system." This first concept further stated Japan's intention to rely upon the U.S. nuclear deterrent against any nuclear threat.

• *Countering aggression.* "Should indirect aggression—or any unlawful military activity which might lead to aggression—against this nation occur, Japan will take immediate responsive action in order to settle the situation at an early stage. Should direct aggression occur, Japan will repel such aggression at the earliest possible stage by taking immediate responsive action and by trying to conduct an integrated, systematic operation of its defense capability. Japan will repel limited and small scale aggression, in principle, without external assistance. In cases where the unassisted repelling of aggression is not feasible, due to scale, type or other factors of such aggression, Japan will continue an unyielding resistance by mobilizing all available forces until such time as cooperation from the United States is introduced, thus rebuffing such aggression."

The Outline further identified defense capability levels and specific postures to be maintained by all branches of the SDF, norms that are still in effect today. These were achieved as a result of the Mid-Term Defense Program system also adopted in 1976, which stipulated the level of defense capability made necessary by the international situation. This new system, which also provided defense planners greater flexibility to budget "year to year," was used to plan MSDF quality upgrades and to achieve the currently maintained level of forces. (For the MSDF quota structure, see table 4.)

Table 4
National Defense Program Outline MSDF Quotas
(Adopted on 29 October 1976)

Basic Units

Antisubmarine Surface Ship Units (for mobile operations)	4 Escort Flotillas
Antisubmarine Surface Ship Units (Regional District Units)	10 Divisions
Submarine Units	6 Divisions
Minesweeping Units	2 Flotillas
Land-based Antisubmarine Aircraft Units	16 Squadrons

Main Equipment

Antisubmarine Surface Ships	Approximately 60 Ships
Submarines	16 Submarines
Combat Aircraft	Approximately 220 Aircraft

Source: *Defense of Japan 1993*

Funding. Japan's defense spending is a subject guaranteed to generate discussion, both at home and abroad. There are those who say Japan spends too much on defense, in light of its true security needs and the "Peace Constitution." Others argue that its defense spending policy is slowly but surely financing the feared remilitarization of the country. On the other hand, calls are heard that Japan

should increase spending and "burden-sharing" for its own defense, or increase its support to international peacekeeping operations and disaster relief. More extreme voices call on Japan to go it alone and provide totally for its own defense without any outside alliances. While the intent and adequacy of past Japanese spending policies are beyond the scope of this article, the unique considerations faced in drafting defense budgets, and the results achieved, may be outlined. Table 5 depicts SDF funding data for 1955–1993.

Early defense budgets of the SDF were primarily influenced by three factors. First, because the Japanese economy had been ravaged by the war, politicians had given economic recovery the highest priority in government spending. Second, general apathy, if not resentment, was prevalent toward the military, which was held responsible by most Japanese for the disaster that had been brought upon Japan. Therefore, support for defense spending was not very enthusiastic in either the government or the private sector. Third, there was lack of agreement in the political arena as to what level of defense was appropriate and lawful under the new constitution.¹⁰

The second-mentioned reason—resentment of the military's role in leading Japan into World War II—was instrumental in the adoption of a system of firm civilian control over the Self-Defense Forces when they were established in 1954. Civilian control has allowed the Finance Ministry significant influence over defense budget requests before they are submitted to the Diet, or parliament. In fact, this arrangement has resulted in procurement cancellations within the Finance Ministry or Defense Agency without benefit of full debate by defense experts and the Diet as to a system's merit. It is interesting to note that during the formulation of the Second Defense Buildup Program, a call by the MSDF for a Japanese-built helicopter carrier was defeated in the Defense Agency, just as an earlier offer of a carrier by Admiral Arleigh Burke, then the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, had been rejected. Critics argued on both occasions that such armaments were both unauthorized by Japan's Constitution and prohibitively expensive.¹¹

During the past two decades, Japanese defense expenditures have risen substantially. In the 1980s, defense spending increased annually by more than 5 percent and rose as a percentage of the national budget each year as well.¹² This trend was a result of several factors: increased Cold War tension in the late 1970s and mid-1980s, and a corresponding Soviet military buildup in the Far East; increased U.S. pressure on Japan to shoulder more of its own defense; growing Japanese concern about the long-term U.S. military commitment and role in the region in the wake of the 1969 "Nixon Doctrine"; U.S. military withdrawals from Asia in the early 1970s, and the fall of South Vietnam; and finally, the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, which reinforced the perception of linkage between Japan's economic and military security.¹³

Table 5
Defense Expenditures (Original Budget, 100 million yen)

FY	GNP Initial Forecast (A)	General Account (Original) (B)	Growth from Previous Year %	Defense Budget (Original) (C)	Growth from Previous Year %	Percent Ratio of Defense Budget to GNP (C+A)	Percent Ratio of Defense Budget to General Account (C+B)
1955	75,590	9,915	-0.8	1,349	-3.3	1.78	13.61
1960	127,480	15,697	10.6	1,569	0.6	1.23	9.99
1965	281,600	36,581	12.4	3,014	9.6	1.07	8.24
1970	724,400	79,498	17.9	5,695	17.7	0.79	7.16
1971	843,200	94,143	18.4	6,709	17.8	0.8	7.13
1972	905,500	114,677	21.8	8,002	19.3	0.88	6.98
1973	1,098,000	142,841	24.6	9,355	16.9	0.85	6.55
1974	1,315,000	170,994	19.7	10,930	16.8	0.83	6.39
1975	1,585,000	212,888	24.5	13,273	21.4	0.84	6.23
1976	1,681,000	242,960	14.1	15,124	13.9	0.9	6.22
1977	1,928,500	285,143	17.4	16,906	11.8	0.88	5.93
1978	2,106,000	342,950	20.3	19,010	12.4	0.9	5.54
1979	2,320,000	386,001	12.6	20,945	10.2	0.9	5.43
1980	2,478,000	425,888	10.3	22,302	6.5	0.9	5.24
1981	2,648,000	467,881	9.9	24,000	7.6	0.91	5.13
1982	2,772,000	496,808	6.2	25,861	7.8	0.93	5.21
1983	2,817,000	503,796	1.4	27,542	6.5	0.98	5.47
1984	2,960,000	506,272	0.5	29,346	6.55	0.99	5.8
1985	3,146,000	524,996	3.7	31,371	6.9	1	5.98
1986	3,367,000	540,886	3	33,435	6.58	0.99	6.18
1987	3,504,000	541,010	0	35,174	5.2	1	6.5
1988	3,652,000	566,997	4.8	37,003	5.2	1.01	6.53
1989	3,897,000	604,142	6.6	39,198	5.9	1.01	6.49
1990	4,172,000	662,368	9.6	41,593	6.1	1	6.28
1991	4,596,000	703,474	6.2	43,860	5.45	0.95	6.23
1992	4,837,000	722,180	2.7	45,518	3.8	0.94	6.3
1993	4,953,000	723,548	0.2	46,406	2	0.94	6.41

Data taken from Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan* (white papers for each year). Figures for 1982 and thereafter are adjusted to the fiscal 1992 budget basis for convenience of comparison.

Japan stands today at a major turning point as regards funding for the Self-Defense Forces. Opponents of defense, pointing to the end of the Cold War and Japan's economic recession, say the time is right to cut spending in that area. Proponents are in a difficult position, because for the past several decades they have justified defense spending by the Soviet threat, which they must now admit is gone. Overall SDF funding is likely to be reduced in the next several years to realize savings from the end of the Cold War and the much-diminished threat from Russia. It is unlikely, though, that the JMSDF will bear the brunt of these cuts.

The Constitutional Debate

The Preamble and Article 9 of the Japanese constitution relate to the maintenance of "war potential" and military forces. They have been at the center of controversy surrounding the Constitution since its adoption in 1947.¹⁴

[Preamble] We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationships, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the Earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.

[Article 9] Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Whether Japan's constitution originally intended to deny the right of self defense has been extensively debated over the years. That debate need not be rehearsed here, except to say that the opposition voices base their argument on a literal reading of Article 9. They draw little or no distinction between offensive and defensive capabilities, and they continue to resist strongly any broadening in the SDF's mission or capabilities. Even proponents of the SDF have undergone a degree of evolution in their attempt to identify missions and allowable force structures in an ever-changing international situation. As circumstances have altered over the years, so too has the definition of what constitutes "war potential" and what role the SDF is to play in the defense of Japan. A brief summary of how the Constitution, specifically Article 9, has been and is being construed is useful here.

Past Interpretations. The Japanese government's reading of Article 9 has gradually shifted. The government's early official position was absolutely pacifist and highly idealistic, stating that war would not be permitted under any circumstances, including defensive wars.¹⁵ In the summer of 1946, during a Diet debate on the proposed constitution, Prime Minister Yoshida declared: "The war-renouncing article seems to justify the right of self-defense; however, I find it too dangerous to recognize such a right. Many recent conflicts have occurred under the guise of defense. Thus the recognition of self-defense will only invite war. . . . The war-renouncing article does not directly reject the right of self-defense. However, as paragraph 2 of Article 9 denies all armaments and the right of self-defense and the right of belligerency of the state, wars based on the right of self-defense and the right of belligerency are renounced. By voluntarily renouncing the right of belligerency we establish the basis for world peace. Through this constitution we solemnly declare our determination to establish world peace and to lead all the peace-loving nations of the world."

The first major shift occurred following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. As American forces stationed in Japan deployed to Korea, Japan was left virtually defenseless. General MacArthur, as has been described, called for the establishment of the 75,000-man National Police Reserve Force (NPRF) to fill the void. On 30 July 1950 the government explained that the mission of the NPRF was solely to maintain public order and that it had no relationship to "war potential."¹⁶ By 1952, with Japan's occupation by U.S. forces ended and the National Safety Force and Coastal Security Force soon to be established, that interpretation seemed to need clarification. As a result, the Japanese government asserted that Article 9 did not deny the right of self defense and that maintenance of minimal weapons needed in a defensive war was not prohibited under the Constitution. In November of the same year, Japan announced the following view of the new National Safety Force: "War potential is one which possesses equipment and corps useful in waging modern warfare. Objectively, since the National Safety Force and Coastal Security Force cannot execute modern warfare given their facilities and corps, they do not come under the term 'war potential' written in the Constitution."¹⁷

The meaning of "war potential" would be further redefined in 1954, with the establishment of the SDF, as meaning forces that "exceed the minimum requirement for self-defense." It is this definition of "war potential" that is used today and that has allowed the buildup of the MSDF.

Also clarified in 1954 was the government's position that the Constitution did in fact allow for the maintenance of self-defense forces. With the passage of the Defense Agency Establishment and Self-Defense Forces laws, which created the National Defense Agency and the Ground, Air, and Maritime Self-Defense Forces, the Japanese government officially acknowledged for the first time its

responsibility for Japan's external defense. The mission of these forces was given as to "defend Japan against direct and indirect aggression, and when necessary to maintain public order."¹⁸ Further, in remarking on the inauguration of the SDF, the Defense Agency Director General argued that "the Constitution renounces wars. However, it does not renounce wars for the purpose of self-defense. Obstruction of armed interventions from abroad is in itself defense, and its essence differs from that of solving international disputes. Thus defending the nation through the use of arms in case of foreign attacks does not violate the Constitution. Article 9 recognizes the right of self-defense of Japan, an independent nation. Hence the self-defense Forces, whose mission is to defend the nation, and the establishment of a capable corps with the necessary limits to serve the purpose of self-defense, do not violate the Constitution in any way."¹⁹

A "Minimum Level" of Strength. The government's view remains that Article 9 does not deny the right of self defense and that therefore the maintenance of the minimum level of armed strength necessary to exercise this right is not restricted. This "minimum level" is subjectively defined and is relative to the world situation at any given time; qualitative and quantitative analysis of the threat determines what force structure is required to defend Japan.

Japan defines two conditions that must exist before the right of self defense can be invoked.²⁰ First, there must be an act of aggression against Japan, or the threat of one. Second, no appropriate means other than self defense may exist to deal with it. If self defense is finally resorted to, only the minimum necessary force may be used.

Concerning collective defense, the position is that agreements of this type would exceed the minimum level of security necessary for the defense of Japan and are therefore prohibited under the Constitution. However, as a sovereign state, Japan has the same right to collective defense under international law as all other sovereign nations.²¹

The use of force to defend Japan is not confined to the geographic scope of Japanese territorial land, sea, and air space. However, the exact boundaries of defensive action are difficult to define, especially in the case of the MSDF. Generally speaking, the government believes that the Constitution does not permit the dispatch of the SDF to foreign territory, waters, or air space, as such deployment would go beyond the "minimum level" necessary for defense and run counter to the portion of Article 9 renouncing "the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes." In fact, in 1954, the same year the SDF was established, an uneasy House of Councilors passed a motion (the Overseas Dispatch Prohibition Resolution) forbidding such deployments.²² This stricture has become central to the debate on participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

Japan's inability to participate in the UN-sanctioned Gulf war against Iraq in 1991, excepting minesweeping units sent following the end of hostilities, resulted in a national debate concerning Japan's role in future UN operations. Though it had provided financial support amounting to \$13 billion for Gulf war operations and for aid to countries most seriously affected economically by the conflict, Japan was criticized harshly in some sectors for not having done more.²³ Desiring to provide leadership in the international community commensurate with its status as an economic superpower, and realizing that this goal would not be accomplished through financial donations alone, in the summer of 1992 Japan passed the International Peace Cooperation Bill and a bill for revision of the International Emergency Relief Corps Law. These laws allow Japanese SDF personnel to participate in UN peacekeeping outside Japan provided certain prerequisites can be assured:

- "Agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached among the parties to the conflict."
- "The parties to the conflict, including the territorial states, shall have given their consent to deployment of the peacekeeping force and Japan's participation in the force."
- "The peacekeeping force shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any party to the conflict."
- "Should any of the above guideline requirements cease to be satisfied, the government of Japan may withdraw its contingent."
- "Use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the lives, personnel, etc."²⁴

It should be emphasized that these two laws that allow SDF participation in UN peacekeeping operations and disaster relief were passed only after considerable debate and in the face of significant opposition from certain sectors of Japan's government and general populace. Japan's Asian neighbors, who remember only too well Japanese troop "deployments" of fifty years ago, have also been apprehensive over the passage of these laws. Japanese opposition parties, of course, insist that they violate the Constitution, specifically Article 9; even many supporters concede the apparent problem and suggest that any further broadening of these laws would require a constitutional amendment.²⁵

The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement

The most important factors in the stability of the Asia-Pacific region over the past forty years have been the presence of American forces and the Mutual Defense Treaty between Japan and the United States. The success of this relationship during the Cold War is indisputable. It deterred Soviet aggression and allowed many of the local economies, notably those of Japan and South

Korea, to flourish without the burden of providing entirely for their own defense. The United States also was well served in that it had access to stable markets and enjoyed military alliances that enhanced its position against the Soviet Union and facilitated movement to the Middle East. It is fair to say that the security arrangements between Japan and the U.S. worked very well not only for the two countries but for the entire free world as well.

During the past twenty years, Japan's Self-Defense Forces received significant quantitative and qualitative improvements. The justification offered by Japanese politicians and Defense Agency officials centered around the need to counter Soviet military capabilities. Additionally, Japan was increasingly under pressure to help provide for its own defense as the financial burden of the Cold War upon the United States grew greater. Today, however, the end of the Cold War makes it logical for both nations to ask, "How has Japan's need for self defense changed?" and, "Is the Mutual Defense Treaty still necessary?" What, then, is the future of this relationship?

The history of the JMSDF shows that despite Japan's "Peace Constitution," and even prior to the escalation of the Cold War, leaders in both Japan and the United States realized that Japan could not exist without adequate provision for self defense. It was true immediately following World War II; it was true during the Cold War; and it remains true today. Geopolitically, Japan lies in a region of extreme diversity and a long history of conflict between nations and cultures. The fact that Japan is an island nation relying almost exclusively on imported raw materials makes its survival as a nation forever dependent upon access to foreign resources and markets via unrestricted sea lanes. In view of this, the only real questions become, "To what extent will Japan contribute to the maintenance of a stable world order?" and, "To what extent will it assist in keeping sea lanes open?" Both conditions are vital to the national security of Japan. It is in this context that the security relationship between Japan and the United States is most likely to develop over the long term.

Economics. As the world's two largest economies, inseparably linked for the foreseeable future, Japan and the United States have a vested interest in the economic success of one another. Both Japan and America are struggling with sluggish economies, and America is further burdened with a budget deficit that even optimistic economists estimate will require many years to reduce significantly. Given growing economic competition, these factors and others make occasional trade friction likely to increase between Japan and the U.S. Such friction is, however, unlikely to be allowed to intensify to such a point that it jeopardizes the close relationship between the two countries. If it does interfere in the bilateral relationship, that will have been the unfortunate result of poor

diplomatic policy, a lack of mutual understanding; it will not have been at all in the best interest of either nation.

Politics. In the political arena several emerging trends will probably lead to a Japanese political philosophy more independent than at present from United States leadership. Most important among them is the Japanese government's desire, already noted, to play a more active world leadership role, one commensurate with the nation's economic stature. Japan seems no longer willing simply to follow the lead of the United States in international politics, perhaps as much as a result of restored national pride as of a desire to ensure that Japan's national interests are represented. The United States supports this orientation and since 1979 has endorsed Japan's bid for a permanent Security Council seat. Because the two nations' interests are so closely tied, most U.S. analysts foresee mainly positive results from increased Japanese influence in world affairs. In fact, many see Japan's leadership as critical to maintaining the balance of power in Asia as China begins to wield increasing influence in the region by virtue of its own economic growth and military modernization. United States policy envisions for Japan a more influential role in guiding other Asian countries toward democracy and political stability.²⁶

One concern of some Japanese is America's commitment to Japan now that the Cold War has ended. The unease stems, to some degree, from the apparent willingness of the U.S. to embrace Russia, a country that has yet to conclude a formal peace treaty with Japan (due to the Northern Territories issue) and still maintains considerable forces in the Far East. Another concern is likely American response to limited acts of aggression against Japan. These are real concerns, and it would seem to be in the best interest of both nations for the U.S. to continue to demonstrate its commitment to Japan.

While United States interests in Asia have changed as a result of the end of the Cold War, they have not diminished in any way. Regional stability is still essential to the economic well-being of the U.S. and its allies around the world, and American presence in Japan remains essential to that stability. Military withdrawal would likely require Japan to increase its own defense capability. Other nations in the region, still mindful of the aggression inflicted upon them in World War II and wary of any Japanese movement toward a power-projection capability, would probably embark upon a large, rapid military buildup to counter a perceived rearmament of Japan. This development, in turn, would undoubtedly lead to military and political instability detrimental to continued economic growth and prosperity in the region. At present, even the administration of President William Clinton, elected in part due to his pledge to reduce defense spending, has acknowledged the need to maintain a credible level of

U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region despite the budgetary crisis and military down-sizing.

In short, the importance of the alliance between Japan and the United States is effectively unchanged by the end of the Cold War. As long as the United States intends to play a leading role in the security, both economic and military, of Asia, it seems in its best interest and Japan's to maintain this alliance. While the United States struggles with its debt problems, there may be even more pressure upon Japan to assist, financially and logistically, in maintaining U.S. forces in that country. The military relationship also is likely to become, more and more, one of equal partnership in the region. The future will probably involve greater sharing of advanced technology and cooperative development of technology designed to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region.

Japan's Relations with Regional Powers

Several countries of Asia are today in periods of great uncertainty and change as a result of the end of the Cold War, the enormous economic success of many Asian nations, and the corresponding political clout such success brings. Over the past four decades, most countries in the area have flourished under the security umbrella of the United States. The success of bilateral security agreements, designed primarily as safeguards against communist aggression, provided stability and contributed to the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.

Despite the obvious difficulty of predicting the future of the Asia-Pacific region and Japan's corresponding role, it is important to examine the underlying issues, because the forces at work in Asia will undoubtedly affect the course of world history. (For Japan itself, the task is complicated by its constitutional restrictions and the political sensitivity of discussing them. This sensitivity was vividly demonstrated in December 1993 by the resignation of the Director General of the Defense Agency after he had made comments supporting revision of the war-renouncing Constitution.)²⁷ The world as a whole is entering a time when economic power will wield increasing influence, as lesser-developed nations and countries economically devastated by the Cold War seek to raise their standards of living.²⁸ Even the so-called First World nations, particularly the United States, paid a heavy financial price. These economies must now be restructured to remain competitive in increasingly free world trade. Most economists agree that the Asia-Pacific region will fuel the world economy. Developments in Asia, economic and political, will have worldwide repercussions and consequences for Japan's military and naval requirements. Japan's current and probable future relationships with four countries—Russia, China,

North Korea, and, of course, the United States—will in large part determine Japan's defense needs.

Russia. Projections of the political, economic, and military relationship between Japan and Russia are complicated by continuing transition in the former Soviet Union and the uncertain outcome of political and economic reforms. The Cold War left Russia in economic collapse; for the Russians, who have known only authoritarian rule and possess no experience in free-market economics, the transition to a market economy is painful and time-consuming. Infrastructure is lacking, as is a judiciary capable of managing the complicated system of contracts and business regulations necessary to conduct both domestic and international business.²⁹ Faced with these obstacles, Russia will probably take many years to recover economically—provided political reform stays on track.

The collapse of communism created much anticipation in Japan that the Northern Territories issue could at last be resolved, which would lead to better economic ties and a more trusting relationship with Russia. This has yet to happen. Russian nationalist groups and the military establishment both strongly believe that the four disputed islands (Shikotan, Iturup, Kunashir, and the Habomai group) are important to Russian security in the Pacific and that any territorial concessions in the Kuriles would open the door for other border claims around Russia.³⁰ Accordingly, they sternly oppose any suggestion of returning the Northern Territories to Japan. The recent success of nationalist parties in parliament and the lingering Russian military resistance to the return of the islands to Japan has probably decreased the likelihood of a resolution in the near future. This dispute leads Japan to question Russian sincerity about reconciliation, and it seems certain to continue to discourage close relations.

Another primary obstacle to closer relations and larger economic investment in Russia by Japanese investors (and the accompanying political ties that would result) is Russia's economic and political instability. Japanese political leaders have informed Russia of the preconditions for large-scale aid; at a January 1992 Washington conference on aiding the new Commonwealth, the Foreign Minister, Michio Watanabe, listed full transition to a market economy, further political transformation, and a foreign policy "based on law and justice."³¹ Business leaders have also stated prerequisites for private investment in the Russian Far East: stabilization of the ruble and improvement there of basic necessities and social infrastructure such as transportation and environmental protection.³² Clearly, Japan desires expanded economic opportunity in Russia, particularly its Far East; but only after political and market reform is securely in place and irreversible will Japan make a large-scale commitment. Russia's ability to meet these prerequisites is probably still a number of years away.

Regardless of which political party is in power in Moscow, Russia will still control one of the world's largest (and nuclear-capable) armed forces, including a very powerful (at least in numbers) Pacific fleet. Given the size of this force, its close proximity to Japan, the delicate balance of power in the region, and the Northern Territories dispute (which has so far prevented any formal peace treaty between the two countries), the overwhelming consensus among the Japanese is that their nation should "wait and see" before discounting any potential threat from Russia. While the latter is obviously occupied at the moment with internal issues, the vision of an economically recovered Russia that has not truly abandoned past tendencies of settling international disputes with force clearly concerns many Japanese for the "mid to long term."³³ Japan's geographic location as a potential barrier to Russian access to the Pacific Ocean makes Japan a consideration in Russian military strategy, and vice versa. A true warming of relations between Russia and Japan will involve a difficult transition for both countries. Their history of animosity, mistrust, and even conflict, is a long one.

China. From a Japanese perspective, it is very possible that the end of the twentieth century will be remembered as the "good old days" of Sino-Japanese relations. Trends currently underway in the People's Republic of China will undoubtedly change the economic, political, and military complexion of Asia in the twenty-first century. These trends include "marketization" of China's structured economy and modernization of its military forces. When one looks where these trends could lead, it is difficult to envision a future situation in China that will serve Japan's national interest better than the current one.

China's market policies, introduced in 1979, have already generated enormous expansion in the Chinese economy. From 1984 through 1990 China's growth rate is reported to have averaged 9 percent per year.³⁴ Projections differ for China's sustainable economic growth over the next several years, but they range from about 6 percent to as high as 9 percent.³⁵ There are, of course, many factors that can restrict any economy, and China is no exception. The Tokyo-based Institute for International Policy Studies has identified four factors that impede growth in China: "inadequate transportation capacity, energy shortages, and environmental pollution—all of which can be eliminated by economic measures—and the low level of education, which requires a more fundamental long-term effort."³⁶ These factors are manageable, and few analysts doubt, barring a reversal of government policies (unlikely after fifteen years of experience of the benefits of a market economy), that China will develop into an economic heavyweight early in the twenty-first century. *The Economist* points out that "present day China, as measured by purchasing power parity, is the third largest economic power in the world, next only to the United States and Japan, and will be the top economic power by 2010."³⁷ While this report may be overly

optimistic, the point is clear—China is fast becoming an economic force to be reckoned with. It is this increased economic power that is financing the modernization of China's military, which is of particular concern to the countries of Asia, including Japan.

In the past several decades, China's massive military force was structured primarily to defeat territorial aggression. Today, however, like many countries, China is restructuring its military forces and reducing their size. In fact, since the mid-1980s it has reduced the number of personnel in uniform by 25 percent and is reportedly considering further cuts.³⁸ However, defense spending, which had been declining in the mid-1980s, has increased significantly since 1988. Since 1990 it has constituted approximately 9.8 percent of the gross national product (GNP), but actual defense expenditures increased 13 percent from 1991 to 1992 and by 14.9 percent from 1992 to 1993.³⁹ The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency estimates that "when adjusted for inflation, budgeted defense spending—which may account for only half the country's military spending—fell 21 percent from 1984–1988 . . . but had risen 22 percent since 1988."⁴⁰ While not out of line as a percentage of GNP, this outlay could be cause for concern. This money is being spent to modernize China's forces, especially its navy and air force, the arms that represent China's ability to extend its maritime interests and territorial claims should an armed struggle occur. China's acquisition of a new generation of destroyers and frigates with surface-to-surface missiles and electronic warfare systems will significantly upgrade its capabilities in the South China Sea. Air cover at sea has been enhanced by the 1992 acquisition of twenty-four Su-27 long-range, air-superiority fighters from Russia and the construction of an airfield on Yong Xing Island in the Paracels.⁴¹ It is also reported that China is at least considering obtaining an aircraft carrier of some sort.⁴² China is clearly structuring its forces to obtain a modest power-projection capability.

In the near term, however, there is no significant threat to Japan from China. The Chinese political leadership, having witnessed the dismal failure of Soviet communism, is convinced that it must proceed with market reforms.⁴³ This process must occur rapidly, lest China's own political system experience public dissatisfaction and instability. Therefore the nation is not likely to embark soon upon a confrontational path.

Nevertheless, in 1992 China asserted, in its Territorial Waters Act, a claim over the Spratly Islands, the northerly Paracel Islands, Taiwan, and Senkaku Island (which Japan claims) located at the southern tip of the Ryukyus island chain off the northern coast of Taiwan in the East China Sea. Beijing then awarded to an American oil company an exploration concession between the Spratlys and the southern Vietnamese coast and reserved the right to use force to protect it.⁴⁴ In addition, the construction of the airfield on Yong Xing underscores the seriousness of China's commitment to use force if necessary to

enforce its territorial claims. These claims of course include the natural resources and fishing rights associated with the islands.

China's geographic position adjoining Japan's sea lines of communication, a pending territorial dispute over Senkaku Island, the modernization of China's naval forces, and China's unclear intentions for the latter, seem ample reason for Japanese concern. Given the mutual suspicion of each nation that the other seeks to dominate the region, the possibility for conflict in the long term appears real for many Japanese. They see China as clearly the most significant potential threat to regional security for the coming years.

From Japan's perspective, the worst possible outcome of China's "marketization" and modernization would be for that nation to enforce territorial claims, especially against Senkaku Island. Military action to resolve territorial disputes could easily spill over and threaten Japan's sea lanes through the South China Sea. This concern is exacerbated by the fear that the U.S. would not militarily assist Japan in a dispute with China over Senkaku Island. With its current force structure, the JMSDF would be hard pressed to enforce Japan's claim, due primarily to the lack of air cover.

North Korea. Unquestionably, the primary near-term threat to regional stability in Northeast Asia is North Korea. Its government, often described as "unpredictable," embarked in 1994 upon a dangerous game of "cat and mouse" with the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency over nuclear facilities. Suspected by the international community of developing nuclear weapons, North Korea refused inspections by the IAEA and caused severe concern by threatening to withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty. It is generally accepted by the major regional powers, including Russia, China, and Japan, that stability in North Korea is key to maintaining peace in Northeast Asia and to preventing a new arms race there.

In the long term, the seriousness of the threat posed to Japan from the Korean Peninsula will depend on the course of reunification and the attitude of the resulting government toward Japan. There is, of course, long-standing animosity on both sides. Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa's attempt to better relations with South Korea with an apology for Japan's wartime conduct in Korea received criticism at home.⁴⁵ From Japan's viewpoint, a unified Korea's intentions will be seen in how quickly it reduces the enormous size of its combined armed forces. That is, while the current situation on the Korean Peninsula has its dangers, a reunified Korea could also present problems for Japan.

The Future of the JMSDF

If one could accurately forecast political, economic, and military developments in the countries around Japan and foretell the success of diplomatic efforts toward their governments, then it would be possible to predict Japan's defense requirements, future missions, and "force structure"—that is, what assets it will have and how they will be organized. We have just seen the difficulty of such politico-economic forecasts, however. Military prediction is also complicated by the definition of "threat" in itself. It is a function of both capability and intent; capability may be (or seem) easy to measure, but intent is elusive and changeable.

Still, there are two possible developments that, if they were to occur, would change the missions and structure of the JMSDF more than would any other that could arise in the Asia-Pacific region. The first would be escalation of economic friction between the United States and Japan to such a point that American forces are withdrawn. Were this to occur before real trust of Japan on the part of its neighbors existed, a rapid and destabilizing arms buildup could result, as already noted. The second would be a Chinese decision not only to modernize but significantly enlarge its South China Sea forces. That would bring on at the minimum a moderate buildup of Japanese forces even if the U.S.-Japan security treaty remained in effect. With these two possibilities in mind, however, it is possible at least to sketch the evolution of missions and capabilities of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force in the near, middle, and far terms, as far out as 2010.

Mission Areas. One highly plausible area for JMSDF activity is United Nations operations and international disaster relief. Perhaps the most visible items of evidence of Japan's desire to play a more influential role in international politics are its bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and the passage in 1992 of the so-called "PKO Bill" authorizing SDF personnel to participate in UN peacekeeping. There are major issues here for both Japan and the United Nations, but it is very possible that Japan's Self-Defense Forces will play an increasing role in peacekeeping and in disaster relief operations in the coming years. MSDF participation could take several forms, including transportation of peacekeeping forces, logistical support to deployed ground SDF units, refugee evacuation, and emergency evacuation of Japanese personnel. The National Defense Program Outline currently being reviewed within the Defense Agency could well identify roles of this nature for the MSDF as part of Japan's growing UN-support activity.

A second mission area is the defense of the home islands and the sea lanes. The MSDF's primary wartime missions, in conjunction with the U.S. Seventh Fleet, are protection of Japan's sea lines of communication, deterring territorial

aggression, and controlling the major straits (Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima) surrounding Japan.⁴⁶ With the currently reduced Russian threat, mission priorities may reflect greater attention toward Japan's southern sea lanes and decreased emphasis on mainland defense in the northern regions. In 1981 Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki, visiting President Ronald Reagan, announced that Japan would commit the MSDF to protecting Japan's sea lanes out to a thousand nautical miles from the home islands.⁴⁷ Since that announcement, a thousand miles has remained the generally accepted area of responsibility for the JMSDF. Unless a major balance of power shift occurs in the Asia-Pacific region and political considerations accordingly dictate otherwise, there is little likelihood of change; expanding the area of responsibility would require additions of force sure to bring strong objections from Asian neighbors.

A third likely mission is the protection of ocean resources and outlying islands. The dispute over Takeshima Island (with South Korea) seems unlikely to be dangerous; however, those with China over Senkaku Island and, less directly, China's dispute with other regional nations over the Spratlys and Paracels, and how this dispute will be resolved, are of particular concern for Japanese defense planners. If matters so develop that China attempts to take possession of other disputed islands by force, for instance the Spratly or Paracel islands, Japan will be, as noted, in a difficult position militarily to enforce its claim to Senkaku. Its vulnerabilities make it likely that ocean resource and island defense priorities will be expanded as MSDF missions in the long term.

Finally, there is the mission of theater missile defense, or TMD. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—biological, chemical, and nuclear—is a problem rapidly approaching crisis proportions. The best known examples of countries obtaining such weapons are Iran, Iraq, and North Korea—although these are certainly not the only states seeking to obtain this capability. Certain states may obtain in the coming decade not only weapons of mass destruction but, even more alarming, the means of delivery. Japan, in response to this threat, is considering seriously the concept of regional protection against ballistic missiles. One option may involve an improved version of the Patriot system, another an upgrade to its Aegis shipboard systems and Standard missile so as to develop a TMD capability that could be integrated with emerging U.S. programs. The U.S. Navy is currently investigating this option with its own Aegis ships as well.⁴⁸

The cost-effectiveness of such a system aside, a significant question Japan may have to answer concerns related cooperative security arrangements with other nations; remote sensors (e.g., satellites), which markedly improve detection and tracking and would thereby enhance the system's performance, would involve third-party nations and therefore pose a difficult political dilemma for Japan.⁴⁹ Such arrangements are now considered to be prohibited by Article 9 of the

Constitution. This restriction may prove to be a formidable obstacle should Japan elect to proceed with regional TMD development. If a theater missile defense system is developed, the JMSDF, with its Aegis-equipped warships, will likely play a large role.⁵⁰

Force Structure. Barring a catastrophic regional development, the outlook for the JMSDF is one of continued modernization, training, emphasis on high technology, and a slight reduction in size. In the near term (through the end of the century), budget restraints and the disappearance of the East-West confrontation seem likely to cause the total numbers of ships to decline slightly, through gradual retirement and a reduced rate of procurement. The current Mid-Term Defense Program was amended for these reasons in 1992. As a result, the MSDF is planning to have fifty-six destroyers by the end of 1995 instead of the original target of sixty.⁵¹ Acquisition of the P-3C maritime patrol aircraft and of other aircraft was reduced as well. The existing goal of a total of 220 combat aircraft will probably be cut in the next program.

One important planned asset is a landing ship of 8,900 tons, intended to replace the old tank landing ships. The new type will be capable of operating air-cushion landing craft; accordingly, it will greatly improve the MSDF's logistical effectiveness, which would be particularly important in peacekeeping operations.

Fleet organization is not likely to change, though some transfer of assets to the south is a possibility. In the middle to long term, the most significant changes will occur if a TMD mission is undertaken. That would probably necessitate a significant increase in the number of Aegis-capable ships and, due to the high cost of the system, reductions in other MSDF assets. Also, many members of the MSDF seem eager to obtain a vertical-and-short-takeoff-and-landing (VSTOL) carrier to improve air defense; however, this is unlikely unless either China obtains a carrier (causing Japan and its neighbors to agree that Japan should also obtain one) or the U.S. can no longer deploy a conventional CV in Japan and Tokyo elects to obtain its own non-nuclear carrier rather than allow a U.S. nuclear-powered ship to be stationed there.

Finally, an anticipated shortage of recruitment-age personnel, caused by Japan's aging population, could bring about the need to increase significantly the size of the MSDF reserve forces. Increasing the reserve component, presently of insignificant numbers, could be seen as a way to provide the qualified personnel necessary to operate today's high-technology warfare systems in Japan's labor-short economy.

The issues and variables affecting Japan's defense are indeed complicated and numerous. First, Japan is dependent upon access to world markets and resources for its very survival, as acknowledged by the U.S. even in the immediate

aftermath of World War II. Accordingly, Japan's sea lines of communication must be secure. Second, the Asia-Pacific region will probably experience political realignments, economic growth, and military modernization (if not outright buildup) during the coming decades. Major changes are likely in many of the countries surrounding Japan; indeed, Russia is currently in the midst of such an upheaval. The course of these changes in neighboring countries, as of now unpredictable, will heavily influence Japan's defense policies over the next fifteen years. Third, Japan's international policies are still very much affected by the lingering memories of Japan's efforts to bring about the "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere." As a result, Japan is acutely aware of its need to earn international respect and trust, especially from its immediate neighbors. Finally, since its inception, the United States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty has been the cornerstone of Asia-Pacific security. The treaty continues to serve well the interests of both nations, and it is viewed by nearly all regional nations as being an indispensable stabilizing influence. For now and the foreseeable future, there is no acceptable substitute for that treaty. These four facts, or more specifically, their interrelationships, will constitute the driving force behind Japan's policies toward defense and United Nations support over the next fifteen years.

If and when the democratic and free market reforms within Russia are secure, and once the Northern Territories dispute is settled, perhaps Japan can fully relax with respect to its northern neighbor. If and when the Korean Peninsula, Japan's closest neighbor and historical rival, no longer presents a threat to regional stability, perhaps Japan can relax to the west. If and when the potential of Chinese expansion is removed and Japan's sea lanes to the south are unthreatened, perhaps Japan can relax in that direction.

For now, Japan cannot relax. The region today is relatively calm; but change is coming in many forms, and change often creates instability. Given the unpredictable possibilities for the Asia-Pacific region, even an optimist would have difficulty envisioning all of them developing in such a way as to enhance Japan's security. Japan's most likely and prudent security policy appears to be to continue to pursue a modern, well trained, high-technology defense capability. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, working closely with U.S. forces, will be vital in maintaining the nation's defense and ensuring regional stability.

Notes

1. Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, *The Sea War in Korea* (Manchester, N.H.: Ayer, 1957), p. 142.
2. James Auer, *The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-1971* (New York: Irvington, 1973).
3. Arleigh Burke, personal papers (Washington: Naval History Division, 1951), quoted in Auer. For Cold War hostilities and U.S. and Japanese government concern over the Soviet threat, see Martin E. Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968* (New York and London: Columbia Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 23-42.

4. Quoted in "Kokkai Rongi no Naka no Jieitai" (The Self-Defense Forces in Diet discussions), *Keizai Orai*, June 1967, p. 119.

5. Auer, pp. 94–9. Auer cites Aso Shigeru of the National Diet Library.

6. Article 8, "Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States Forces Japan," *United States–Japan Agreements and Other Documents* (Tokyo: U.S. Forces Japan, 1961), p. 50.

7. Until fiscal 1977, major procurement issues were laid out by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet for planning periods of from three to five years; the resulting plans were announced as the First through Fourth Defense Buildup Programs. Prepared under the general guidance of the Basic National Defense Policy of providing "effective defense capability," these programs aimed at a gradual buildup with the goal of procuring "efficient items which are the most effective against an invasion situation in a limited war with conventional weapons." In the early 1970s, the defense buildup became a subject of debate in the National Diet, especially as to the establishment of limits, which were lacking in policies and programs. The National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) became effective in fiscal 1977; it clearly identified the policy of buildup, maintenance, and employment of defensive power.

Because the Finance Ministry and Defense Agency were unable to agree on allocations for the 1961–1966 plan, no formal budget was approved for 1961 (see table 2). Individual ships were authorized in that year on a case basis.

Under the NDPO, planning decisions have been made for each fiscal year. In addition, however, Mid-Term Defense Estimates look out over five-year periods beginning two years after the preparation date; they contain strategic projections for the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces. They are intended for the use not of the government (as the Defense Buildup Programs had been) but of the Japanese Defense Agency, which bases upon them its operational planning and budget requests for each fiscal year. The Mid-Term Estimates are not fixed but are reviewed annually and reissued every three years.

8. Linton Wells II, *The Sea and Japan's Strategic Interest, 1975–1985* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1975). For the broad area of JMSDF development, see Auer.

9. Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1976* (Tokyo: The Japan Times, Ltd.).

10. Wells.

11. Auer, p. 159.

12. Lorell Levin and Arthur Alexander, *The Wary Warriors: Future Directions in Japanese Security Policies* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 1992), p. 8.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

14. Quoted from Osamu Nishi, *Ten Days inside General Headquarters (GHQ): How the Original Draft of the Japanese Constitution Was Written in 1946* (Tokyo: Seibudo Publishing Co., 1989).

15. Osamu Nishi, *The Constitution and the National Defense Law System in Japan* (Tokyo: Seibudo Publishing Co., 1987).

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Ibid.*

18. "Jieita: Ho" (Self-Defense Forces Law), chap. 3, art. 1.

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Ibid.*

21. The one exception to this policy is, of course, the "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security" of 23 June 1960 between Japan and the U.S. Article V reads in part: "Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. . . ." Article VII declares in part, "This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security."

22. *Ibid.*

23. Francis Fukuyama and Kongdan Oh, *U.S.-Japan Security Relationship After the Cold War* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 1993).

24. Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1993* (Tokyo: The Japan Times, Ltd.).

25. Fukuyama and Oh, p. 20.

26. Dick Cheney, *Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., January 1993), pp. 4, 21–2.

27. *Japan Times*, 3 December 1993.

28. Samuel Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests," *Survival*, February 1991.

29. Stephen Blank, "We Can Live Without You: Rivalry and Dialogue in Russo-Japanese Relations," *Comparative Strategy*, June 1993, p. 180.

30. Fukuyama and Oh, p. 10.

31. Blank, p. 181.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
33. A Russian border guard vessel opened fire on two Japanese boats fishing off the southern Kurile islands on 15 August 1994, wounding at least one crewmember. The two boats were fishing inside disputed Russian Pacific waters. It was one of the most serious episodes in the forty-year dispute between Russia and Japan over the islands. *The New York Times*, 16 August 1994.
34. Barber B. Conable, Jr., and David Lampton, "China: The Coming Power," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1992, p. 135.
35. Hisahiro Kanayama, *The Marketization of China and Japan's Response: Prospects for the Future* (Tokyo: Institute for International Policy Studies, 1993), pp. 16-7.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-8.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
38. Conable and Lampton, p. 135.
39. Fukuyama and Oh, p. 11.
40. Conable and Lampton, p. 136.
41. Bonnie Glaser, "China's Security Perceptions, Interests and Ambitions," *Asian Survey*, March 1993, p. 265.
42. "Chinese Buy Russian Carrier," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, September 1992, p. 123. The sale is unconfirmed, however; see Alexander C. Huang, "The Chinese Navy's Offshore Active Defense Strategy: Conceptualization and Implications," *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1994, esp. p. 7.
43. Glaser pp. 266-8.
44. "South China Sea: Treacherous Shoals," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13 August 1992, p. 15.
45. *Japan Times*, 7 November 1993.
46. *Defense of Japan 1993*.
47. Lee H. Endress and Karl H. Eulenstein, *U.S.-Japan Security Relationship in the 1990s*, Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Command (J55) Background Paper, August 1991. (The views, opinions, and findings contained in that paper are those of the authors and should not be construed as an official USCINCPAC position, policy, or decision unless so designated by official documents.)
48. William D. Smith, "Creating Defenses against Theater Ballistic Missiles Is an Awesome Challenge," *Almanac of Sea Power*, January 1994, pp. 12-3.
49. A defense issues advisory group formed by former Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa recently reported to Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama that Japan needs to acquire an improved intelligence-gathering capability, build a missile defense system, and prepare to dispatch forces for UN peacekeeping missions. The panel of businessmen, academics, and former government bureaucrats said that Japan's laws should be amended so the country can take part more fully in peacekeeping missions. Some specific recommendations include shifting priorities to "high tech" equipment for the Ground Self-Defense Force, reducing ASW vessels and aircraft, seeking closer cooperation with the U.S. on TMD, and improving the JMSDF sea patrol, surface battle, and air defense capabilities. See Eiichiro Sekigawa, "Panel Urges Overhaul of Japan's Military" *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 22 August 1994, p. 59.
50. See Smith, esp. p. 12.
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Ψ

The wisdom of the scribe depends
on the opportunity of leisure;
and he who has little business may become wise.

Ecclesiasticus 38:24

Balancing Efficiency with Equity in Foreign Defense Acquisitions

Dennis B. Wilson

NATIONS PURCHASE WEAPONS TO DEFEND and advance state interests, but the decision to acquire any major weapon system must also consider the economic impact, for at least two reasons. First, weapons are purchased with the taxpayers' money and must therefore be justified politically. Political justification often requires being able to point to the benefits of an acquisition for the domestic economy. Second, nations seek to preserve a defense industrial base, a collection of industries capable of producing weapon systems or parts thereof, so as to minimize dependence on other nations for essential arms. These defense industrial bases need to produce if they are to be sustained.

The perceived need for defense acquisitions to provide economic benefits and to support a defense industrial base can lead governments to maintain entire industries. For example, Sweden, a nation of approximately nine million people, produces expensive high-technology fighter aircraft. Israel, an even smaller nation of five million, built the Kfir fighter and sought to produce the Lavi, a very expensive, state-of-the-art aircraft. Even when a government has decided to buy military equipment from a foreign source, however, it often seeks to negotiate *offsets*—a collective term for various industrial and commercial concessions extracted from sellers by foreign governments or firms as conditions for purchasing military exports.¹ Examples include coproduction, licensed

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production, subcontractor production, overseas investment, technology transfer, and countertrade.² Offsets may be implemented in three ways or combinations of them: directly (an agreement that components for the items being purchased will be produced within the country buying them), "semidirectly" (an agreement that the vendor will incorporate components produced by the purchasing nation in items sold to third countries or even domestically), and indirectly (all other types of economic activity that the purchasing nation agrees to "count" towards the seller's offset obligation).³ Of these three types of offset, the direct and semidirect are of the most concern, because they affect the production and cost of the item being acquired and may have long-term effects on the ability of the original vendor to sell it, either domestically or abroad. While indirect offsets may have an important aggregate economic effect, it is difficult to measure the effect of any individual indirect offset.

The amount of money being spent worldwide on armaments has declined as a result of the end of the Cold War.⁴ This decline has resulted in economic pressures on weapons manufacturers and has heightened national concerns about preserving defense industrial bases.⁵ Hence the economic and military effects of offsets have become more important than ever. Balancing the efficient development and production of weapons with the need to allocate economic benefits equitably will be a growing, yet difficult to achieve, priority for governments and contractors. This article describes the effects of several well known offset transactions, reviews how governments have sought to procure weapon systems at reasonable cost while justifying politically the acquisition from foreign suppliers, describes the half-hearted efforts of the U.S. government to limit offsets in transactions financed by its own money, then suggests some measures for achieving a better balance between efficiency and political acceptability.

Offsets become a public policy concern for the nation of the vendor for the same reasons that the purchasing nation asks for them in the first place. First, offsets reduce the money that flows into the seller's nation as a result of the sale, thus reducing the economic advantage from it and affecting the balance of trade with the purchasing nation.⁶ Second, an agreement to produce all or part of a weapon system elsewhere may reduce a nation's defense industrial base. Part of this concern involves technology transfer, that is, selling one's defense or industrial secrets to actual or potential competitors. Third, the purchasing nation may pass on weapons, parts, or technology to nations unfriendly to the nation of the original vendor. On the other hand, although the vendor's nation and the purchasing nation have clearly conflicting interests when offsets are negotiated, keeping the cost of the weapon system reasonable is a large unifying interest. Certain offsets, like coproduction (discussed below), may raise costs significantly

and, if they result in seriously inefficient production arrangements, reduce the number of weapons that can be purchased.

Coproduction: The Most Visible Offset

Of all the types of offset, coproduction has the greatest and easiest to measure economic effect, since it affects the cost of the very item being acquired. Offsets such as countertrade have an overall economic effect and may even have devastating impact on small or localized industries, but, in general, their effects are more diffuse and difficult to measure than those of coproduction. Coproduction is an arrangement that enables a foreign company to acquire the know-how to manufacture or assemble, repair, maintain, and operate all or part of a defense item. It may be implemented either directly between governments or through specific licensing arrangements by designated commercial firms. Coproduction arrangements may include codevelopment: an agreement to design and develop a new or modified model of equipment in the expectation that it will eventually be produced.⁷

Vendors and their nations resist coproduction. Firms have little incentive to set up potential rivals in foreign countries and possibly lose sales both in their customers' countries and in others in which the latter may market their new products; their nations have the same concerns, since coproduction may have adverse balance-of-trade implications and reduce the domestic defense industrial base. Nevertheless, the immediate economic gains to the vendor resulting from the sale, coupled with the economic benefits for the purchasing nation and its industrial base of insisting on coproduction, are so substantial that coproduction remains a popular form of offset.⁸

An illustration of coproduction is the agreement between McDonnell Douglas and British Aerospace for the former to build T-45A Goshawks for the U.S. Navy; these jet trainers are a variant of the British Hawk aircraft. While British Aerospace would have preferred to be the direct supplier, that arrangement would have been politically unacceptable to the U.S., because of the number of aerospace industry jobs involved and the cost of the contract. On the other hand, by accepting McDonnell Douglas as a coproducer, British Aerospace secured a valuable contract that included production and delivery of parts of the T-45A airframe and engine, as well as the licensing fee.⁹

Acquisition Costs. Coproduction almost always raises costs.¹⁰ The vendor already has production facilities and arrangements with subcontractors and suppliers; if simply acquiring the item for the least cost were the objective, buying "off-the-shelf" would be the solution. The U.S. itself ordinarily insists on eventual domestic manufacture of systems that it acquires from vendors in

foreign countries. The T-45A is one example; two others are the Beretta M-9 pistol and the Fabrique National M-249 squad automatic weapon. While these arrangements have the potential for inefficiency, the American military market is so large that its facilities can ordinarily attain the economies of scale necessary to avoid dramatically increased costs. When the purchasing country seeks to replicate all or some of these production assets, inefficiencies arise.¹¹ For relatively simple items such as ammunition, coproduction may not raise costs significantly, since the acquiring nation can achieve the economies of scale necessary to produce efficiently.¹² For a technologically sophisticated system, however, acquisition costs can rise dramatically.

One good example is the Egyptian M1A1 tank. The reasons for coproduction were largely political. In the early 1980s, Egypt decided to modernize its army by procuring a new main battle tank. Egyptian officials, noting that Israel, India, and Brazil all produced (or proposed to produce) tanks, decided that Egypt, as the most populous country in the Arab world, should do so also.¹³ In August 1984, General Dynamics and the government of Egypt signed a \$150 million contract, financed by U.S. foreign military assistance, for a tank factory; Egypt spent an additional \$605 million to build it. When Cairo approached Washington with its proposal to coproduce the M1A1, the existence of the plant, and the fact that the Egyptians saw in tank coproduction an important indicator of American support, caused the U.S. government to agree.¹⁴ In the end, coproducing tanks in Egypt raised the cost of each M1A1 from \$3.6 million to \$5.2 million.¹⁵

This U.S.-Egyptian coproduction program is by no means unique in raising costs. Japan will spend about twice the money per plane to acquire its FS-X fighter (\$61 million apiece in 1988 dollars) than it would have cost to buy an equivalent number of U.S.-built F-16s (\$28 million apiece).¹⁶ The Japanese government chose this course of action for reasons of industrial development and political acceptability. In the late 1970s the Japan Defense Agency began considering replacing its fleet of domestically produced F-1 fighters. The U.S. Department of Defense sought to persuade the Agency to purchase a U.S. aircraft off the shelf, but in 1985 the Japanese Technical Research and Development Institute announced that Japan possessed the domestic capability to develop an advanced fighter, except for the engine. From that point on, American efforts turned toward convincing the Japanese to codevelop an aircraft with the U.S.¹⁷

Other Management Problems. If coproduction had only the effect of raising acquisition costs, it would be just another example of the triumph of economic and political goals over narrow cost-effectiveness. In addition, to the extent that a purchasing nation spends its own funds, it is not of overriding concern to the United States whether or not that nation obtains maximum military efficiencies

in its defense expenditures. But coproduction arrangements pose other problems that *do* directly affect the U.S.: the security implications of any transfer of hardware or technology beyond the nation originally acquiring them, and the security and economic effect of both the loss of sales and the establishment of foreign competitors.

Transfer problems result when foreign governments or contractors do not honor limitations that the U.S. government imposes on transfers of the products of coproduction efforts to additional nations. The U.S. has had only limited success in enforcing such restrictions. For example, according to a 1971 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the United States and the Republic of Korea for the coproduction of M-16 rifles, Korea agreed not to transfer rifles or components to third parties without American consent. Nonetheless, according to a General Accounting Office (GAO) study, Korea manufactured more M-16s and components than were permitted by the MOU and sold them.¹⁸ The problems of unauthorized transfer experienced by the Korean M-16 coproduction program are not isolated. In a review of eighteen U.S. military coproduction arrangements with six nations, the GAO found that unauthorized sales had occurred in five programs governed by MOU's and in several governed by Letters of Offer and Acceptance. The GAO found that controls over coproduction were weak and that the U.S. had little ability to verify production quantities or final destinations.¹⁹

Technology transfer issues arise when the U.S. government seeks to limit the knowledge and skills that the vendor can transfer to the acquiring nation as part of a coproduction arrangement; when it seeks to keep the transferred technology out of the hands of countries other than the immediate recipient; or when the U.S. insists on rights to technology developed during the course of the effort. The nation and company receiving the U.S.-developed technology would, naturally, prefer to have unlimited rights to use and transfer it and to be able to protect any technology developed during the coproduction effort.

Technology transfer issues became the dominant concern in the U.S.-Japanese FS-X codevelopment.²⁰ Although the United States pressured Japan to codevelop and coproduce an aircraft in conjunction with an American company, the agreement to do so raised fears that the Japanese company's acquisition of aerospace technology would produce a significant competitor, possibly undermining the American aerospace industrial base.²¹ The concern raised by members of Congress and various agencies caused President George Bush to order, in February 1989, an interagency review of the FS-X agreement. This review resulted in clarifications that increased safeguards for American technology transferred to Japan, and it confirmed U.S. access to technology developed by Japanese industries during the course of the project. Despite these modifications, concern that the Japanese aerospace industry would use the FS-X

program to compete with American firms continued to generate strong opposition, and the program only narrowly missed being disapproved by Congress.²² The FS-X was unusual in that the U.S. was particularly insistent that it be permitted access to technology developed by the Japanese.²³ Whether Japan ever produces an aerospace industry that realizes the fears of FS-X codevelopment opponents, and to what extent the codevelopment effort will have played a role in its doing so, are questions that only time will answer.²⁴

The cumulative effect of offsets on the U.S. defense industrial base has been debated. One economic model, developed by Data Resources Incorporated for the Office of Management and Budget, concluded that export sales increased the real output of the top thirty American defense industries, even after factoring out the offset effects.²⁵ However, at least one microeconomic example, the U.S.-Egyptian M1A1 tank, suggests that offsets may have an adverse effect on the domestic defense industrial base.²⁶ While the U.S. did sell twenty-five complete tanks to Egypt and components for an additional 499 built in Egypt, thus extending worker employment on the domestic M1A1 production line, General Dynamics' own study estimated that coproduction of tanks would, over the long run, significantly reduce American jobs.²⁷ While coproduction was preferable to selling no tanks at all, it was largely financed by U.S. security assistance funds; Egypt would have had difficulty arranging similar foreign funding for another tank from a manufacturer of a different nation.²⁸ In fact, one of Egypt's stated objectives was to produce spare parts for export to other countries that use the M1A1. As long as the Egyptian plant stays in the parts business, it will compete with U.S. firms.

It is difficult to predict the effect of an offset, even one like coproduction, on the defense industrial base of either nation. There are simply too many factors, and subsequent efforts to expand the program may succeed or fail depending on matters that, like the market, are beyond the control of either country.²⁹ Nevertheless, the inherent risk of coproduction—that of setting up a potential rival—is always present.³⁰

A peculiar situation exists for American contractors selling to nations that receive U.S. foreign military assistance.³¹ Governments receiving such assistance (largely Israel and Egypt) often seek to obtain offsets even though the money for the purchase has come from the United States itself. The incongruity of U.S. money being used to extract concessions from domestic contractors has led Washington to try to eliminate offsets in transactions based on foreign military financing, but these efforts have been a good example of exceptions swallowing the rule. On 16 April 1990 the Bush administration issued a policy that "U.S. government funds should not be used to finance offsets in security assistance sales except in accordance with currently established policies and procedures." While

this language appeared to solve the problem, the fact that "established policies and procedures" permitted such offsets meant that matters continued just as before. Congress subscribed to this "non-policy" by incorporating it verbatim in the Defense Production Act of 1992.³² The persistence of offsets that work to the clear economic disadvantage of the U.S.—transactions financed by the U.S. government itself—is an excellent example of the "problem of the commons": all American contractors would be better off if offsets in transactions funded by foreign military financing were eliminated, but each individual contractor continues to offer offsets in order to compete for the foreign military financing that is available.

Attempts to Rationalize Offsets

The fact that offsets cause such problems as those described is not news, and most companies prefer to avoid them. However, because the arms market is very competitive, most find that to sell military systems they must offer acceptable offset packages; accordingly they resist government efforts to limit them.³³ Companies contend that restricting their ability to offer offsets puts them at a competitive disadvantage, an argument generally accepted by the U.S. government.³⁴ Congress has, however, acted to prohibit American contractors from offering to pay third parties to buy from the original foreign customer.³⁵

One effort to rationalize offsets—by developing an economically sound equivalent for them—has been the activity of the Independent European Program Group, or IEPG (now the Western European Armaments Group) to develop an integrated European armaments market.³⁶ In 1986 an IEPG report, *Towards a Stronger Europe*, identified the need for *juste retour*, a fair return, in the form either of technology transfer or work sharing (that is, the ability to produce some portion of the system domestically in order to obtain some direct, immediate economic advantage from the transition) for a purchasing country's investment in a weapons program. While the concept of *juste retour* is similar to offsets in that it seeks to confer an economic benefit on a nation acquiring military systems from another, it differs in operating on a broad, long-term basis rather than project by project. To substitute *juste retour* for offsets, the IEPG members agreed that national contracting procedures would remain in place but that awards would be based on "the most economic offer," regardless of the bidder's country. The proposed criteria included not only price and fulfillment of technical specifications but also the maintenance and strengthening of the European technological and industrial base, *juste retour* (how production of the system would be allocated within the IEPG membership), technology transfer issues, the interests of countries with developing defense industries, and life-cycle costs.³⁷ The IEPG made gradual progress toward improved cross-border

contracting within Europe. The post-Cold War efforts of its successor, the Armaments Group, however, have been delayed by the reluctance of Western European Union members to risk large layoffs in their defense industries, and also by the slow process of restructuring Europe's security organizations.³⁸

Is the idea of *juste retour* as part of a large system of transnational contracting superior to offsets? Offsets are negotiated between two knowledgeable parties and can be tailored in a variety of ways to accommodate differing interests, subject to the approval of the governments involved. The Armaments Group system, by contrast, seeks to fit each proposed transaction into an already existing pattern of defense contracts and related trade. It requires a bureaucracy to implement and has all of the disadvantages associated with attempts to manage any sort of economic activity.³⁹ Moreover, it may be difficult to allocate work shares to the satisfaction of the governments. For example, a nation is unlikely to forego participation in high-technology electronics projects in exchange for a high work share in entrenching tools, no matter how lucrative the manufacture of picks, spades, and shovels may be. Finally, *juste retour* is merely one aspect of a set of reforms designed to lead to a European Defense Equipment Market, a market guided by the principle that an industry from any member country should have equal opportunity to bid for contracts offered by any other member country. Because of difficulties with other portions of the Armaments Group agenda, it may never be successfully implemented.

Despite the drawbacks of *juste retour*, it does have advantages over transaction-specific offsets. First, defense trade is and has been anything but *laissez-faire*.⁴⁰ Interests of national security, balance of trade, and industrial bases constantly influence proposed transactions; the only question is how this influence is to be managed. Second, as discussed, there are difficulties associated with two forms of offset, coproduction and technology transfer. Other forms of offsets also raise problems, although the effects are more difficult to measure and assess.⁴¹ *Juste retour*, by contrast, helps to achieve more efficient development and production, while conferring economic benefits on the participants. It can consider the region-wide effects of sales and technology transfers, and it can produce arrangements more understandable than (often very confusing) offset agreements. A fair test of *juste retour* as a generally available alternative to offsets will apparently have to wait until a European Defense Equipment Market has been established and develops a track record of managing the details of cross-border weapon development and production.

In addition to the efforts of the IEPG and the Armaments Group to establish a more open market for defense equipment within Europe, there has been at least one proposal to expand the idea of an open defense market beyond a single region. In March 1990, the U.S. ambassador to Nato, William Taft, proposed creation of a structure modeled on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

(better known simply as the GATT).⁴² Its members would include the Nato nations plus Japan, South Korea, and Australia. The "defense GATT" would have an agreed code of conduct limiting protectionist practices, eliminating tariffs on defense goods, and establishing dispute settlement mechanisms.

The Nato Conference of National Armaments Directors established a special task group in October 1990 to examine Ambassador Taft's proposal. Its initial report, published in March 1991, reflected the different ideas of the Nato members on the respective roles of government and the market in governing defense production and trade. The report identified both the potential benefits and problems of a defense GATT; the key constraint mentioned was the limited amount of defense trade among Nato allies. It offered four options, ranging from a simple code of conduct to a Nato purchasing agency.

In July 1991 the North Atlantic Council established a group to continue studying the issue and develop the code of conduct recommended by the task group report. In addition, the new Council group attempted to gather statistics on the size and destinations of the arms exports of Nato members—a difficult task since on that subject most nations are even more secretive than the U.S.⁴³ By January 1992 the Council group had proposed a code with a provision very similar to the IEPG's *juste retour*.⁴⁴ The effort toward a defense GATT has, however, been slowed by the same factors that have impeded the efforts of the Armaments Group, as well as by the fact that the United States is a member of neither the Western European Union nor the European Union. It is unlikely that the idea of a defense GATT can be realized until significant progress is made toward a European Defense Equipment Market. It should be noted, however, that American manufacturers fear that the development of such a regional market will shut them off to a significant degree from European sales.⁴⁵

A Worthy Goal But a Major Challenge

While nations have always had to consider the economic consequences of decisions on whether and how to acquire weapons, those considerations will become even more important in the future. The market for armaments is shrinking at the same time that weapons are growing more sophisticated and consequently more expensive. Left unaddressed, these factors lead to acquisition arrangements such as coproduction that drive costs even higher. Moreover, the efforts of individual nations, including the U.S., to maintain domestic defense industrial bases tend to produce fragmented and inefficient industries, causing even higher costs.

Such problems lend themselves to supranational solutions. The idea of apportioning defense development and production so that every nation receives some economic benefit, while costs of development and production are kept

reasonable, has led to efforts by the IEPG, the proposal for a defense GATT, and the idea of a European Defense Equipment Market.⁴⁶ These ideas are worthwhile, but they suffer from being essentially regional efforts to rationalize a worldwide market. European efforts to develop jointly very sophisticated weapon systems (e.g., Eurofighter 2000, the Tiger helicopter, and the Future Large Aircraft) have had major difficulties; in general, any European armaments program that ignores the United States appears highly unrealistic.⁴⁷

If regional efforts to develop an integrated arms market are problematic, perhaps a worldwide defense GATT is possible. Any proposal for a large-scale defense trade agreement, however, runs afoul of the nature of armaments themselves: they are designed to be used *against* other countries—one buys them if one assumes that some other nation or nations may have to be resisted forcibly. States will not accede to the production even of parts of essential weapons in countries that may be hostile, nor have they any incentive to lower weapon acquisition costs for such states. On the other hand, if a worldwide defense GATT is unworkable, one less than worldwide may be seen as threatening by nations left out.⁴⁸ If the cost of sophisticated weapons can be reduced through a system that substantially reduces redundant production facilities, more such weapons can be purchased for a given amount of money—which, even without overt threats, could increase tensions.

Consequently, if efforts to replace offsets with a broader system of apportioned work shares are not likely to yield positive results in the near future, what should the United States do here and now? Several approaches that could reduce the inefficiencies associated with offsets should be tried. First, the U.S. should continue to encourage domestic manufacturers as well as other governments to avoid offsets, especially when they result in conspicuously uneconomical production. While rhetoric may not change behavior immediately, the fact that offsets often lead to substantial inefficiencies needs to be emphasized. Second, offsets should not be permitted in contracts financed with U.S. foreign military funds. It is bad enough for American contractors to have to agree to economically irrational offsets in order to win a contract; it should be intolerable for the U.S. government to provide the money that enables foreign governments to require them. Third, the U.S. should not insist on domestic production of weapon systems if it raises costs significantly and if the reliability of the supplier can be reasonably assured. Finally, the United States should encourage the development of supranational armaments markets in which *juste retour* is substituted for offsets. The fact that there are problems with the idea of a defense GATT—just as GATT itself has problems—does not mean that improved rationality in weapons development and production should not be pursued. Nations nervous that other countries belong to a defense GATT could be encouraged to qualify for membership themselves by changing their behavior. While weapon acquisition,

by its very essence, can probably never be made fully rational economically, its high costs make even partial success a worthy goal. Until the day when nations compete to "beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks," balancing the tension between efficiency and equity in foreign defense acquisitions will be a major challenge to national leaders, military officials, and contractors.

Notes

1. A good definition of offset is contained in U.S. General Accounting Office (hereafter GAO), *Defense Production Act: Offsets in Military Exports and Proposed Amendments to the Act* (Washington: April 1990), p. 1, fn. 1.

2. "Countertrade" refers to economic transactions in which something other than cash is accepted in payment for goods. It can be as simple as barter but often becomes more complicated, because the original seller must dispose of commodities received. In one example, U.S. contractors financed the establishment of a Greek corporation that in turn invested in companies engaged in medical diagnostics, sportswear, wire-bending machines, financial services software, and textiles. In another example, American contractors used brokers to link buyers with foreign commodities sellers in Israel, Turkey, and Greece; the commodities included wiring, petroleum, and chemicals. GAO, *Military Exports: Concerns over Offsets Generated with U.S. Foreign Military Financing Program Funds* (Washington: June 1994), p. 19. Coproduction is discussed below. Licensed production is the grant of a right by a holder of a patent, copyright, or other legal right to another person to engage in production that would otherwise constitute an infringement of the patent, copyright, or other legal right.

3. J.A. Kirtland, *Offsets: What They Are, Why We Do Them*, handout distributed at a conference in Washington, D.C., on the Globalization of the Aerospace and Defense Industries and the Role of Offsets (hereafter Globalization Conference), 5 March 1990, p. 6. See also Joseph Kelley, GAO, "U.S.-Korea Fighter Coproduction Program," testimony before the Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 4 April 1990, p. 7. For descriptions of the offset arrangements in the sale of F/A-18s to Malaysia, Switzerland, and Finland, see Jeff Cole and Sarah Lubman, "Bombs Away: Weapons Merchants Are Going Great Guns in Post-Cold War Era," *The Wall Street Journal*, 28 January 1994, p. A6. For the Malaysian offset transaction, "Malaysian Modernization," *Armed Forces Journal International*, October 1994, pp. 62, 65. The controversy associated with the Finnish transaction is described in Jeff Cole, "Pentagon Contractors Often Offer Cash to Help Foreign Firms Compete in the U.S.," *The Wall Street Journal*, 7 May 1993, p. A4. The indirect offset is especially important, yet difficult to evaluate because it may allow the exporter to count already existing activities toward an offset requirement; it may also allow "multipliers," that is, credits toward an offset obligation reflecting the economic effect of a given amount of money spent in the purchasing country. For example, General Instrument Company claimed to have received \$1 million in offset credits for having spent \$100,000 in South Korea as part of a contract to sell radar warning equipment to that nation. (Author's notes, presentation of Michael Stephen of General Instrument Company, 5 March 1990, Globalization Conference.) A description of how offsets benefit a nation receiving them is contained in Grant Hammond, "Offset, Arms, and Innovation," *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1987, p. 179. Examples of all three types of offsets are contained in GAO, *Military Exports: Concerns over Foreign Military Financing*, pp. 18-9.

4. For a description of the effects of the end of the Cold War on the defense industry, see Gary Pagliano, *Defense Industry in Transition: Issues and Options for Congress*, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, 11 January 1994, pp. 1-4.

5. The effect of defense cutbacks on defense industries and on the export efforts of defense firms and governments is described in "World Market Forces Improved Military Exports," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* (hereafter *AWST*), 14 February 1994, pp. 55-6; and John Tirpak, "Army Aiding Foreign Sales," *AWST*, 9 May 1994, p. 76. One possible response to the shrinking defense market, cross-border mergers, is discussed in John Tirpak, "Next Stop: International Defense Consolidation," *AWST*, 24 October 1994, p. 57.

6. Concerns about the balance-of-trade effects of offsets become especially acute when a vendor agrees to an obligation *in excess* of the amount of the contract, as Boeing did in its sale of Awacs aircraft to the United Kingdom. (F. Clifton Berry, Jr., "British Offset Policy," *National Defense*, May/June 1989, p. 32.)

7. GAO, *Technology Transfer: Japanese Firms Involved in F-15 Coproduction and Civil Aircraft Program* (Washington: June 1992), p. 1.

8. The first instances of coproduction involving American defense contractors were the F-104 Starfighter aircraft and the Hawk anti-aircraft missile systems, with European nations in the late 1950s. (Leo G.B. Welt, "Military Offsets," *National Defense*, March 1984, p. 21.) Further examples include the Turkish F-16 fighter, pursuant to a contract with General Dynamics (Cole and Lubman, p. A7); South Korean M-16 rifles, with Colt Industries (GAO, *U.S.-Korea Coproduction: A Review of the M-16 Rifle Program* [Washington: April 1988], pp. 6-7); and South Korean F-16s, with General Dynamics (Joseph Kelly, GAO, "U.S.-Korea Fighter Coproduction Program—the F-16 Version," testimony before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science, and the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 1 August 1991, pp. 1-6). A comprehensive list of government-to-government coproduction agreements as of 1985 appears in GAO, *Military Coproduction: U.S. Management of Programs Worldwide* (Washington: March 1989), p. 25. One of the most recent candidates for codevelopment and coproduction is the AIM-9X air-to-air missile; see David Hughes, "Review of Foreign Missiles to Parallel AIM-9X Dem/Val," *AWST*, 23 May 1994, pp. 20-1.

9. Norman Polmar, *The Naval Institute Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet*, 15th ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), p. 433.

10. A presidential policy statement of 16 April 1990, developed by an interagency group chaired by the National Security Council, stated the U.S. government's view that certain offsets for military exports are economically inefficient and market-distorting. (GAO, *Military Exports: Implementation of Recent Offset Legislation* [Washington: December 1990], pp. 2-3.) To the extent that foreign customers coproduce American military systems, sales of portions of those systems may result in reduced cost to the U.S. government if manufacturers can spread their overhead costs over a greater number of units; see Hammond, "Offset, Arms, and Innovation," p. 177. This potential for savings is, however, even more true of direct sales than for coproduction. (But see note 15, below.)

11. In addition to production inefficiencies, there are often other costs associated with coproduction, e.g., royalties, and licensing and technical assistance fees. (Kelley, "U.S.-Korea Fighter Coproduction Programs," p. 6.)

12. There has been, for example, little controversy associated with the Greek or Korean coproduction of small arms and artillery ammunition; see GAO, *Military Coproduction*, p. 25.

13. Author's notes of personal conversation with Egyptian Major General Abdel Moneim el Tawil, Deputy Chief of Armaments Ministry, and Brigadier Aly Fahmy, Project Manager, on 3 April 1989, and of conversations with Major General Andrew Cooley and Colonel Terry Carr, U.S. Army, on 4 April 1989.

14. GAO, *Military Aid to Egypt: Tank Coproduction Raised Costs and May Not Meet Many Program Goals* (Washington: July 1993), pp. 1, 10.

15. GAO, *Military Aid to Egypt*, pp. 10-4, 22-6. The cost per tank could climb to as much as \$6 million if the Egyptian government cannot use at least 60 percent of the factory for some other purpose.

16. GAO, *U.S.-Japan Codevelopment: Review of the FS-X Program* (Washington: February 1990), pp. 4, 35. FS-X development costs have continued to rise as the program has progressed, although the Japanese government has declined to provide specific cost data; see GAO, *U.S.-Japan Codevelopment: Update of the FS-X Program* (Washington: June 1992), pp. 3, 18-9. Japan also spent 55-80 percent more to produce the Patriot surface-to-air missile in Japan rather than buying the system off the shelf from Raytheon, while European governments acquiring the Patriot paid about 80 percent more for their coproduction arrangements. Michael Chinworth, "Industry and Government in Japanese Defense Procurement: The Case of the Patriot Missile System," *Comparative Strategy*, no. 3, 1990, pp. 222, 228. The European nations coproducing the F-16 paid about one-third more for each aircraft because of the coproduction arrangement, while the U.S. Air Force paid about 5 percent more for each F-16 that it bought because of coproduction with European manufacturers. (Michael Rich and William Stanley, "Cost and Schedule Implications of Multinational Coproduction," *Defense Management Journal*, no. 2, Second Quarter, 1984, p. 7.)

17. GAO, *U.S.-Japan FS-X Review*, pp. 10-1.

18. Not only did the Korean contractor, Daewoo Precision Industries, sell M-16s and their parts to third parties but it entered into a contract in 1983 with a U.S. company to sell spare parts back to the U.S. While the U.S. sale was blocked by a court injunction, sales of Korean M-16s and parts to other nations continued. (GAO, *U.S.-Korean M-16*, pp. 6-12.)

19. GAO, *Military Coproduction*, pp. 5, 13-9. The precise list of items found by GAO to have been shipped without authority was classified, and they were not identified in the unclassified report. In addition, concerns have been raised about the transfer of U.S.-furnished missile technology by Israel to other nations, but information about such transfers remains classified. (GAO, *U.S.-Israel Arrow/Aces Program: Cost, Technical, Proliferation, and Management Concerns* [Washington: August 1993], p. 3.) For a discussion of other concerns about technology transferred to Israel, see Cole and Lubman, p. A.7.

20. A less dramatic example of problems with technology transfer in a codevelopment effort is contained in GAO, *Weapons Codevelopment: U.S. National Interests in the MLRS Terminal Guidance Warhead Program*

(Washington: April 1992), pp. 2, 9–11. An example of a codevelopment program that failed entirely because of technology transfer issues is the German-American attempt to develop target-sensing submunitions for attacking armored targets with artillery ammunition. (GAO, *Defense Acquisition: U.S.-German Examinations of the MLRS Terminal Guidance Warhead Program* [Washington: October 1991], p. 26.)

21. See "Japan's FS-X: What's Behind the Controversy?," *The Estimate*, February 24–9 March, 1989, pp. 5–8. There has never been any question that the Japanese government has targeted the aerospace industry for development; see GAO, *F-15 Coproduction*, p. 5. Much of the concern expressed by opponents of FS-X codevelopment lay in the fear that Japanese industry would acquire aerospace systems integration technology; see Ted Agres, "FSX Deal Polarizes Options on Trade in U.S. and Japan," *Research and Development*, May 1989, pp. 36–7. Although South Korea clearly regarded coproduction of the F-16 as the basis for developing its own aerospace industry, the arrangement between General Dynamics and South Korea never generated the same amount of opposition as did the FS-X; Kelley, "U.S.-Korea Fighter Coproduction Program," pp. 5–6.

22. GAO, *U.S.-Japan FS-X Update*, pp. 12–3. Despite congressional fears about technology transfer to Japan, the latest review of the FS-X project concludes that the U.S. adequately controlled the release of technical data to Japan; *ibid.*, pp. 26–32. In light of the concerns generated by the FS-X codevelopment and coproduction program, it is surprising that U.S.-Japan coproduction of the Patriot missile excited so little interest, even though it involved substantial transfers of systems-integration technology, about which the most concern was expressed by opponents of the FS-X. Raytheon, the principal contractor, agreed to coproduction almost from the outset, and the U.S. government raised no objection, aside from concerns about transfer of certain software packages. This acquiescence might have been the result of previous Japanese production of such missiles as the Hawk, Sparrow, and Sidewinder; see Chinworth, pp. 198, 209–13, and 218.

23. GAO, *U.S.-Japan: FS-X Update*, pp. 18–25. During the course of the FS-X codevelopment project, the U.S. has gained access to a number of technologies incorporated in the FS-X, including electromagnetic wave-absorbing material, phased array radar, central computer, inertial navigation, and integrated electronic warfare system. (*AWST*, 11 April 1994, p. 13.) As of November 1994, Lockheed, General Dynamics' successor on the American side of the FS-X project, had received over twenty thousand technical documents related to the FS-X. (*AWST*, 7 November 1994, p. 53.)

24. Developing a high-performance military fighter may not be an economical way of gaining experience in producing civil aircraft. Transfers of military aerospace technologies to civil aircraft may be decreasing, since the latter must be proven safe and efficient, while for military aircraft the emphasis is on performance; see GAO, *F-15 Coproduction*, p. 2.

25. GAO, *Defense Production Act*, p. 6. The model assumed that the reported offsets were necessary for the reported exports; *ibid.*, pp. 7–8. Coproduction programs such as the Egyptian M1A1 make this assumption questionable; it should be noted that other departments involved in the preparation of the report refused to sign it, although it is not clear whether their objection was to this model or other factors. (Author's notes, presentation by John Kirtland of FMC Corporation, 5 March 1990, Globalization Conference.) In addition, use of offsets and the percentage of the value of contracts required to be covered by offsets have increased since 1991, after having declined for several years; Cole and Lubman, pp. A6–A7. Finally, the economic effects of offsets may be difficult to compute, because of multipliers and of existing or planned economic activity in the purchasing country. For example, General Instrument Company claimed to have fulfilled a \$5.7 million offset obligation to South Korea by spending only \$440,000 within South Korea. (Author's notes on Stephen presentation.)

26. Other anecdotal examples of adverse effects of offsets on the U.S. defense industrial base are contained in GAO, *Military Exports: Concern with Foreign Military Financing*, pp. 9–11.

27. The General Dynamics study was an economic analysis dated February 1988 and performed by Science Applications International Corporation. GAO, *Military Aid to Egypt*, p. 13, fn. 7.

28. GAO, *Military Aid to Egypt*, pp. 14–6. Egypt did consider adopting the French AMX 40, the German Leopard II, the British Challenger II, and the Brazilian Ossarto prototype tank. The French and Brazilians discussed financing terms with the government of Egypt, but the terms are unknown; it is unlikely that they were as favorable as U.S. foreign military financing. (Author's notes, personal conversations in Egypt.)

29. A comparison of the various factors influencing costs and schedules of U.S., European national, and European collaborative programs with the U.S.-European F-16 coproduction arrangement is contained in Rich and Stanley, pp. 3–8.

30. The effects of setting up rivals are well illustrated by the example of the F-16. In the case of the South Korean F-16, General Dynamics had so many offset arrangements with previous purchasers of the F-16 that it became very difficult to estimate the percentage of the aircraft built in South Korea that would be produced in the U.S.; Kelley, pp. 9–11. For example, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands had been guaranteed continued European coproduction of 15 percent of the value of all third-country sales of F-16s, and, therefore, these nations had a right to produce 15 percent of the value of the U.S. F-16s sold to South

Korea; GAO, *Military Exports: Recent Legislation*, p. 3, n. 2. But this indirect offset requirement had to be reconciled with the offset arrangement agreed to by General Dynamics in connection with coproduction of the F-16 in Turkey by which Turkey was guaranteed \$396.5 million in follow-on coproduction of F-16 parts. Satisfying the Turkish offset obligation resulted in forty aircraft being assembled in Turkey for export to Egypt. F-16s built in Turkey obviously generated some U.S. jobs, but not as many as F-16s built in Fort Worth. (Cole and Lubman, p. A7; and GAO, *Military Exports: Concerns over Foreign Military Financing*, p. 7.)

31. The U.S. foreign military financing grant aid program is unique in the world. No other arms supplier has a program that provides a combination of grant aid and allows offsets. (GAO, *Military Exports: Concerns over Foreign Military Financing*, p. 3, 23.)

32. GAO, *Military Exports: Concerns over Foreign Military Financing*, pp. 2-3, 9. The Department of Defense response to a June 1994 GAO recommendation that offsets be eliminated in FMF transactions was that such a bar could cause severe foreign policy repercussions. See *AWST*, 24 October 1994, p. 57.

33. GAO, *Military Exports: Recent Legislation*, pp. 4-5; Kirtland, p. 5; and author's notes on Kirtland presentation.

34. The U.S. government at one time encouraged offsets as a means of stabilizing then-fragile economies of U.S. allies, providing for defense standardization, and creating a defense industrial base in friendly nations; Welt, p. 22. One conspicuous exception to the present general U.S. policy of nonintervention in offset arrangements occurred in the competition between General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas to sell either F-16s or F/A-18s to South Korea. When the government learned that these two companies were competing to offer more attractive offsets, it intervened and limited offsets to 30 percent; Kelley, p. 14. Congress has also shown concern about the economic effects of offsets and has sought to pressure the executive branch to do more to limit them. The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 1989 required reports on offsets and that the executive branch establish a comprehensive policy on offsets and attempt to negotiate with foreign governments to limit their adverse effects. (GAO, *Military Exports: Recent Legislation*, pp. 2-5; and GAO, *Defense Production Act*, pp. 1-2.) That requirement led to an April 1990 policy that recognized the need to minimize market distortion and other adverse effects of offsets, reaffirmed the traditional policy of noninvolvement in offset arrangements, and emphasized that American firms were responsible for negotiating offset arrangements with foreign governments. That policy became part of the Defense Production Act, passed in 1992; GAO, *Military Exports: Concerns over Foreign Military Financing*, p. 2. The acceptability of offset-associated costs as overhead expenses properly chargeable to government contracts has changed over time; *ibid.*, pp. 20-3.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 26. The transaction that provoked the legislation, which involved Northrop's sale of F/A-18s to Finland, coupled with Northrop's subsequent subsidization of a bid of a Finnish papermaking-machine firm to a U.S. company, is described in Cole and Lubman, p. A6.

36. The IEPG, established in 1976, was an intergovernmental organization whose membership included all the European Community members of Nato plus Norway and Turkey. The IEPG's objectives were to promote European cooperation in research, development, and production of defense equipment, improve transatlantic armaments cooperation, and maintain a healthy European defense industrial base. (GAO, *European Initiatives: Implications for U.S. Defense Trade and Cooperation* [Washington: April 1991], p. 13.) In December 1992 the IEPG was succeeded by the Armaments Group as an agency of the Western European Union, the security arm of the European Union. (The IEPG was then dissolved.) The objective of the Armaments Group is the establishment of a European Defense Equipment Market. The Armaments Group is a complicated organization, because it includes countries like Denmark, Norway, and Turkey which were members of the IEPG and thus of the Western European Armaments Group but are not in the Western European Union. (Giovanni de Briganti, "Europe Ideal of Open Defense Market Stalls," *Defense News*, 22 November 1993, pp. 8, 12.)

37. GAO, *European Initiatives*, p. 28.

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-30; and Briganti, pp. 8, 12. The efforts by the Western European Union to create a common defense equipment market could easily be the subject of a separate article. They have been marked by a considerable effort to suggest how such an equipment market could be structured, but very little progress in actually achieving one. An example of how a truly integrated European defense equipment market might work would be governmental agreement that Germany would become the tank maker for Europe, France the aircraft manufacturer, Britain the shipbuilder, Italy the helicopter supplier, other countries playing their parts by producing smaller systems and components. Such an arrangement appears a long way off. "Messrs. Walker and Gummet Stress Difficulty and Necessity of Integrating the Armaments Industry in Europe," *Atlantic News*, 29 October 1993, p. 3.

39. For the IEPG to implement its system of *juste retour*, each member country's defense ministry had to record both prime contracts and subcontracts awarded to foreign firms. The IEPG then compiled an overall survey, developed a baseline, and sought to evaluate intra-European defense trade imbalances; GAO, *European Initiatives*, p. 28. Suggestions have been made that no mechanism for *juste retour* can be institutionalized without creating an IEPG or Armaments Groups trade manager. (Theodor Galdi, *The European Defense Industry*:

Responses to Global Change and European Integration, Congressional Research Service [Washington: March 1992], p. 12.) Offsets, however, also require bureaucracy to administer. A description of the British system of determining whether particular economic activity can be counted in fulfillment of a vendor's offset obligation is found in Berry, "British Offset Policy," pp. 32-3.

40. In terms of output, the majority of each of 60 percent of the French arms firms are state-owned, and another 28 percent are wholly state-owned. Only 12 percent of French arms output is generated by principally private firms. In the United Kingdom, while the arms industry is almost entirely in private hands, the government possesses a high-level, well organized sales promotion system; Galdi, pp. 5, 7, 9. Even the United States has introduced an aggressive national export policy aimed at using nineteen federal agencies to help U.S. manufacturers compete in foreign markets, and the fiscal 1994 Department of Defense authorization bill established a one-year discretionary program of loan guarantees for American defense exports to Nato members, Israel, Australia, Japan, and South Korea. (Pagliano, pp. 9, 11.)

41. Examples of offsets not involving coproduction are given in notes 2 and 3 above.

42. The plan for a defense GATT was part of a wider four-point plan to foster efficiency and rationalization in Nato's defense industry and to maintain military strength at lower cost; Galdi, p. 13.

43. Relatively complete information about the defense economy of the twelve European Union nations was presented for the first time in a survey published by the European Institute for Research and Information on Peace and Security, located in Brussels, in June 1994. ("The Armaments Industry Still in a Deep Crisis," *Atlantic News*, 17 June 1994, p. 4.)

44. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-4. A similar attempt by Nato's Conference of National Armaments Directors to develop a code of conduct has yet to be finalized; *Atlantic News*, 6 May 1994, p. 2.

45. While the IEPG sought to eliminate offsets among its members, they could continue to impose them on outside competitors, including those from the United States; GAO, *European Initiatives*, pp. 24, 34, 45. European defense contractors, for their part, complain that procurement practices followed by the U.S. military have the effect of shutting them out of large portions of the lucrative American military equipment market; GAO, *International Procurement: NATO Allies' Implementation of Reciprocal Defense Agreements* (Washington: March 1992), pp. 3-5. The attitude of the French government appears especially hostile to transatlantic cooperation; Holger Mey, "Germany Faces Crossroad," *Defense News*, 7-13 November 1994, p. 19.

46. Even France, which has been one of the most insular nations in Europe insofar as defense equipment is concerned, has acknowledged that it must give up its self-sufficiency in armaments production. In 1993 France and Germany set up a joint procurement agency and invited other nations to participate. (Francis Tusa, "Long-Range Vision: Procurement Chief Grapples with Structural Disarmament," *Armed Forces Journal International*, June 1994, p. 42; and Francis Tusa, "Can France Face the Future?" *Armed Forces Journal International*, June 1994, p. 44.) The commander of the French air force has stated that France's next jet fighter after the Rafale must be a joint European project. (Francis Tusa, "General Vincent Lanata: Interview with Commander of the French Air Force," *Armed Forces Journal International*, June 1994, p. 43.) In addition, the French government, in its role as president of the Western European Union Armaments Group, will name a full-time chairman for the group with the specific task of advancing the idea of a European armaments agency. France may have some difficulty, however, since some WEU members are unhappy about the Franco-German armaments agency formed in late 1993; see Giovanni de Briganti, "French Set Out to Revamp European Industry," *Defense News*, 3-9 October 1994, p. 37.

47. Giovanni de Briganti, "German Hesitation Impedes Joint Weapon Efforts," *Defense News*, 22 November 1993, p. 8; and Carole Shifrin, "Eurofighter Partners Debate Program Issues," *AWST*, 23 May 1994, pp. 42-4. In both the Eurofighter 2000 and the Tiger helicopter programs, codevelopment, coproduction, or off-the-shelf sales offers from an American company were rejected—McDonnell Douglas's "Hornet 2000" F/A-18 derivative for the Eurofighter 2000 and its AH-64 Apache helicopter for the Tiger. (GAO, *European Initiatives*, pp. 48-9.) The government of the United Kingdom may decline further participation in the Future Large Aircraft program in favor of purchasing Lockheed C-130Js as a more cost-effective way of meeting Royal Air Force air transport requirements; *AWST*, 9 May 1994, p. 76.

48. The problem of which nations to include and which to exclude is presently plaguing the Clinton administration's efforts to create a "NAFTA for Arms Trade." ("DOD, NSA, State, Commerce Draft Conventional Arms Trade Plan," *Inside the White House*, 10 March 1994, p. 11.)

Personal Reflections on the Use of Military Force and Its Relevance to National Security Strategy

Admiral Charles R. Larson, U.S. Navy

AS I REFLECT ON MY PERSONAL CAREER in the field of military force and national security, I wish I could offer a simple vision, sharply refined and clarified by decades of experience. But such a vision eludes me. These are topics of immense scope and complexity—my personal reflections on the past few decades are a bit kaleidoscopic.

- I have seen the *diverse tools* of military force: the cockpits of aircraft, the control rooms of submarines, the frenetic buzz of command centers.

- I have seen the *disparate levels* of force application: the gripping suspense of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the painful grind of the Vietnam War, the relentless rush of Desert Storm.

- And I have seen the *variant purposes* for the application of military force: from humanitarian operations, saving thousands of lives on the cyclone-swept lowlands of Bangladesh, to Cold War deterrence, threatening millions of lives with nuclear devastation.

Is this complex perspective merely the price we pay for having lived—as the Chinese curse would have it—through “interesting times”? Are things settling down? I’m afraid we all know the answer to that. These times may be the most “interesting” of all, and the public policy debate on the role of military force in our national security rages unabated. The questions are all around us.

- How do you use military force in a post-Cold War world?
- When should force be committed? Are we committing it properly in Bosnia? Or are we too late? Should we have strict rules for when to commit force?

Admiral Larson, as the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command, delivered this address to the Secretary of the Navy’s Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College on 15 June 1994. Admiral Larson left that post on 11 July 1994 to assume his present duties as Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy.

- How much force is appropriate? Did we have too much going in to Somalia? Did we use it properly while there?

- How much force structure do we need? Why do we need decisive, overwhelming force?

The torrent of current debate can even spill beyond current questions, to issues of the past or future. From the comfortable vantage point of historical retrospect, some are asking if military force—or at least so much military force—was really needed to win the Cold War. Others are asking if we are maintaining an obsolete force, ill prepared for a future when “war will be transformed,” “civilizations will clash,” and nation-states will either be subsumed by ultranational forces or disintegrate into ethnic fragments.

If there is any humor in all of this, it may lie in the frustration of a New York newspaper article reporting that General John M. Shalikashvili did “not believe that you can bring peace [to Bosnia] through the barrel of a gun.” Highly incensed, the newspaper ran a headline that read, “The Pentagon is Crawling with Pacifists.” If you’re a military person who lived through the Vietnam era, you can’t help but chuckle.

But in the end we all have to make sense of this confusion. How can we understand it? Are there *any* useful guidelines? What is the use of military force and its relevance to national security strategy? And how do we approach this examination? Do we put national security strategy under a microscope? That’s problematic, because national strategy continues to evolve. Do we look for unifying threads among the clamor of ideas on military force? That is equally daunting. If it is hard to grasp the elements of this issue, perhaps we will do better if we address its context, the general notion of conflict. I am speaking of conflict in a most general sense that includes not only war but all forms of international competition. I do not have a grand theory of conflict to lay out—just three very simple observations. I think you will agree that they are simple—perhaps so simple that we tend to overlook them. My hope is that insights on this phenomenon called “conflict” may help us understand the complex topic of military force and its relevance for national security strategy.

My first observation on conflict is this: *ideas*—ideas in competition—are the basis of conflict. Are there alternative perspectives on conflict? Of course. Conflict can be viewed as a balancing of power, an outgrowth of economic competition, or even a clash of civilizations. But power protects and projects ideas of value and interest; economic relationships advance ideas of individual and group profit; and clashing civilizations are best defined by the ideas that distinguish them. Ideas are the common denominator in conflict. Ideas matter, because they are the stuff of decision, and decisions—by either individuals or groups of individuals—permeate every aspect of conflict.

We now describe our Cold War victory, for example, as a victory of ideas. Free markets and democratic pluralism prevailed in a protracted competition with command economies and totalitarianism. Although ideas are the basis of conflict, however, not all ideas are defined to the point of ideology. The Cold War was exceptional in that sense: we enjoyed, and endured, a competing set of ideas well defined in theory and miserably demonstrated in execution. Today the competing ideas can be ambiguous, arcane, or—from our perspective—bizarre. We are turning to regional strategies because we face regional ideas, ideas that we find more confusing than enlightening.

- Is General Aided the rightful controller of the port of Mogadishu?
- Is the Tutsi minority a lethal threat to the Hutus of Rwanda?
- Do Bosnian Serbs have “historical justification” for ethnic cleansing to seize a secure, contiguous territory?

Frankly, Americans do not know much about these ideas. They have not had decades—as in the Cold War—to learn about them. Until they learn about them, they won’t care. Some cynics might scoff and say that Americans rarely care about ideas. I disagree completely. A few weeks ago I read an interview exploring the “typical American” with Gish Jen, a young Chinese-American writer. In Ms. Jen’s opinion, “the nature of being American has to do with having certain shared ideas. We’re ‘the great experiment.’ We’re a country that’s built on thoughts and conceptions. . . .” Ms. Jen has it exactly right. Americans will go to war for the ideas of a Washington or a Lincoln. They tend to be indifferent to the pragmatic arguments of *realpolitik*. Anyone attempting to understand the use of force for United States national security must understand this resonance in the mainsprings of American motivation—to Americans, *ideas matter*.

My second observation on conflict deals with the mechanism for this competition of ideas. How is conflict resolved? My observation is simply this: there are two components to conflict resolution—*logic* and *violence*. That is a rather stark statement. The philosopher Ayn Rand put it rather bluntly as well: “There are only two means by which men can deal with one another: guns or logic. Force or persuasion. Those that know that they cannot win by means of logic, have always resorted to guns.”

Americans are comfortable seeing logic as a component of conflict resolution. Our instincts are that reason should prevail. That was certainly our strategy for the Cold War—and it worked. Through decades of containment and daily demonstration that ours was the superior system, the element of logic prevailed. As Michael Howard puts it, “The Cold War was not won by Western armed forces. . . . The war was won by Western market economies. . . .”

Americans are less comfortable with the role of violence in conflict. We aim for a rule of law, and the paradox of our violent society is abhorred as our greatest failure. But in conflict, violence is a reality and not an aberration. We are a bit

bewildered that people could favor violence over logic in the competition of ideas. But as events from Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and Rwanda demonstrate, the world is filled with people prepared to "resort to guns." That is why we must be engaged—and that is why we must be prepared.

If you find the violence and logic components of conflict resolution a bit too much of an "either-or" proposition, then you are ready for my third and final observation on conflict: the violence and logic components of conflict resolution are totally *interdependent*—they cannot be applied in isolation. Although we accept the role of logic in our Cold War victory, for example, the potential violence of Western military strength was the enabling factor that made a containment strategy feasible. Today we see that logic would have the North Koreans voluntarily give up their nuclear program to reap the economic benefits that would accrue to their people. We know that Kim Il Sung is no stranger to violence, and we dare not rely on logic alone in dealing with the North Koreans.*

Military force, properly applied, is not pure violence. It is the measured application of violence to encourage a favorable course of logic on the part of our opponents. For military force to be effective, violence does not have to be applied, but merely credible. The violence you threaten must induce a compelling logic for your opponent in which he foresees a situation that is even more unpleasant than the concession you seek. That situation must be or appear to be inevitable and permanent—otherwise the enemy will not give in but will wait for things to improve. Winston Churchill recognized this synergy of violence and logic in a note to the First Sea Lord: "*Superior force is a powerful persuader.*"

So my observations on conflict are really quite simple: *ideas* are the basis of conflict; there are two components to conflict resolution, *logic* and *violence*; and these components of conflict resolution are *totally interdependent*. As I said, they are pretty simple—perhaps so simple that we tend to overlook them. What implications do they carry for the use of military force in our national security?

Turning first to the post-Cold War environment, we have already noted that in the post-Cold War world, the ideas in competition are diffuse and diverse. Although communism was a frightening ideology, in retrospect it was clearly defined and relatively easy to understand. Today, new and unfamiliar issues vault into our consciousness. The ambivalence of ideas is not confined to overseas—the hierarchy of our own ideas is changing also. During the Cold War, the idea that our very national existence was daily at risk propelled national security concerns to the top of our agenda. But national security is no longer first among equals. It competes, internally, with ideas of economic security and human rights. The internal competition of ideas further complicates our external dealings, as demonstrated in our experiences with China over the last several

* The North Korean leader died on 8 July 1994, three weeks after this address was delivered.

months. From the perspective of our immediate national security, it is a safer but a much more complex world.

From the perspective of so many other countries, it is *not* a safer world. As the great competition between communism and democracy leaves center stage, scores of other conflicts gain increased attention. We fool ourselves if we think that our Cold War victory is a global win for democracy. And we delude ourselves if we think that our relatively bloodless Cold War strategy is a model for all other conflicts. Logic will not always be heard. All over the globe, people who cannot win by logic are prepared to resort to guns.

Post-Cold War strategists may need to resurrect a Cold War term: *linkage*. The art of effective use of military force will certainly be the art of linkage: among ideas, among the components of conflict resolution, and among opposing forces. The linkage among ideas—the basis of conflict—will be a fundamental consideration. We will need to understand the ideas that underlie regional tensions and crises. We will need to draw the logical links between those ideas and our own interests and values. We will need to prioritize those links, because our ideas and interests are not equal. A firm understanding of our own ideas and values will be the first consideration in security strategy. Our national ideas and interests should be a prominent feature of our National Security Strategy document. The linkage between violence and logic—the components of conflict resolution—must be understood. To consider either in isolation is a futile exercise. If our current debate on the use of military force has a singular deficiency, it is a propensity to treat violence and logic as completely independent aspects of conflict resolution. We are particularly prone to mistake fighting, or the cessation of fighting, as an end rather than a means. But if your goal is to end the violence, and you do not assess the ideas and reasoning process behind the violence, you will be disappointed. People who have resorted to violence have already decided that the logic of the competing ideas was not compelling. How do you change their reasoning? How can military force offer them an alternative future so unpleasant that logic will prevail? Will the violence of bombing losses outweigh Serb commitment to the idea of a “Greater Serbia,” driving them to the negotiating table? Or will it merely stiffen their resolve? Determining the linkage between violence and logic is the art of military strategy.

Finally, strategy will always be an art rather than a science, because there is a linkage among opposing forces. There are two sides in a competition of ideas. Actions beget reactions. If we conduct aerial raids, can Aided introduce a countermeasure? If we bomb Serb artillery, can it be moved to hospital yards? Such calculations dominate the thinking of the military professional. When we commit military force, we must have already answered the next question: if this doesn’t work, then what? This linkage between opposing forces is the reason

the military professional hates gradualism. Gradualism gives the enemy time to react effectively. The military professional favors decisive, overwhelming force, not because he loves violence but because he wants the logic of the enemy's situation both to be, and appear to be, immediately hopeless.

If we view the use of military force from the context of our three simple observations on conflict, the role of the media comes into focus. In a competition of ideas, the role of the media—the communicator of ideas—is central, not peripheral. Global and instantaneous telecommunications offer both opportunity and challenge. The opportunity includes the frequent and pervasive communications of our capabilities and intentions, giving an opponent every chance to pursue logic in resolving a crisis. The concomitant challenge, however, is that internal doubts, disagreements, and misgivings are equally communicated—in fact, amplified—lending embarrassing transparency to our actual will and staying power. This is especially true for democracies, and this transparency seriously limits the utility of military force for symbolic or demonstrative purposes.

None of my personal reflections leads me to see a decrease in the utility of our military forces. We generally recognize and accept the uses of military forces for both deterrence and what Tom Schelling of Harvard calls *compellence*, the actual use of armed force to make people do things. However, there is another role for military force that is not so widely understood—what Michael Howard calls *reassurance*. Reassurance provides a general sense of security that is not specific to any particular threat or scenario. I stand before you with over three years of personal experience in the use of military force for reassurance. As Commander in Chief, Pacific Command, I pursued a theater military strategy I called Cooperative Engagement—“cooperative” because it emphasized our military cooperation with friends and allies, and “engagement” to underscore U.S. resolve to remain engaged throughout the region. This strategy was not threat-specific. It reassured the countries of the region with every means at our disposal. We did not just think in terms of planes, ships, and tanks; we thought about humanitarian and nation-building programs, emergency disaster relief, security assistance, training assistance, and a host of other “engagements.” In all of them we continuously and effectively communicated U.S. ideas, interests, and values. We maximized the transparency of capabilities and intentions, thereby minimizing the likelihood of a resort to violence. Although any two nations can be very different, they invariably share at least one idea: the imperative of national security. As nations try to understand each other, their respective militaries offer an excellent starting point. In Pacific Command, we demonstrated the stabilizing, reassuring role of military forces—their utility not only in war but in peace as well.

Is the Pentagon crawling with pacifists? The Pentagon is crawling with people who have a lifetime of experience and study in the science of military force. They understand the capabilities of violence, but they understand its limitations as well. They know, for example, the limits of air power. They know the risks to pilots. They know the influences of weather and terrain. They understand the potential countermeasures of passive and active air defense, and they know too well the capabilities of enemy “pacifists” to determine these countermeasures.

But violence is not the only calculation of military force. Either explicitly or implicitly, these “Pentagon pacifists” are analyzing the ideas in competition. Does the American public understand them? Does the American public understand the linkage to the things they hold dear? Do they value that linkage to the extent that they will bear the cost? If the answers are “no,” then these Pentagon pacifists will be inclined to submit a judgment against the use of military force.

One of our more interesting media side-debates is whether military men should make such judgments, judgments that appear so political. Edward Luttwak, for example, complains that our security structure now suffers a “paralyzing reversal of roles, in which the military simply refuses to offer military options when asked for them and is not disciplined to do so.” Mr. Luttwak believes the Pentagon is crawling with pacifists and that they should leave the domestic logic to the politicians. Mr. Luttwak has the courage of his convictions, but I believe he asks the wrong thing of today’s senior military leadership. We all went to Vietnam with the courage of our convictions. In sad retrospect, we would have rather had the support of the American people. *The components of conflict resolution are totally interdependent.* You can not separate the political from the military. At the senior military level, our “Pentagon pacifists” must consider the entire interaction of military, political, economic, and diplomatic factors. Purely military advice—if such advice is possible—can mislead.

So, having laid out my conceptual framework and some of its more obvious implications, I will summarize my personal reflections on the use of military force.

- Don’t look for “the end of history,” and don’t wait for the “end of conflict.” As long as there are human beings on this planet, there will be ideas. Ideas will compete, and military force will always be needed, because some human beings will choose violence over logic.

- The ideas of others will often be in direct conflict with our own ideas and interests. Even if they are not, the violence that occurs will contradict our societal commitment to peaceful resolution of conflict. In both cases, there will be pressure to “do something.”

- We must strive to understand the competition of ideas that drives the violence, and what conditions must be established so that logic will prevail.

- We must maintain superior force, Churchill's "powerful persuader." Absent a specific threat, we still must have a force capable of deterring, compelling, and reassuring. We must not size this force on the basis of the actual violence it imposed in the past, using such measures as "1.5 Desert Storms." Rather, we must size the force so that future competitors will measure its potential violence and accept a logic that deters, compels, and reassures.

- "Surgical strikes" are tempting. But when we apply force, we must have a goal in mind and be ready to take the next step, and the next after that, if we do not achieve our expected result. In our transparent democracy we must project a resolve that convinces our adversary that we can create a situation more unpleasant than the concession we seek, so that logic will prevail. We must have the will to continue. Our people must understand what we are doing and accept going all the way to the goal we have chosen.

I recall a wonderful sequence from the film *Lawrence of Arabia*. T.E. Lawrence has just encountered the culture of Arabia, a world of very different ideas. During a desert trek, one of the Arabs is separated from the group. His companions are resigned to this act of God: "Allah wills it—it is written." Lawrence risks his own life and saves the straggler. Upon returning to the camp he confronts his companions: "See? Nothing is written! *We write!*" As we confront the future, we must remember that nothing is written. Are we doomed to a clash of civilizations? Will military force lose its utility to the nation state? We do not know. But it's a good bet that conflict will continue to be a competition of ideas. Those ideas will compete through logic and violence. Most importantly: nothing is written—*we write*. Through cooperation and careful study we can shape the future, achieving, we hope, a world where logic is more common than violence.

Ψ

A mind is an officer's principal weapon.

Major General Paul K. Van Riper, USMC

General Walter Krueger and Joint War Planning, 1922–1938

Major George B. Eaton, U.S. Army

JOINT OPERATIONS, JOINT EDUCATION, AND joint war planning are nothing new for the Army and Navy, although there are those who apparently lose sight of the fact. Unfortunately, as in many other sectors of American life, the U.S. military often forgets how it dealt with such issues in previous eras. During the 1920s and 1930s, while the nation was immersed in isolationism, the war colleges and the senior staffs of the Army and Navy dealt at length with the problems of joint operations, joint doctrine, and joint war planning. Many of the innovations and developments of the period paid almost immediate dividends during World War II. More interestingly, some features of 1930s joint planning and doctrine are being used today as “new” procedures.

After World War II, Admiral Chester Nimitz said that the Pacific campaign had turned out just as it had been gamed for twenty years at the Naval War College;¹ the only thing, he recalled, that had not been anticipated was the kamikaze. The Army may not have been so sanguine in those same twenty years. It had at times argued with, and at times agreed with, the Navy on plans for a possible war against Japan. Most of the disagreements seem to have centered over command issues, the relief of the garrison in the Philippines, and the length of time it would take the Army to mobilize and train before it was prepared to conduct operations.² In addition to war plans, both the Army and the Navy developed exercises for their respective war colleges and for testing joint plans

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and doctrine. In several cases the two colleges cooperated in developing war games.

During the entire interwar period, General Walter Krueger played a key role for the Army in both planning and exercises. Between 1921 and 1938 Krueger attended both the Army and the Naval war colleges, taught at the Army War College for one year and at the Naval War College for four years, and served seven years in the Army War Plans Division. This article explores General Krueger's role in the development of war plans and exercises, especially War Plan Orange. Krueger, it will be seen, was a central and catalytic figure in the preparation of a generation of Army and naval officers for the Pacific Ocean battles of World War II and in moving the Army to a modern, flexible method of war planning. In a useful sense, to examine Walter Krueger's career in the 1920s and 1930s is to study the progress of joint planning in the interwar years.

Walter Krueger was born in Flatow, West Prussia, on 26 January 1881. His father died in 1884, and in 1889 Anna Hasse Krueger brought Walter and his two siblings to the United States. When the Spanish-American War broke out in 1898, Walter was enrolled in the Cincinnati Technical Institute. He enlisted in the 2d Volunteer Infantry and served in Cuba at Santiago and Holguin. In June 1899 Krueger enlisted in the regular Army. He was posted to the Philippines and fought in several engagements during the Philippine Insurrection, rising to the rank of sergeant. Krueger received a commission in 1901, having passed a written examination in lieu of West Point attendance (a common procedure at the time). After a tour in the United States, which included teaching at the Infantry and Cavalry School, Krueger returned to the Philippines, where he mapped areas of Luzon to the north and east of Manila.

Krueger's career soon settled into the slow grind of the old Army. He was promoted to captain only in 1916, but by the end of the First World War he had spent two tours in France, as operations officer of a division, chief of staff of the Army Tank Corps, and as operations officer of two different corps, including the one that commanded the occupation troops in Germany from 1918 until 1923. He was then assigned to the second Army War College class convened after the war. After graduation, although now qualified for either General Staff service or higher command, Krueger was retained at the College, first as an instructor and then in the Historical Division. He traveled to Berlin in early 1922 to study German strategy.

In April 1923 Krueger began his first tour in the Army War Plans Division (AWPD). He remained in the Division until June 1925, when he was assigned to the Naval War College as a student in the senior class of 1926. In 1928, after bursitis ended a brief period of training at the Army Flight School (at the age of 47), Krueger returned to the Naval War College as an instructor. He was

responsible there for teaching German strategy in World War I, the Army command system, and joint operations. He left Newport in 1932.

For two years, Krueger, now a colonel, commanded the 6th Infantry Regiment. In 1934 he returned to the Army War Plans Division as its executive officer, and in June 1936 he was appointed as Chief, AWPDP, serving on the Joint Board. It was a momentous time to serve in War Plans; during this four-year tour the manual *Joint Action of the Army and Navy* was revised and expanded, War Plan Orange was drastically revised, the defenses of Oahu were upgraded, and the Rainbow plans were begun. George Marshall succeeded him on the AWPDP when now-Brigadier General Krueger was assigned to command a brigade in June 1938. In 1939 he commanded the 2d Infantry Division, VIII Corps in 1940, and in 1941 the Third Army. In February 1943 he was transferred to Australia to take over Sixth Army, and as General Douglas MacArthur's senior ground commander he began the long campaigns across New Guinea and New Britain to, ultimately, the Philippines.

Walter Krueger's Army career involved remarkably broad experience with the Navy and in joint operations and planning; it repeatedly placed him where some of the most fruitful work in those years was being done.

The Army War College and Army War Plans

As a faculty member at the Army War College, Lieutenant Colonel Krueger focused on operations, war planning, and strategy in the World War. Lectures on "The Basic War Plan," Germany, and Hannibal aside, few details of his activities at the College are known.³ Krueger did spend, however, four months in 1922 in research at the Reichsarchiv in Potsdam. With his perfect German and his Prussian heritage, he was apparently the first American allowed into the German war archives after 1919.⁴ His lectures on German strategy were so well regarded that in 1923 the Chief of Staff of the Army directed that they be reproduced and distributed to all general officers, General Staff officers, and the General Service Schools.⁵

In July 1922, AWPDP requested that Krueger be assigned to it, and the period of grooming for joint duties and joint cooperation began.⁶ Immediately upon arrival he was thrust into war planning and exercises, as part of the "G3," or Operations, section. He was part of a five-man group responsible for preparing Army plans, coordinating joint plans with the Navy, and formulating exercises. At least two officers in the G3 section of AWPDP worked on each of the plans, to maintain continuity and achieve "harmony of thought."⁷ By April 1923 Krueger was appointed to the Joint Planning Committee of the Joint Board and was working in earnest on joint plans, doctrine, and operations.

At this point a word needs to be said about the mission of the General Staff and AWPD in the 1920s and on the function of the Joint Board and Joint Planning Committee. Prior to World War I, despite the attempted reforms of the Secretary of War, Elihu Root, and the establishment of the General Staff in 1903, the War Department remained tied to the Bureau system. The chief of each bureau (the Adjutant General, Quartermaster, etc.) ran it like a fiefdom, and woe betide the Chief of Staff of the Army who tried to make changes or to bring the bureaus under his control. The Chief of Staff was charged with day-to-day operations and planning for contingencies, but he was also the Commanding General of the Army, expected to take command of all forces in the field in case of war.⁸

When World War I broke out, President Woodrow Wilson decided to keep his Chief of Staff, General Peyton March, in Washington and designated General John J. Pershing to command in the field. Pershing was given such latitude that he vied with March for power and influence, establishing in essence his own army in France. When the war was over and the occupation troops had returned, the War Department decided to strengthen the role of the Chief of Staff (who was now Pershing himself). Legislation was rewritten to ensure that the Chief would be the field commander in the next war.⁹ The War Department also adopted the French "G-staff" system (G1 for personnel, G2 for intelligence, G3 for operations and training, and G4 for logistics), and it added a War Plans Division.¹⁰

That division was charged with developing contingency plans for future wars. These were the "color plans" for each potential enemy (red for Britain, green for Mexico, orange for Japan, tan for Cuba, etc.).¹¹ It had its own G-staff organization and in time of war was to attach itself to the field army: the chief, AWPD, was to become its Chief of Staff, and the other planners, already conversant with the contingency plans, would constitute the nucleus of his staff.¹²

The Joint Army and Navy Board (better known as the Joint Board) had been established in 1903 to advise the president and the secretaries of War and the Navy on issues involving both services. Its mandate was limited in that as originally chartered it could discuss only matters referred to it; eventually it was given the right to initiate studies. The Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations were members, as were their assistants and the chiefs of their respective war planning divisions.¹³ It quickly became apparent that these senior officers did not have the time to study adequately problems involving joint issues; accordingly, they created a Joint Planning Committee, which researched issues as charged by the Joint Board and made recommendations. If it could not resolve differences, the Committee presented the Board with the Army and Navy positions. By 1932 only three matters out of over five hundred had had to be presented to the president for decision due to the Joint Board's inability to reach

consensus. The Joint Planning Committee also had the right to initiate studies. With three or more members from the respective war planning offices, it met informally, keeping no minutes.¹⁴

After his appointment to the Joint Planning Committee, Krueger was given oversight of several AWPDP projects. He was responsible for the Panama Defense Program, which had been instituted to correct deficiencies noted in a January 1923 joint exercise. He was also given responsibility for War Plan Tan (intervention in Cuba), Brown (intervention in the Philippines), and Orange (war with Japan).¹⁵ It appears that Krueger was also given staff responsibility for the use of chemical weapons, artillery developments, and the deployment of the Air Corps.¹⁶

It was as a member of the Joint Planning Committee that Krueger first met and developed relationships with naval officers, associations he would carry with him to the Naval War College and in his work on the General Staff in the 1930s. The naval officers included Captains Wilbur Coffey, William S. Pye, and William H. Standley.

At that time, the Committee was working on a revision of the estimate of the enemy situation for War Plan Orange. As approved by the Joint Board on 7 July 1923, the estimate drew the following general conclusions: first, the U.S. would have to establish a naval presence in the western Pacific superior to Japan's; second, Manila Bay would have to be held or retaken in order to achieve the above; third, the U.S. would have to control all Japanese Mandated Islands (the Marianas, Marshalls, and Carolines, given to Japan—but not to be militarized—under the Versailles Treaty); and fourth, achieving these three goals would compel Japan to submit. The estimate foresaw a long and primarily maritime war in which the U.S. would immediately assume the strategic offensive.¹⁷ The Joint Planning Committee then began to prepare the Joint War Plan. The first draft, by Krueger and Coffey, contained little except some dates and sizes of forces—the fleet would concentrate in Hawaiian waters at D+10 (i.e., the tenth day of the war) at a strength 25 percent larger than Japan's, and the Army would provide ten thousand troops. It did, however, specify an immediate offensive against the Japanese to destroy their fleet—therefore exemplifying, as at least one historian of War Plan Orange has it, the “Thruster” strategy. (The alternative “Cautionary” strategy foresaw a slower advance across the Pacific, taking small islands as advanced bases.)¹⁸

The second draft was written solely by Krueger and was much longer (the estimate of the situation being greatly expanded) and more detailed. The discussion of war aims was Clausewitzian, in that Krueger refused to state specific aims, saying rather that they would depend on the cause of war. He did not, however, believe there would be an unlimited war, inasmuch as he did not

foresee Japan threatening the national existence of the United States. Krueger noted that while the U.S. had the advantage over Japan in manpower, industry, and finance, the distances in the Pacific were a disadvantage to American naval operations. He expected the Japanese to seize American possessions, including the Philippines, Guam, Wake, and Samoa, and then shift to the strategic defensive. He concluded that the United States would be forced, accordingly, to the offensive in order to maintain or regain its western Pacific possessions and establish superiority in the Far East. He also felt that the U.S. would have to target Japanese naval forces and also its economic life (through embargoes, blockades, etc.).¹⁹

Navy missions remained the same in the second draft, but the Army's were more specific. The Army was to generate fifty thousand troops by D+10 and an additional, unspecified contingent by D+30. It would garrison the Marshalls and Carolines (relieving Marines already there), recapture Guam, and conduct additional joint operations as required. Krueger also specified the command relationships involved; he believed that unity of command was necessary—which was not the accepted view at the time—and he proposed creation of a Joint United States Asiatic Expeditionary Force (USAEF) under one commander.²⁰

Krueger's second draft is of particular interest in several respects: it envisioned Japanese actions as they would actually occur in 1941 and 1942; it recognized Japanese economic vulnerability; and it recommended the advance across the Central Pacific that would in fact be conducted by Admiral Nimitz in World War II. However, it was probably unrealistic in 1923 to expect the Army to have fifty thousand troops available in Hawaii at D+10, unless mobilization had already occurred; Krueger did not address that problem. In addition, his worksheets suggest that he expected the Marines to have garrisoned the Carolines and Marshalls, notwithstanding his estimate that the Japanese would try to take all American possessions; he seems not to have considered that those islands would have to be retaken. Finally, he never clearly stated the scope of operations. Despite its unwillingness to state war aims, the document looked like an all-or-nothing proposition for total war. Perhaps the greatest flaw in these early drafts (and in the final approved plan) is that the restrictions of the Washington Naval Treaty made it unlikely that the Navy could successfully take the actions envisioned. In sum, the plan was infeasible.

Krueger's ideas can be traced in his fifth draft of the plan (the third and fourth having been submitted by Navy members of the Joint Planning Committee). This version, dated 28 February 1924, was much sparser than his previous effort. It is apparent that Krueger's earlier suggestion of unity of command had encountered opposition. His new paragraph on command specified, in an apparent attempt to clarify matters and mollify naval planners, that the com-

mander in chief of USAEF would, during the initial phase, be the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and that during the "Subsequent Phase" either an Army or naval officer would be designated by the president as joint commander.²¹ Other changes retained some of the problems of the earlier drafts. First, the naval forces to be gathered in Hawaii at D+10 were to be 50 percent greater than the Japanese, as opposed to the 25 percent mentioned earlier (a strength advantage that would require the entire U.S. Navy to achieve). In addition, Manila was now to be reinforced; the potential reconquest operation had been dropped. Also, this draft would have had the Army pre-stock supplies and equipment for the initial fifty-thousand-man contingent in the Philippines. The planning committee had obviously changed its assumptions; it now expected the Philippine garrison to hold Manila Bay until the Navy arrived with reinforcements.

The last draft, submitted in response to a 10 July 1924 Joint Board directive to revise the interservice command relationships, was also written by Krueger. This version dropped the idea of unity in command; Krueger was clearly ahead of his time on that issue. There were now three phases—Initial, Second, and Conditional Subsequent—the last being any actions required should the sea and air campaign against Japan's navy and its economic base fail. Each service would create a single command for all its forces in the theater, and a joint staff would be formed for the Army and Navy commanders. The Army would no longer be responsible for retaking Guam or providing troops to relieve the Marine garrisons in the Carolines and Marshalls. However, another fifteen thousand troops were to be available at D+30 for movement to Pacific locations "to be seized and held." That is, the Army was envisioning being able to provide—within thirty days—almost every soldier it then had on active duty. Krueger's draft was approved, without amendment, by the Joint Board on 15 August 1924.²²

Krueger next turned his attention to the Army Strategic Plan Orange. This document, with its annexes, determined which troops would be mobilized to execute the overall plan, directed the procurement and storage of equipment in the Philippines, and specified the reconquest of Guam as the mission of the troops to be assembled at D+30. Further, the plan asserted that Manila would be reinforced before the Japanese could take it—although the Japanese were expected to land three or more divisions on Luzon within eight days of declaration of war, whereas the fifty-thousand-man reinforcements were not due (in Oahu) until D+10. The way around this problem was to define D-Day as the day the war plan was activated, presumably before the first day of the war; the planners assumed there would be time to mobilize.²³

Errors of logic abounded in the Army plan. The same paragraph that noted the Japanese could land in eight days also predicted that they would conduct a surprise attack. The paper noted how much more difficult it would

be to gain naval superiority over Japan if Manila had already fallen, yet it acknowledged, as noted, that reinforcements could not arrive on time if mobilization had not occurred well ahead of the outbreak of war, and it assigned no alternative base area if Manila Bay were no longer available. It was already known that Guam could not support the entire fleet. In sum, Krueger and AWPD were assuming away the threat to Luzon and taking for granted that reinforcements would arrive in time. The plan's covering letter (by Krueger) suggests that the planners knew all this: "Although a great amount of work has been given to its preparation, it contains no doubt many small errors and inconsistencies and perhaps a few large ones. In my judgment the plan constitutes a suitable basis for development and I therefore submit it with the recommendation that it be approved."²⁴ Perhaps, after compromising on the issue of unity of command, the Army planners were simply waiting to try again, in a formal revision to the approved plan. It is interesting to note that the first draft of the subsequent revision gave the Army until D+50 to assemble troops (now 65,000) at Oahu and addressed the possibility that Manila had fallen; however, successive drafts still envisioned massing the entire U.S. fleet in the Pacific, as if there would be no other threat, and seemed to ignore treaty limits on the number of ships.²⁵

The development of joint war plans such as Orange was not Krueger's only experience in this area; for example, he also observed the joint exercise at the Panama Canal in February 1923. On the basis of his report and those of other observers, the Joint Board announced that it would design future joint exercises itself. This idea was tested in January 1924, and Krueger was the action officer for developing the joint plan and the advisor to the chief Army umpire.²⁶ Two 1924 exercises tried plans Krueger had helped prepare for defense of the Canal Zone and led to a series of recommended improvements including more troops, ammunition stocks, and capital construction. Both of these Panama Canal exercises were "joint" in that both services participated, but the scenario had them opposing each other, not operating as a team. Krueger served in a similar position in the Grand Joint Exercise in Hawaii in the spring of 1925. On this occasion the two services for the first time acted on the same side, in a joint attack upon the defenses of Oahu.²⁷

The Naval War College and OP-VI

Armed with this experience in joint war planning, Krueger reported to the Naval War College. Now, for the first time, he would work with war gaming as developed at Newport. His first experience in this realm was in Joint Problem I, played by his class (apparently individually) from March to May 1926. His 1926 solution helps to clarify his thinking in the 1924 revision of War Plan Orange.

The General Situation issued for the game postulated that Japan and the U.S. had already mobilized, after a long period of tension. It also stated that the main frictions were related to trade and immigration and that, due to stockpiling, Japan might not require sea communications for up to a year. The situation warned that Japan was capable of a strategic surprise attack, although not against the American continent.²⁸

This Naval War College game addressed some of the problems noted above in War Plan Orange. First, alternative anchorages in the Philippines were named, and second, the game laid down that the Philippine garrison could hold for at least thirty days.²⁹ However, in his solution Krueger stated that it would take at least ten days to assemble all forces and twenty-three to steam to the Philippines, by which time, he noted, Manila could have fallen. He emphasized the additional problems the United States would face if the Philippines were lost—the U.S. could not succeed in a naval campaign without some form of advanced base in the Western Pacific. “BLUE [is] on the horns of a dilemma, for he must either move across the Pacific before he has superior strength available, in order to save Manila, or wait until his forces are concentrated, and meanwhile see Manila fall into ORANGE hands.”³⁰

In his analysis of “friendly” courses of action, Krueger argued that ORANGE was inferior to the U.S. in all areas except troop strength and would become more so as time went on. He concluded that in order to avoid giving the Japanese the tactical advantages of defending against an amphibious invasion, the U.S. fleet had to sortie immediately to the Philippines and defeat the Japanese fleet before Manila fell; the troops required to retake Guam, the Marshalls, and the Carolines could be transported once the advanced base had been secured. Krueger also refused to make plans for the deployment of Army troops from Hawaii: future operations would “depend so largely upon the outcome of the operations of the BLUE Battlefield, that it would be futile to predict how [they] should be executed.”³¹

Krueger’s solution to Joint Problem I, written about a year after War Plan Orange, is useful in that it expands on the reasons for discounting the need to retake Manila, addresses mobilization and deployment schedules, and examines the defense of the U.S. and the Philippines. In addition, Krueger outlined again in the problem many of the conditions that would lead to war with Japan in 1941, foresaw Japanese operations against the Marshalls, Marianas, and Carolines, and predicted great difficulty in defeating the Japanese if they took what would have been the advanced base at Manila. Finally, in his paper Krueger remained unwilling to discuss war aims or to propose actions that would limit U.S. flexibility. However, this game was not particularly joint other than in coordinating Navy and Army air assets. The student had only to determine the proper

method of deployment. The problem Krueger would develop as a faculty member in 1928 went on actually to address joint overseas operations.

When in 1928 Krueger reported to Newport as a faculty member, the presidents of the Army and Navy war colleges had agreed to cooperate in the development of a joint overseas problem to be played at both schools. Krueger became the liaison with the Army War College. To judge by correspondence between the two presidents, the development of the problem was not smooth. Rear Admiral Joel R.P. Pringle envisioned four goals: revising methods for joint planning, examining the problems of coordination, testing command relationships, and exercising the provisional *Joint Operations Landing in Force* (a locally produced text). While Pringle was concerned with the staff process, Major General W.D. Connor seemed to focus on problems he saw in command relations and in the evolution of the BLUE-ORANGE confrontation before the start of the problem. Nonetheless, the game—designated Operations Problem VI, or OP-VI—was duly played in May 1929. It may be assumed that Krueger, the only Army faculty member at the Naval War College, played a major role in developing the Army portions.³²

As completed, OP-VI was truly a joint proposition, with the students having to consider loading, transporting, and debarking Army forces in an opposed landing. They were also required to design air operations and naval gunfire support. The problems arising in War Plan Orange as to the mobilization and movement of troops before the fall of Manila were set aside (despite the concern of General Connor); the city was assumed to be already in Japanese hands. The students were freed thereby to concentrate on operational and tactical problems as opposed to those of a strategic nature. The mission given was “to capture Luzon, by joint operations beginning one December [i.e., 1 December], in order to gain a base (Manila Bay) from which further operations may be undertaken to isolate ORANGE.”³³

At the outset BLUE had some 55,000 troops in the southern Philippines. However, the BLUE estimate assessed the ORANGE forces as already having one hundred thousand troops on LUZON and that 350,000 BLUE troops would be required to retake that island. BLUE was seizing additional southern islands, which it planned to develop as a base area.³⁴ The commander in chief of the BLUE fleet, or COMINCH, decided he would need from April until November to build up the forces required. The Commander, Philippine Force, a subordinate of COMINCH, was given command of all BLUE army and naval forces in the Philippines area and was assigned a series of naval as well as military missions to complete before November. The naval tasks included cutting ORANGE lines of communication to Luzon, and among the military missions was establishing air bases within range of the island. All command relationships were based on the principle of paramount interest.³⁵

The new game went far beyond the one Krueger had played in 1926. Command relationships and missions were established so that all commanders were required to consider and execute land, air, and sea operations. The problem was realistic in that it acknowledged damage to the BLUE fleet, difficulty in retaking Luzon, and a requirement for land-based air and thus airfields somewhere in the Philippine Islands, preferably on Mindoro. It also foresaw the need to take a series of smaller islands to interrupt ORANGE communications. These missions had not been envisioned in the initial mission to COMINCH—just as they had not been addressed in the actual 1925 War Plan Orange—but they were clearly implicit.

The plan for the game assault on Luzon envisioned landings in the Batangas area south of that island to establish airfields and then in Lingayen Gulf and on Bataan in order to take Manila.³⁶ Detailed plans for these landings were written by the student players after consultations with Krueger and other Naval War College faculty members. Several letters survive in which Krueger and the assistant commandant of the Army War College exchanged information. The naval officer on the Army War College faculty observed, "The joint problem is a wonder and explains the failure of so many previous joint undertakings. . . . Krueger [has] done some wonderful work."³⁷

Krueger's other major duty at the Naval War College was teaching joint operations and delivering a series of lectures on World War I strategy. The joint operations lecture was over seventy pages in length; the latter series, collected, was over three hundred pages long, and Krueger thought about publishing it.³⁸ It was in OP-VI, however, that Krueger made a significant and lasting impression on the U.S. Navy. The game was played for most of the 1930s, with updates for changes in technology. Each group of students would spend more than a month working on the problem, and each group of graduates would add to expertise in the fleet. In fact, the estimate it contained of the Japanese situation needed little revision when war broke out in 1941. The events described in the game scenario were actually to occur, largely as written, and the process of retaking Luzon unfolded much as in the game, with airfields on Mindoro and secondary landings at Batangas and on Bataan.

Army War Plans Division, 1934–1938

Upon his return to the AWPDP, Krueger was again thrown into the process of developing joint war plans. This time, as the division's executive officer, Krueger was the senior Army officer on the Joint Planning Committee. He would later, as chief of the AWPDP, have a seat on the Joint Board. All papers produced by the division passed through his hands before going to the chief; upon assuming the latter duties, he had to approve them. Thus, in these years

Krueger had oversight over all aspects of Army joint war planning—but this time he had far greater experience in naval matters.

The Joint Board had approved in 1928 a new Orange Plan, which remained in place, with many changes, until the mid-1930s. The plan retained some aspects of the 1925 version in that it envisioned an immediate offensive riposte toward the Philippines in response to Japanese aggression. However, OP-VI had already demonstrated that the 1925 and 1928 Orange Plans would lead to severe damage to the American fleet.³⁹ In addition, a 1933 joint exercise raised serious doubt as to the ability of the fleet to make the transpacific passage.⁴⁰ Little had been done, however, to change the plan until 1934, when Japan left the League of Nations and gave notice that in 1936 it would abrogate arms limitations treaties.

In 1932 Captain S.W. Bryant, USN, had become chief of naval planning and in July 1933 Admiral Standley the Chief of Naval Operations. Both of these men had worked with Krueger in previous assignments. The mid-1930s has been called “an era of harmony among the war-planning agencies. An atmosphere of shared values fostered agreement on large issues and settlement of details by mutual accommodation or at least by orderly debates that yielded results all parties could accept.”⁴¹ Perhaps the relationships Krueger had forged with these and other naval officers, as well as his knowledge of naval operations and limitations, account for some of the new cooperation.

Both Bryant and Standley, however, were “Cautionaries.” They believed that the Navy could not save Manila and that War Plan Orange should call for seizing Truk as the main advanced base, after preliminary operations in the Mandated Islands. The Navy did not show its new concept to the Army until early 1935, when Brigadier General Stanley Embick, who was known for opposing an immediate offensive against Japan, became Chief, AWPD.⁴² The opening for the Navy—besides Embick’s arrival—was a memo from General MacArthur, Army Chief of Staff, asking for a revision of the plan due to changes in Army command structures. MacArthur also wanted to add a Pacific Coast Theater to control the mobilization and embarkation of troops for Hawaii.⁴³ By 1935 the Army was ready to take a slower approach to war with Japan.⁴⁴

Embick soon energized Army War Plans to look for staging bases required before an assault on the Philippines. He was even willing to consider not retaking the Philippines at all.⁴⁵ AWPD coordinated with Navy War Plans on the issue. Although Bryant was gone by spring, another friend of Krueger, Rear Admiral Pye, was now director, and another colleague, Captain Coffey, was on the Navy planning staff.


The Joint Planning Committee rapidly approved the Navy’s plan, and Krueger signed the memo to the Joint Board recommending the change. Other amendments followed, but they did not affect the general concept. The new plan was much more realistic than those of 1925 and 1928. The forces in Manila

were now only to hold the mouth of Manila Bay "as long as possible," and their commander was to expect no reinforcements. The first Army force to be generated was now only 7,500 men, to be taken from an active Army division and made available in San Francisco on the twelfth day after mobilization, or M+12. Larger forces were not required until M+20 (12,000 more men), M+60 (30,000 more), M+90 (50,000 more), and M+105 (as needed). In addition, for the first time, Plan Orange now required that all forces be trained for amphibious operations.⁴⁶ MacArthur tacitly agreed to the expected loss of the Philippines.

Interestingly, the Joint Board approved the new, slower-paced plan in May 1935 as a revision to the 1928 plan rather than as a whole new document. Embick, in a letter to MacArthur, defended it as a change to "the *initial* deployment" of Army troops rather than as a material change to the concept for sending expeditionary forces to the western Pacific. He downplayed the significance of the planned operations in the Carolines and Marshalls prior to any move to the Philippines.⁴⁷ In fact, the revision opened the possibility of direct attack on Japan from the bases secured in the Carolines. The newly approved Orange Plan, with its "island-hopping" approach to the Philippines, crafted under Krueger's supervision, looked much like the war that had been envisioned in OP-VI.

The next change to War Plan Orange arose almost immediately, from the efforts of the Army and naval planning staffs to work out the practicalities of the new revision. The Army did not complete its detailed planning until the summer of 1936, by which time Krueger was Chief, AWPD.⁴⁸ A formal revision was approved in May 1936, partly as the result of a joint exercise conducted in that year to test the new war plan, but no major aspects of the plan were altered.⁴⁹

In this period Krueger began to synthesize his years of experience in war planning and joint operations and to study independently the concept of war planning itself, especially in the case of Japan. The result was three significant documents, the first completed less than a week after the Joint Board approved the 1936 revision to War Plan Orange. This hundred-page study evaluated Japanese courses of action in case of a Pacific war. Instead of the normal focus on Guam and the Philippines and a Japanese strategic offensive, Krueger thought that, notwithstanding limited offensive operations, the Japanese would take the strategic defensive. That is, after establishing a defensive line, the Japanese would defend it, forcing the U.S. to try to pierce its perimeter. Specifically, Krueger cited the Marianas as a key part of the Japanese war effort. The Marianas with the Carolines and Marshalls formed a large T (see map) masking the Philippines, protecting the sea lines of communication between Japan and the Dutch East Indies, and threatening the flank of any fleet movement toward the Philippines or directly from Hawaii to Japan. Krueger termed this zone the "main line of



resistance"; only after it was penetrated would the Japanese be required to offer a major fleet battle.⁵⁰

Krueger also noted that all these islands were within flying distance of each other. He specifically listed the islands large enough to support bomber squadrons—Chichi Jima, Maug, Saipan, Guam, Yap, Fais, Truk, Ponape, Jaluit, Kursae, Wotje, and Eniwetok. He noted that if a plane flew over the Marianas chain from Japan to Yap, the longest overwater flight would be 550 miles, while from Saipan to Jaluit in the Marshalls the longest was 525 miles. The islands could therefore support each other or a long-range air movement.⁵¹

Krueger went on to discuss three possible Japanese courses of action. Each was part of a defensive strategy; each included the conquest of the Philippines, Guam, and the Aleutians (if not Alaska); and each required the Japanese to inflict heavy losses among American capital ships in order to create a more equitable situation for a major fleet engagement. The islands he had listed were to be used as air and submarine bases for raids on the American fleet. The first course of action would be the capture of Hawaii and Alaskan islands, which would lead to a campaign of attrition against the American fleet. The second alternative was to occupy the Mandated Islands and Alaska and then operate against Hawaii and the Pacific Coast. The third course was the same as the second but with more emphasis on defending the conquered assets and less on attrition of the American fleet.⁵²

The rationale for the first course, Krueger thought, would be the hope that the American people were too pacifistic to support a long war for the purpose of regaining Hawaii. The Japanese would expect the U.S. in that case to negotiate a conclusion or simply accept the loss. Krueger did not believe that Japan expected to follow this course of action but that "if opportunity beckons too hard Orange will succumb and make the attempt." He believed instead that the Japanese would adopt the second course. Their forces would then not be as dispersed as in the first and would not try to defend each and every Mandated island as in the third. The Japanese would focus their efforts on the T described earlier but would not strongly defend the Marshalls as a group; instead, they would develop the islands that had the highest military potential. Forces in the Aleutians would then threaten the American flank, discouraging an advance through the North Pacific and forcing the U.S. to the southern route to the western Pacific, guarded by the Marianas and Carolines.⁵³

The paper is interesting in many respects. First, it indicates that Krueger was thinking along the same lines as his naval colleagues. Second, it shows him once again accurately foreseeing many elements of the Pacific war; the islands and defenses he described are the same as or much like those in the Navy's actual Central Pacific campaigns of World War II. Moreover, his view of the islands as air bases and his observation that a plane could fly from one to another forecast

what was to be the great limiter of advance in the Southwest Pacific—the operating range of land-based fighter aircraft. Finally, he envisioned the defensive strategy and hope for negotiation that ultimately motivated the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and their Centrifugal Offensive in 1941–1942.⁵⁴

The second key document of his tenure as Chief, AWPD, was written a year later, in October 1937. In the meantime Krueger had overseen some significant changes in the way the Army would mobilize for war. Before 1936, mobilization had been based on the requirements of specific war plans. Thus, whole new units for specific tasks might be created and deployed before National Guard units were mobilized and before some active formations had even been brought up to wartime strength. This method of mobilization had caused problems in the 1925 War Plan Orange and was part of the reason the Navy was ready for immediate action while the Army required a period of time to be ready for deployment. In October 1936, therefore, the Army implemented the Protective Mobilization Plan, under which the first mission of the armed forces was to protect the nation as it geared up its war effort. A balanced force would be mobilized with the mission of covering the United States, Hawaii, and the Panama Canal.⁵⁵

It appears that this new policy of mobilizing first to defend the U.S. and only thereafter to undertake overseas operations was the spark for a 28 October 1937 memo that Krueger personally delivered to the Chief of Staff.

For some time there has been serious doubt in my mind as to the soundness of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—ORANGE (1928) as amended. This doubt has been intensified by events now taking place in the Far East. Moreover, the possibility that the plan referred to may be put into execution if the Far Eastern Situation should at any time be such as to involve us, has filled me with such grave apprehension that I feel duty bound to bring it to your attention.

The present plan offers but one course of action for the United States in case of a BLUE-ORANGE war; namely, a prompt strategic offensive against ORANGE across 7,000 miles of sea, via the Mandate Islands. No alternative course of action is provided. In other words . . . the President would be given no choice other than to discard the offensive proposed in the plan or approve it [regardless] of the consequences in the light of—

- a. The issues involved;
- b. The international situation;
- c. Our domestic situation; and
- d. Our state of military and naval preparedness;

any one of which might have a material bearing on the line of action the United States should adopt.

The international situation today is changing with kaleidoscopic rapidity. No one can predict today what the alignments in Europe and Asia will be tomor-

row. . . . Yet the plan, disregarding these considerations, projects a series of detailed successive operations far into the future and into a theater thousands of miles distant from the Continental United States. . . .

It is also probable that the war envisaged in the plan under discussion will involve the maximum war effort of the United States. Unless, however, our people felt that their vital interests were at stake, and this is improbable, we could scarcely expect them to support an offensive war such as that envisaged in this plan. Moreover, we are today in the midst of a profound social revolution which has gradually gained more and more in extent during the past decade. Hence, the staggering toll of such a war as that envisaged in the plan might well strain our political and social structure beyond the breaking point. In any case, what would we gain, even if we were victorious, if America were ruined in the process?

Under this [plan], practically the entire resources of the country would be committed to the support of very distant, very risky offensive operations that are primarily Naval, without due regard to the fact that such offensive operations may not suffice, or may even fail. Furthermore, the wisdom of allotting so much of our limited Regular Army, especially antiaircraft artillery units, and units of the GHQ Air Force, to support such an offensive in a distant theater, before similar units are organized, trained, and equipped to replace them in the United States, is open to serious question. . . . Should the offensive fail or should some other unforeseen contingency arise . . . the security of United States territory might be seriously jeopardized by reason of the fact that such a large proportion of these units had been diverted to expeditionary forces.⁵⁶

This is a remarkable discourse on the state of war planning in 1937. It is obvious that the Protective Mobilization Plan could not protect the U.S. if the war plan then in effect were executed in its entirety; nor would the U.S. be in a position to fight a two-front war. In light of the state of public opinion in 1937 in regard to war and European intervention, Krueger had some basis for questioning the strength of popular support. He also challenged the plan to defeat Japan by primarily naval means—"history does not record a single instance of any first-class military-naval power having ever been subdued primarily by such action." He recommended an entirely new plan that would simply establish a readiness posture and provide alternative courses of action for various contingencies. The plan had to be flexible, feasible, realistic in light of the world situation, and "above all else, it should be in harmony with our national ideals and policy."⁵⁷ The idea of contingency plans rather than preset sequences of actions is clearly a development of his solution to Joint Problem I at Newport in 1926, in which he asserted that follow-on missions could not be specified until the political situation had clarified itself.

The response of the Chief of Staff was almost immediate. On 3 November he sent to the Chief of Naval Operations a retyped copy of the letter over his own signature, with very few changes other than deletion of the emotional

reference to social revolution. On 5 November Stanley Embick, now a major general and the Deputy Chief of Staff, sent a memo to AWPD directing it to prepare for the Joint Board a memorandum recommending that War Plan Orange be rescinded and a new Orange Plan be created that provided for the defense of the U.S. and thereafter for contingency courses of action. On 10 November the Joint Board agreed that the 1928 War Plan Orange should be cancelled immediately and directed the Joint Planning Committee to produce a new document and, subsequently, contingency plans to go with it.⁵⁸

The Joint Planning Committee was immediately deadlocked. Its members disagreed as to general concept, missions, and operations in the western Pacific, and they could not come to consensus. Krueger's old "Thruster" colleague, Captain Coffey, was the senior naval member of the Committee and tried to sustain the offensive war approach. On 30 November the Committee sent two separate drafts to the Joint Board, but that group also found itself stalemated. On 7 December it directed the Committee to start over, this time providing very specific guidance. The result was the same. The next draft, sent to the Joint Board on 27 December, had two columns each for missions, concepts, and Pacific operations—one the Army draft, the other the Navy proposal. Again, the Joint Board could not agree. Finally, General Embick and Rear Admiral J.O. Richardson were charged with drafting a new plan. They took the last Joint Planning Committee draft, chose the passages they wanted and struck out the others, accepting either the Army or the Navy proposal, paragraph by paragraph. The new plan was approved by the Joint Board on 21 February 1938.⁵⁹

The new approach, then, was a compromise between the two services, but it met the criteria established by Krueger in his memorandum of 28 October. The key assumption was that there would be a period of tension but that Japan would strike without warning. Another postulate was that the U.S. would have enough naval strength to operate westward of Oahu. The concept for waging the war was to exert, by primarily naval means, progressively more severe military and economic pressure. In the mission statements can be sensed the divergence of opinion between the services. The joint mission was to defeat Japan "while conserving the resources of the United States and protecting United States' territory." The Army was to defend the continent, prepare for contingencies, and support the Navy. The Navy was to defeat Japan's forces, interrupt its sea communications and protect those of the U.S. and its allies, and support the Army. Specific Army missions were the defense of the West Coast, the occupation of the Aleutians, and the protection of Oahu and the Panama Canal. The Navy was authorized to operate against Japanese forces in the western Pacific so long as lines of communication were secure.⁶⁰ Command relationships were not specified.

On 22 November, during the drafting of the new plan, Krueger wrote his third significant memorandum on war planning of this period—possibly as advice to his subordinates on the Joint Planning Committee. His opening comment was pure Clausewitz: “The first and most critical decision which the statesman and the highest military authority must make in connection with any war is to determine the nature of the war.” He argued that a plan must take account of political objectives, international considerations, and other issues at stake. Whether a war was to be limited or unlimited had also to be considered and, if the latter, whether the population would support it. “If unlimited war is beyond the strength of a nation, . . . then disaster will overtake the nation that engages in it.” War plans, Krueger continued, had to allow the nation first to mobilize and then to take whatever courses of action were required at the time. He felt there should be a mobilization plan, a concentration plan to achieve the state of readiness required, and then a number of tentative operations plans meant only to show in a general way what things could be done. Such an approach, he felt, did not limit options to the defensive but allowed in fact the greatest freedom of action. In a direct rebuff of the Navy position, he argued that its proposals went beyond mobilization, concentration, defense, and preparation, and that they tended to involve the United States in larger wars. “Let us not forget,” Krueger ended, “Napoleon’s assertion that he never had a plan; that France and Germany each had a plan, but that beyond the respective concentrations, both failed.”⁶¹

This memo was Krueger’s final important input to the war planning process before he left AWPD in July 1938. His impact had been significant. Not only had he stimulated a drastic revision of the plans for war with Japan, calling on his extensive personal knowledge of Japan’s power, options, and likely actions as well as of the requirements of war in the Pacific, but his principles for war planning had affected the rest of the “color-coded” plans. In December 1937, during the revision of Plan Orange, the Japanese sank the gunboat USS *Panay*; later that month President Roosevelt authorized the first talks with the British Admiralty, and in January 1938 the first discussions were held with the Canadians. Events had finally forced the war-planning machinery to recognize, as Krueger had implied, that Japan might not be the only enemy in a future war and that the U.S. could have powerful allies.⁶² Later that year efforts began that resulted in the Rainbow Plans; these and future plans were based on the current international situation, not a frozen set of assumptions.

Of greater interest to the modern officer is the resemblance of Krueger’s method of war planning to the approach used today by the Joint Staff and the unified commanders. Krueger’s insistence on flexibility, political direction, economic and diplomatic action, and contingency plans bears striking

resemblance to Adaptive Planning and Flexible Deterrent Options. Krueger recognized that the inflexible war plans of World War I and those developed by the U.S. Army and Navy in the 1920s and 1930s would have forced the nation into total war and required commitment of the vast majority of active forces to a single campaign, leaving none for the defense of the continent or for a second, simultaneous effort.

Krueger's career itself foreshadowed modern joint ideas. From the early 1920s to the late 1930s he served in a succession of positions that added to his experience of and contacts with the Navy. He could never have appreciated the flaws of the contemporary war-planning method had he not spent time in close association with naval officers. The result was input that resulted in a War Plan Orange requiring no essential changes until 1935. He was then active in the revision of that plan to reflect a more cautious approach, and ultimately its abandonment in 1938. Additionally, Krueger played an important role in producing a wargame series that trained Army and naval officers for a decade in the methods of joint planning and landing force operations and that helped maintain focus on war in the Pacific.

Walter Krueger's prescription for planning and his views on joint command were dramatically new in his time and did not receive full acceptance, but in the past decade they have become standard procedure for the U.S. military. They anticipated the modern war-planning community's approach, which is based on the current situation, contingencies, and political decision making—and they took shape in a period in which the foundations were laid for the joint warfare edifice that is being constructed today.

Notes

1. E.B. Potter, *Nimitz* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1976), p. 136.
2. See Edward Miller, *War Plan Orange* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991), *passim*. See also National Archives (hereafter NA), Record Group (RG) 165 War Plans Division, General Correspondence, 1920–1942, boxes 264–73 “Color Plans,” and NA, RG 407 Administrative Services Division, Ops Branch, Special Projects—War Plans “Color” 1920–1945. The latter are the classified file copies of the plans.
3. Military History Institute (hereafter MHI), File 224–28, “The Basic War Plan,” Remarks delivered at the W.P.D. Conference, Army War College (AWC), 12 January 1922; Krueger Papers, box 21, file: Articles and Speeches, “Observations and Reflections on the Situation in Germany,” a lecture at the AWC, 28 September 1922, and “The Military System of the German Empire,” a lecture at AWC, 24 October 1922; Krueger Papers, box 22, folder WWI Corr. and Materials, “Evolution of the German War Plan of 1914,” a lecture at AWC, January 1923; and Krueger Papers, box 21, “The Conditions of Success in War as Illustrated by Hannibal's Campaigns in Italy,” a lecture at AWC, 20 March 1923. This lecture was later published in *Coast Artillery Journal*, but the copies in the Krueger papers are undated. Although this last lecture was dated in 1923, it is clear that he also gave it in 1922. See Krueger Papers, box 21, Brig. Gen. E.F. McGlachlin, “The Art of Command, Part III,” a lecture at the AWC, 17 December 1921, p. 3, where he notes that Krueger will give a lecture on Hannibal. In his talk on war planning Krueger advised students as to what a joint war plan should contain but made no comments on the process.
4. Krueger Papers, file 1, box 1, letter in German dated 22 June 1922 addressed to the Chief, German Archives, thanking him on the eve of Krueger's return to the U.S. for his assistance; Krueger Papers, box 13, Detached Service Record. This is a handwritten record kept by Krueger from 1914 to 1942 detailing all assignments, leaves, promotions, and temporary duties.

5. NA, RG 165, War Plans Division, General Correspondence, 1920-1942, box 51, file 867-1.
6. All dates pertaining to Krueger's tours at AWPD are from NA, RG 165, Records of the Army War Plans Division, Subject and Name Index, microfilmed as series M1080, roll 10, subject: Krueger, and from his Detached Service Record (see endnote 4, above).
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 5, and 8. "Harmony of thought" may have meant, in the modern vernacular, "sanity check."
8. Ray S. Cline, *The United States Army in World War II: The War Department: Washington Command Post: The Operations Division* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951), pp. 14-7.
9. Edgar F. Raines, Jr., and David R. Campbell, *The Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Evolution of Army Ideas on the Command, Control, and Coordination of the U.S. Armed Forces, 1942-1985* (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1986), p. 2.
10. Cline, p. 20.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-4.
13. Raines and Campbell, pp. 3-4.
14. NA, RG 165, box 149, file 3740-1, Memo by Krueger, "Relations Between the Army and Navy," 27 August 1937, p. 3.
15. NA, RG 165, box 85, file 2138, packet of memoranda from April 1923 to July 1924, all entitled "Safeguarding Plans and Projects"; box 77, file 1727, memorandum, subject: Defense Projects and War Plans, 22 May 1924.
16. NA, RG 165, Records of the Army War Plans Division, subject and name index, microfilmed as series M1080, roll 10, subject: Krueger, cards 2 and 3; RG 165, box 77, file 1727-2, memorandum, subject: Defense Projects and War Plans, 22 May 1924; RG 165, box 85, file 2138, Safeguarding Plans and Projects, 24 July 1924. Krueger observed General "Billy" Mitchell's bombing of a former German battleship in September 1923 and submitted a report, RG 165, file 1430, 8 September 1923; unfortunately, the report is missing from the files. See also RG 165, box 71, files 1347-1, 1347-2, Annual Reports of the AWP, 1924 and NA, RG 165, box 77, file 1727-7, memorandum "Present Status of War Plans," 10 April 1926; box 71, file 1347-2, "Status of War Plans and Defense Projects," 11 December 1924.
17. NA, RG 225, series M1421, Records of the Joint Board, roll 9, Joint Board (hereafter JB) 325-207.
18. NA, RG 165, box War Plan Orange, file 2720-22. This packet of papers is a development file for the 1928 revision but includes drafts of the 1924 version. One of the first pages is a table of contents. The first draft by Krueger and Coffey is undated but was probably from fall 1923. It also appears to be an incomplete copy, ending abruptly on page 4. See Miller for discussion of the terms "Thruster" and "Cautionary."
19. NA, RG 165, file 2720-22, 2d draft, 7 November 1923, pp. 2-3.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-11.
21. *Ibid.*, 5th draft, 28 February 1924, *passim*.
22. *Ibid.*, item 8, "Draft by Krueger," 15 July 1924, *passim*; JB 325-228, annotation on copy of Joint War Plan Orange, indicating approval 15 August 1924.
23. NA, RG 407, box 69, file 230, Adjutant General Office, Administrative Services Division, Operations Branch, Army Strategic Plan Orange, 29 January 1925.
24. NA, RG 165, box War Plan Orange, file 1991, Krueger, memorandum, subject: Army War Plan Orange, 23 January 1925. Miller suggests that the Army had a surge of interest in saving Manila. He also notes that Army planners soon realized that Manila would probably be lost and that more time would be needed to mobilize troops; see pp. 132-49.
25. NA, RG 165, file 2720-22, item 9, draft 23 September 1926 (Capt. Pye).
26. NA, RG 165, box 60, file 1004, packet of documents relating to exercises in the Panama Canal Zone, 1922-1923; box 73, file 1470, packet of documents relating to joint exercises, winter 1923-1924.
27. NA, RG 165, box 76, file 1678, packet of documents relating to maneuvers in Hawaii, spring 1925.
28. Krueger Papers, box 21, file NWC Course 1925-26, Joint Problem I—Class of 1926, section 2-26(a), pp. 1-2, and section 2-26(c), Krueger Solution, p. 22.
29. *Ibid.*, sections 2-26(d) and 2-26(a), p. 5.
30. *Ibid.*, Krueger's solution, pp. 12, 23, and 32. The convention was that the U.S. was "BLUE," the enemy "ORANGE."
31. *Ibid.*, Krueger's solution, pp. 25, 43, and 52.
32. MHI, AWC Curricular Archives, file 242-13 is a packet of correspondence between Pringle and Connor for March-August 1928. One of 17 April 1928 sets Pringle's goals, and one of 11 June 1928 appoints Krueger as the Naval War College (NWC) point of contact.
33. Naval Historical Collection (hereafter NHC), RG 4, file 1438, OP-VI, 1438-A, pp. 1-4 and annex C, p. 2.
34. *Ibid.*, OP-VI, 1438-B, section 4, pp. 5-6, and 1438-C, p. 22.

The Art of Strategy and Force Planning

Henry C. Bartlett, G. Paul Holman,
and Timothy E. Somes

AN ANCIENT CLICHE HOLDS THAT strategy is an art, not a science. Specifically, strategy is the linking of ends and means—a “game plan” that tells how finite resources will be employed to accomplish declared objectives. Coherent strategy is the key to institutional success; it is as important for businesses and universities as it is for countries.

Force planning, like strategy, is also an art. It is the process of appraising the security needs of a nation, establishing the military requirements that result from them, and selecting, within resource constraints, military forces to meet those requirements.

Practitioners of strategy and force planning come from a wide variety of academic disciplines and professional backgrounds. Some have particular knowledge of geopolitics; others have extensive experience in economics, diplomacy, or political office. Many have spent years in operational military billets. Some are especially comfortable with abstract concepts, others prefer practicalities. The challenge is to blend this array of perspectives and approaches so as to devise the best strategies and capabilities to support a nation’s security aims.

The first half of this article presents a simple model that addresses the key variables in the art of strategy and force planning. This part stresses logical decisions about ends, means, and strategy; it identifies potential mismatches among the variables, repeating the process as necessary. The second half of the article focuses more narrowly on military force planning. It examines commonly

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
used approaches, whose strengths and weaknesses are then weighed in terms of the model.

A Model of Strategic Development

Practitioners of strategy and force planning constantly struggle to achieve a balance among many competing variables. The art of strategy and force planning is made evident by how well the inevitable tensions among these variables are resolved.

The Key Variables. The "Bartlett model" in figure 1 illustrates this dynamic process. It can be used to explore substantive controversies and to facilitate national security decision making. The model reveals the interaction among what we consider the key variables, and thereby represents a comprehensive approach to strategy development and force planning.

Figure 1
Bartlett Model



Ends and objectives. Strategists and force planners usually think in terms of levels of objectives. At the highest level are national interests, which endure over time and command broad support. The survival of the country and the health of its economy are interests that appear on any such list. Strategists also agree, by and

large, about the desirability of global peace, although they may disagree about the impact of any specific conflict on national interests. Less tangible—and as a result, more controversial—goals arise from the concern for such values as democracy and human rights.

Lower-level goals must be reconciled with these highest-level, national interests. Global objectives must be weighed against regional, and long-term goals against short-term. Assuring such consistency demands a high degree of intellectual rigor and discipline from all strategists. As examples, the U.S. commitments to preservation of open markets and freedom of the seas are long-term objectives that flow from the national interest of economic well-being. Others, such as preventing Iraq and Iran from dominating the Persian Gulf, may be more sensitive to rapid changes.

Security environment. Assessing the security environment is one of the most difficult tasks of strategists and force planners. Sudden changes in the security environment may radically alter national objectives in particular regions of the world. An assessment of the security environment should include a wide range of considerations, such as shifting international power centers, dominant trends, critical uncertainties, evolving economic interdependence, changing domestic requirements, cultural, religious, and demographic trends, ethnic warfare, ecological challenges, and advancing technology. All of these, and other considerations, are factors that determine a nation's security environment.

Strategies are often conceived as "game plans" for achieving desired goals with limited means. The art of the strategist is not only to select the best plan among alternatives but to be sure the game itself is worth playing. At the highest level of national thinking, such a game plan is often referred to as grand, or national security, strategy. It reflects the structure of international relations—not merely a country's sense of who its allies and rivals are but also its strengths, weaknesses, and the capacity of its body politic to accept challenges. Grand strategy should provide a clear concept of how economic, diplomatic, and military instruments of national power will be used to achieve national goals and policy.¹

Lower levels of strategy, for each of the major instruments of national power, are more prescriptive. An economic strategy should explain, for example, how a country intends to change its rate of growth or its role in the world marketplace. A diplomatic strategy should describe how a nation expects to implement its highest goals through communication with foreign governments, directly and in international forums. Finally, a military strategy should support the others, explaining how, and under what circumstances, the military instrument of national power will be used to achieve influence, deterrence, defense, or compellance.

The *means or tools* available to execute the chosen strategy comprise, theoretically, the total resources of the country. In practice, however, strategists and

force planners usually think in terms of three basic sets of tools. The economic instruments of national power include trade agreements, foreign aid, the money supply, taxes, government expenditures, subsidies, and sanctions. Among the diplomatic means are alignments, alliances, ad hoc coalitions, treaties, good offices, and negotiations of every conceivable kind and complexity. Military instruments include the full array of armed might, from the capabilities for nuclear war and large-scale conventional war to nation building. The changing world security environment will alter the relative utility of these instruments and will add others. Different instruments of power already affect international and domestic arenas. Some authorities would emphasize psychology—which reflects the ability of national leaders to use the “bully pulpit” to dominate the communications media, and thus to mobilize public opinion at home and abroad. Still others include technological, informational, environmental, social, cultural, ethnic, and other forms of interaction and influence. Strategists must not overlook these additional varieties of influence.

Constrained resources. Wants almost always exceed *resources*, for governments as well as individuals. Any country must choose among rival demands and mutually exclusive alternatives. The armed forces compete for resources against many other government agencies, against nongovernmental demands, and against each other, especially when a democratic country is at peace. As a result, strategy and force planning entail resource allocation, deciding which objectives and courses of action are most important, and setting priorities.

Risk of failure. Uncertainty is the dominant characteristic of the international and domestic security environments. As a result, strategists and force planners must weigh their hopes for success against the possibility of failure. They do so by reexamining the security environment, goals, strategies, available resources, and tools needed to achieve stated objectives. This is a continuous, iterative process. Perhaps the single most important value of risk assessment is that it results in a constant effort to identify and correct imbalances among the key variables. Strategists, for instance, tend to focus on ends-means mismatches, as generally befits their concern that national objectives not become too ambitious for the resources available. Force planners tend to emphasize strategy-force incongruities, hoping to ensure that the level and mix of future forces will in fact adequately support a given military strategy.

Realigning the Key Variables. As strategists and force planners consider the twenty-first century, they face a constant need to adjust their thinking. The model suggests that a change in one variable will usually result in the modification of others, and accordingly in mismatches. To restore the balance, strategists and planners must be ready to realign the key variables. There are a number of ways of doing so.

Modify the ends. In a rational world, strategists would first assess the international security environment in terms of shifting power centers, dominant trends, and critical uncertainties; then they would articulate specific national ends or objectives. Thus the most logical place to begin correcting a mismatch between the security environment and the means is to reconsider the national ends.

Change the means. Political alterations may generate substantial changes in the means available. Such changes are sometimes quantitative; the Korean War, for instance, caused large increases in U.S. defense spending beginning in 1950, while the collapse of the Soviet Union has prompted sharp declines. A qualitative change in means may necessitate shifting priority from some instruments of national power to others. Consider two illustrations of an adjustment in means precipitated by the recent change in the security environment. First, many observers believe that in an interdependent world economic tools for achieving national objectives have become more effective than military ones, so greater attention must be paid to the strategic use of tools such as boycotts, most-favored-nation status, free-trade agreements, and technological advantage. Second, in both of the post-Cold War efforts to adjust the military means to the security environment (the Cheney-Powell "Base Force" and the 1993 "Bottom-Up Review"), the means were adjusted before a new military strategy was fully developed.²

Revise the strategy. Containment, the grand strategy that guided the West through the Cold War, is no longer applicable. Replacing it has been difficult. Some favor a strategy of collective security, with broad reliance on international institutions such as the United Nations. Others advocate a strategy of selective engagement, focusing more narrowly on critical threats to U.S. national interests. Whatever the ultimate result, such a shift in U.S. strategy will have major implications for all the other variables. In theory, there are many possible ways to achieve any given objective with the resources available; the strategist must pick the best one.

Reevaluate the risk of failure. It is inevitable that national security analysts will disagree about the risks. As an example, a planner assuming that National Guard brigades can be activated and fully trained in a short period of time will see little risk in reducing active-duty units; a colleague who rejects that assumption will be uneasy about such cuts. Another source of discomfort is the potential for "war stoppers," obstacles that make impossible a vital course of action. For example, over the coming decade logistical constraints could well frustrate otherwise brilliant plans and strategies. Finally, the degree of confidence also depends crucially on the nature of the threats and the national interests at stake. Weapons of mass destruction, for example, tend to create greater levels of anxiety than terrorism or conventional conflict. Such examples suggest that risk, as used in

this model, cannot be quantified; rather, it is the "comfort level" that senior planners experience as they assess the key variables.

Alternative Approaches to Force Planning

Although the Bartlett model provides a structure for examining national security, practitioners routinely approach force planning and strategic development from different perspectives. Each approach accentuates one variable or aspect at the expense of others. These alternatives have evolved over the years and are given different relative emphasis in different sectors of the national security assessment and decision-making process.

Top-Down. National interests and objectives "drive" the "top-down" approach to force planning; it, in turn, focuses principally on a nation's grand or national security strategy. This approach is strongly hierarchical, dominated by a downward flow of key documents through successive levels of decision making. A top-down approach has several strengths. First, it helps strategists and force planners concentrate on ends. Second, it provides a systematic way to think through requirements from a broad, or "macro," perspective. Third, it emphasizes the relationship among the supporting instruments of national power—economic, political, and military—each of which requires its own strategy for achieving the higher-level goals.

Finally, a great virtue of the top-down approach is that strategies can be broken down into sets of key "descriptors." If rightly selected, these are more than mere labels or slogans. They should crystallize *how* the strategy will be executed, using only a few words that are as precise and crisp as possible. Higher-level descriptors should serve as criteria for lower-level choices, strategies, and evaluations of force structure, all of which then create lower-level descriptors. For example, the 1994 National Security Strategy made effective use of two important descriptors: Engagement and Enlargement. They were chosen to replace the Cold War descriptor of Containment, and they reflected months of intense debates within the administration.

Whether or not one agrees with that strategy and these descriptors, they provided guidance on how national security objectives would be achieved. The 1994 National Security Strategy declared that the "three central components" (which we would call descriptors) of the strategy of Engagement and Enlargement were: "maintaining a strong defense capability and promoting cooperative security"; to "open foreign markets and spur economic growth"; and "promotion of democracy abroad." For the purposes of military strategists and force planners, "maintaining a strong defense capability" led to such lower-level descriptors as "Credible Overseas Presence," "Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction," "Contributing to Multilateral Peace Operations," "Supporting

Counterterrorism Efforts," and maintaining forces "sufficient to help defeat aggression in two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts."³ The challenge to the force planner is then to craft a force structure that will support these descriptors.

There are certain pitfalls associated with this approach. First, it generally considers possible constraints only late in the planning process. Consequently, when dollar, technological, or other limits are applied, the distance between desires and constraints is likely to be so great that major adjustments among the ends and means become necessary. A second concern is rigidity; because this approach is hierarchical, it can lead lower-level planners to take for granted the validity of higher-level objectives and strategy—even when they deserve to be challenged. A final problem is the degree of openness, or public awareness, of national security strategies. On the one hand, public exposure and debate are essential for achieving consensus and support in a democracy; they are even legally mandated by the Congress. Yet at the same time, specific details may be so sensitive that, for reasons of security, they cannot be publicly stated.

Bottom-Up. Existing military capability drives the "bottom-up" approach to force planning.⁴ It tends to emphasize improving existing capabilities and weapon systems, with particular regard to current operational issues. It is related to military operational planning, since both concepts use current force structure as a basic reference; however, the differences between them are important. The matrix of table 1 shows how force planning and operational planning interrelate.

A major advantage of the bottom-up approach is that it emphasizes the "real" world. Strategists and planners are compelled to focus on how potential adversaries can be handled with existing forces; doing so militates against presuming future capabilities that may never materialize. Focusing on current capability can also improve strategies and operational plans. On the other hand, too much emphasis on a bottom-up approach can result in neglect of the future and may frustrate long-term goals or creativity. Another pitfall is a tendency to lose sight of the "big picture"; local or theater considerations may be allowed to dominate when an integrated global view is required.

Scenario. The "scenario" approach to force planning is situationally driven. The planner starts with a well defined set of conditions at the national, theater, regional, or global level and then postulates a problem or crisis. A fully developed scenario usually combines a large amount of current, real-world information with elements or assumptions of established plans. These frequently include warning and mobilization times, force levels, and, where appropriate, military campaign intentions.

The scenario approach has three clear strengths. The first is its specific and tangible focus. If the scenario is a conventional Iraqi attack against Kuwait, fairly precise planning can be undertaken once major assumptions are made. If simultaneous scenarios are anticipated, such as Korea and Iraq, even more specific

Table 1
Force Planning Compared to Operational Planning

Criteria	Force Planning	Operational Planning
Purpose	Structuring Forces	Fighting Forces
Orientation	Global/Regional	Theater/Local
Input	Future: Forces Threats Objectives Strategies Risk of Failure	Existing: Forces Threats Objectives Strategies Risk of Failure
Output	Planned and Programmed Forces	Contingency/ War Plans
Biases	Development Modernization Force Structure Research & Development	Deployment Employment Readiness Sustainability

planning can result. A further advantage is that it encourages clear priorities; national interests dictate that some regions, theaters, or countries be considered more important than others. A third strength is the dynamic nature of a scenario, in which events are sequential and time lines are specified. However, there are limitations to this approach. The world rarely conforms to a planner's expectations. Also, scenarios tend to take on a life of their own; after all the work involved in planning them, there is a natural reluctance to challenge their basic rationales. Thus such key assumptions as warning times and mobilization rates may become absolutes, and hypotheses about enemy doctrine may be treated as facts. Finally, scenarios tend to be retrospective, reliving old crises rather than exploring new challenges.

Threat. The "threat" approach involves identifying potential opponents and assessing their capabilities. The point of departure is often an assessment of the balance of capabilities between adversaries. Recent changes in the security environment make the threat approach to force planning more difficult than during the Cold War. It does, however, have three strengths, the most important being that it keeps the focus on potential adversaries. Secondly, it considers both the "macro" level, of the global balance of power, and the "micro" level, of specific conflict situations. Finally, the threat approach reminds both strategists and force planners that military capabilities do count in warfare; it requires them to consider serious assessments and devise realistic scenarios.

Of its pitfalls, the most prominent is the difficulty of determining what constitutes a valid threat. Perhaps no other single aspect of the art of the strategist and force planner is more controversial. To deal with this challenge, other terms

(such as "danger," employed in the *Bottom-Up Review*) have sometimes been used. Threat-based planning is inherently reactive, and analysts may have grave difficulty adapting to sudden changes in the international environment. An additional problem of the threat-driven technique lies in its bias toward quantitative data, such as numbers of people, units of energy, or types and quantities of weapon systems. These figures can be misleading in terms of overall unit or weapon system combat power, and this tendency may result in overlooking, underrating, or overestimating important qualitative factors such as experience, leadership, morale, or strategy. A related weakness is a superficial accounting of military force; any war is an extraordinarily complex interaction of people, equipment, and organizations, but threat assessments often employ simplistic numerical comparisons such as tank-versus-tank or tanks-versus-antitank weapons.

Mission. The "mission" approach is functionally based, examining the capabilities of friendly forces irrespective of plausible threats or of crisis or combat conditions. The force planner starts with such broad categories of military activities as strategic deterrence, power projection, or overseas presence. These categories may then be broken down into more specific activities, such as joint strike, air superiority, strategic mobility, sea control, and ground maneuver. Even more specific mission subsets might be suppression of enemy air defenses, counter-battery artillery fire, and mine countermeasures. This approach provides a way of looking at capabilities across general categories of wartime activity.

The mission approach has a number of advantages. First, it fosters realistic and detailed appraisal of the capabilities of any military organization, which is especially useful with respect to future threats, since it allows friendly forces to maximize their strengths and exploit enemy weaknesses in advance. Even if no threat can be identified, this approach allows force planners to set priorities and correct apparent imbalances. The primary shortcoming of the mission approach is a tendency toward suboptimization. Higher-level goals may be ignored and more creative ways of fighting dismissed through institutional inertia or infatuation with traditional warfare specialties.

Hedging. The idea here is to prepare fully (indeed, over-prepare) for any conceivable tasking of military force. This technique seeks redundancy of systems, anticipates a wide range of employment options, and demands a balanced force, i.e., one that can deal with a wide range of contingencies. Different countries facing diverse threats will hedge their strategies and force structures in different ways. The U.S. tends to hedge its force structure by providing for capabilities across the entire spectrum of conflict, from humanitarian assistance operations to global nuclear war.

An emphasis on hedging has merit in that it directly confronts uncertainty about the future. History provides examples of forces tailored for specific purposes that were overcome by unforeseen events. Consequently, hedging seeks to assure both balance and flexibility. On the other hand, it tends to understate friendly strengths, exaggerate the capabilities and the hostility of potential rivals, and thus drive planners toward worst-case scenarios. Its biggest fault, not surprisingly, is that its recommendations are very costly.

Technology. The "technology" emphasis rests upon the belief that conflict can best be deterred and aggression stopped by fielding systems superior to those of potential enemies. The Manhattan Project of World War II, the post-Vietnam War development of precision-guided munitions, and current enthusiasm for "information warfare" all illustrate the technological optimism of U.S. strategists and force planners. The greatest advantage of this approach is that it capitalizes on knowledge and individual creativity, basic strengths of a post-industrial economy. Moreover, it offers the potential of saving lives and reducing casualties. Finally, skillful development of advanced technology may provide significant military leverage (that is, a "force multiplier" or "force enhancer").

There are, nonetheless, definite pitfalls. One is the risk of paying too much money for too small a gain, especially once a technology matures. The opposite problem is that huge investments are required to achieve revolutionary breakthroughs but do not guarantee such successes. Even when development is successful, the technological approach often leads to a dramatically smaller force of much costlier platforms. For all these reasons, it may channel too great a proportion of defense resources into too few, overly specialized programs at the expense of balance, and flexibility, and greater numbers.

Fiscal. The "fiscal" approach is driven by the budget. Overall dollar constraints are fixed at the outset by such nonmilitary considerations as some maximum permissible percentage of Gross Domestic Product, the exigencies of deficit reduction, or the demands of other sectors of the federal budget (e.g., entitlements). The strength of the fiscal approach is that it supports the democratic process—that is, it specifies defense resources in light of the overall economy, competing national requirements, and public perceptions of the security environment. It also requires planners to set priorities, thus avoiding unconstrained thinking and fostering fiscal discipline both within and among a nation's armed services. A major weakness is that the fiscal approach may not reflect the international security environment, resulting in a significant lag between military capabilities and emerging threats. Secondly, reassessment of threats to national interests—which happens regularly in a democratic country—tends to worsen the cyclical character of defense spending, which frustrates rational long-term planning. At its worst, this

technique may lead to the unwise retention of a traditional “fair share” apportionment of funds among the services and defense agencies rather than an integrated and rational allocation that takes account of the greatly changed security situation. Thus it may worsen the potential for interservice rivalry and suboptimization.

Practitioners of strategy and force planning should be sensitive to the strengths and pitfalls of each of these approaches. The various planning focuses tend to produce different solutions and choices. Awareness of these differences can help strategists and planners stay in touch with reality. Table 2 summarizes these alternatives, what drives them, and their strengths and pitfalls.

A Challenging Art

The primary purpose of this article has been to provide a simple but powerful tool (the Bartlett model) to help students of strategy and force planning. There are many strengths to the model: its very simplicity makes it easy to remember; it focuses on the most important variables and helps in their analysis; and, finally, it stresses the iterative nature of the national security decision making process. The second purpose has been to consider some of the approaches to strategy and force planning actually used by practitioners. Each was taken in isolation to make clear its individual merits and limitations. However, during an actual planning cycle several or all of the approaches would probably be used to arrive at decisions. To use this model and these approaches wisely can constitute a real and challenging art.

Finally, the article has argued that strategists and force planners must keep in mind a number of practical principles:

- Collect professional judgment as a crucial ingredient in the decision-making process;
 - Integrate a full range of strategic perspectives and meld force planning approaches;
 - Identify key strategy and force planning “descriptors” to crystallize major goals;
 - Select the best solution, considering economic, political, and military tools of national power;
 - Set priorities, resolve conflicting demands upon resources, and eliminate mismatches;
 - Contemplate the risk of failure and the actions that would then be required;
- and,
- Be sure that the game is worth playing at all.

Table 2
Summary of Alternatives

Approaches	"Drivers"	Strengths	Pitfalls
Top-Down	Interests/ Objectives/ Strategies	Concentrates on ends Systematic (macro view) Integrates tools of power	Ignores constraints too long Fear of challenging higher levels Public awareness of strategy
Bottom-Up	Current military capability	Emphasizes real world Helps improve current war plans	Neglects future Loses big picture
Scenario	Situation/ Circumstances	Specific focus Encourages priorities Dynamic—handles time well	World is unpredictable Takes on life of its own Tends to be retrospective
Threat	Opponents	Focus on future Macro and micro balance of power Emphasizes military capability	Too simplistic Adapts poorly to sudden change Inherently retrospective Biased by quantitative data
Mission	Function	Realistic appraisal of capabilities Sets priorities	Tendency toward suboptimization May ignore higher goals
Hedging	Minimizing risk	Confronts uncertainty Assures balance and flexibility	Understates friendly strengths Exaggerates rivals' capabilities Worst-case scenarios/high cost
Technology	Superior systems	Stresses knowledge and creativity Saves lives and cuts casualties Force multiplier	Often costly for small gain High risk Works against balanced forces
Fiscal	Budget	Supports democratic process Requires setting priorities	May not reflect security environment Worsens cyclical spending Leads to "fair sharing"

That strategy and force planning is an art is a fact worth remembering. It implies that students, practitioners, and critics should recognize that there is more than one approach to formulating strategy and making decisions about future military force structure. Secondly, it underscores the fact that different approaches may lead to alternative solutions. The authors are convinced that using

the Bartlett model and the other ideas described in this article will lead to better national security strategies, plans, decisions, and force choices.

Notes

1. For the most recent edition, see William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington: The White House, July 1994).

2. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated in his *Annual Report to the President and the Congress, January 1991*, "Force reductions were begun in FY [fiscal year] 1990-1991 and will continue during the Department's multiyear defense program. Projected force structure reductions from FY 1990 to FY 1995 include a drop in Army divisions from 28 (18 active) to 18 (12 active), and a drop in Air Force tactical fighter wing equivalents from 36 (24 in the active component) to 26 (15 active). Battle force ships will be reduced to 451, compared to the old goal of 600 ships." (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off. [hereafter GPO], 1991, p. ix). This force structure was called the "Base Force." The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, did not issue the supporting *National Military Strategy* until a year later, in January 1992. Moving away from the Cold War stress on a global strategy, it shifted to a "regionally oriented" strategy. It declared that "this new strategy is built upon the four key foundations of the National Defense Strategy: Strategic Deterrence and Defense, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, and Reconstitution" (p. 6, and Powell's introduction). For the final details of the Base Force see Cheney's *Annual Report to the President and the Congress, February 1992* (Washington: GPO, 1992), pp. vii and 1.

The "Bottom-Up Review" (BUR) was a product of the new Clinton administration. It further reduced the force structure to 10 active Army divisions (37 National Guard brigades—15 with enhanced readiness), 13 active Air Force wings (7 reserve wings), and 346 Navy ships by FY 1999. The initial concepts underlying this force structure appeared in Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review* (Washington: Department of Defense, October 1993). It briefly sketched a strategy "to win two major regional conflicts that occur nearly simultaneously." More specific numbers for the BUR force structure appeared in Les Aspin, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress, January 1994* (Washington: GPO, 1994), p. 27. However, a fully developed National Military Strategy of the United States (signed by the Chairman of the JCS) was late in coming.

3. Clinton, pp. 2, and 6-7.

4. The reader will notice that we use the term "bottom-up" in a different sense than did the BUR. We would characterize the BUR as a combination of "threat" and "scenario" approaches to force planning.

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Errata

An editorial error in our Winter 1995 issue produced both a misstatement and a misspelling in a single sentence in James L. George's review of Bennett Ramberg's Arms Control Without Negotiations. The reference to Rose Gottemoeller on page 137, right column, should read ". . . formerly of RAND, now on the National Security Council staff."

Also, William Gilkerson, the artist whose painting appeared on our Winter 1995 cover, is not (as stated on page 72 of that issue) a Canadian citizen but an American, residing in Nova Scotia.

IN MY VIEW. . .

The National Guard and the Constitution

Sir:

In his review (*Naval War College Review*, Autumn 1994, pp. 138–9) of Robert B. Sligh's *The National Guard and National Defense*, Major Gary A. Trogdon writes that the U.S. Supreme Court in 1990 "would resolve" the state-federal "dilemma" over control of the National Guard. Assigned to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans at that time, I vividly recall the lawsuit by Governors Perpich of Minnesota, Dukakis of Massachusetts and others, which led eventually to a Supreme Court ruling on overseas deployment training of the National Guard. (The immediate context involved unit training in Honduras and elsewhere.)

But the 1990 Supreme Court never really "resolved" control of militia forces in any final sense. The U.S. Constitution, which we have sworn to defend, quite explicitly distinguishes and limits the powers of the United States and "the States respectively" (Article I, Section 8).

This power-sharing enshrined in the founding documents of our Republic was intended by the founders to limit the power and authority of the central government. The Constitution has been amended twenty-six times since 1787, but never Article I, Section 8, a fact which attests to the adequacy of that Section.

Otherwise, Major Trogdon wrote a fine book review, for which I thank him.

Robert P. Fairchild
Lt. Col., Army National Guard

Russian National Interest

Sir:

In my view, Captain First Rank Potvorov makes a policy statement in his essay entitled "National Interests, National Security, and the Russian Navy" (*Naval War College Review*, Autumn 1994). The policy statement addresses Churchill's "key" sought for within his famous "I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma, but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest."

Before making the policy statement, Potvorov, as a preamble, makes several points of a defensive nature, i.e., it is "impossible to deny that changes in Russia cause changes throughout the world," the need to "define what Russia's national interests are," etc. A semantic exercise about national interests follows. Then, with a hint of arrogance, he sends his message under the subject of national security.

Although the Warsaw Pact is now history, he cautions that Nato should not broaden, possibly should even "lock its door," and that the UN, for the moment at least, should be the authority in international security affairs. The fact that Russia is a member of the Security Council is purely coincidental.

The three circle narratives too are revealing. Circle I counsels, perhaps admonishes, former republics to form alliances with Mother Russia, particularly military alliances. Identical historical interests and "family, ethnic, and social ties" are among the reasons. Circle II contains, as noted earlier, the admonition "nor should Nato expand its membership," and Circle III an observation, "Even in the post-confrontational world, Russia and 'Circle III' are still very different. . . ."

Potvorov is correct when he says that Russia is neither East or West. That is the enigma—it wants to be both and neither at the same time.

As Russia regains her momentum, "the essence of Russia's military doctrine lies not only in contributing to global and regional stability but also in ensuring that *no state's* armed forces gain such superiority. . . ." (Emphasis added.)

While a great deal more may be said analysing the essay, one detects a return to former attitudes. John M. Collins, in his *Grand Strategy*, prefaced his discussion on national interests with the following: "'Cheshire puss,' she began rather timidly, . . . 'would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?' 'That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,' said the cat."

Potvorov may be telling us where Russia wants to go. (As an exercise I wonder how an article for a Russian journal written by a U.S. Navy captain on the subject would read, absent having read Potvorov's essay.)

Bruno Gruenwald
Lebanon, Pennsylvania

What They Didn't Say

Sir:

I very much enjoyed reading Captain Ed Smith's article entitled "What ' . . . From the Sea' Didn't Say" (*Naval War College Review*, Winter 1995) and believe he captured the essence of the Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort. One might get the mistaken impression from his measured words, however, that the NFCPE group was fairly homogeneous and that its discussions were mostly dispassionate and analytical (with a little "vigorous debate" thrown in). In fact, the debates were many and generally extremely pointed and passionate. The group wrangled for days over the exact nature of the "product" it was supposed to generate. In the end, I believe ". . . From the Sea" provided a long-range focus which was badly needed by the naval service.

It should therefore come as no surprise that I take exception to your implication (in footnote 7, an editor's note) that the NFCPE's view of the role of navies and Frank Uhlig's (which are contained in his article, "How Navies Fight, and Why," in the same issue) are at variance. Mr. Uhlig lists five enduring naval roles, all of which are found within the concepts described in ". . . From the Sea." Mr. Uhlig then asserts there are three purposes for navies, two absolutes and one conditional. "The absolutes are to ensure first that friendly shipping can flow and second that hostile shipping cannot. Once the flow of friendly shipping is assured . . . navies can risk landing an army on a hostile shore, supporting that army with fire and logistics." Although ". . . From the Sea" only briefly discusses "the absolutes" and concentrates on the conditional purpose for the Navy, it does so because no serious threat to America's ability to control the flow of shipping on the high seas exists for the foreseeable future. (See Sean O'Keefe, "Be Careful What You Ask For," and Bradd C. Hayes, "Keeping the Naval Service Relevant," in U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, January and October 1993).

What Captain Smith "didn't say" in his article is how far the Navy and Marine Corps have yet to go to reach the vision of an integrated Service presented in ". . . From the Sea." The naval service has yet to develop new integrated command structures, define the make-up of a Naval Expeditionary Force, or expand the integration of Navy and Marine Corps fixed-wing aircraft. ". . . From the Sea" remains an excellent road map for the future. The greatest testament to this fact is that the naval service's follow-on paper, "Forward . . . From the Sea," adds little to concepts first introduced in its predecessor.

Captain Bradd C. Hayes, U.S. Navy
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SET AND DRIFT

The Ad Hoc Nature of Policy Making The *Missouri* Visit to Turkey

Robert E. Fisher, Jr.

The remains of the late Turkish Ambassador, His Excellency Mehemet Munir Ertegun, who died at his post in Washington as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps on November 11, 1944, will be returned with full honors to Istanbul, Turkey, on board the U.S.S. Missouri, sailing from New York Harbor on March 21 next.

U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 17 March 1946

A NAVAL VISIT TO TURKEY AND GREECE in 1946 became a symbol of national resolve in support of a threatened potential ally, when the world's most famous battleship was assigned to a mission usually carried out, according to diplomatic precedence, by a cruiser. It also was taken as a model of U.S. restraint in the face of Soviet belligerence, in that the strong Eighth Fleet escort originally proposed by Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes was not sent.¹

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The importance of this symbolism for American policy has become axiomatic. The following characterization is typical: "The most prestigious and powerful ship in the United States fleet, the battleship *Missouri*, was selected to maximize the 'splendid effects' of the mission on the area. The gesture was designed solely as a carefully calculated 'political manifestation' appropriate for the unsettled conditions of the region at the time, and to embellish it Forrestal got Byrnes's approval for plans for an accompanying task force in the region—one that might be made permanent later on."² The accompanying task force was never sent, because, reportedly, of a disagreement over such "a grand display of U.S. naval power in the Mediterranean," which would have included the two newest American aircraft carriers plus escorts.³ "Truman and Byrnes decided that a less formidable display of American naval strength in European waters was appropriate."⁴

The real story of this naval port call, however, is more complex and ambivalent, and less rational and coordinated, than surface appearances suggest. *Missouri's* visit was the end product not of a highly coordinated and rational process of carefully calibrated symbolism; rather, it resulted—like so much of the policy of that period—from the convergence of differently motivated actions and quite limited instruments.

One of the facts that almost has been forgotten by historians is that the selection of the *Missouri* was coincidental, not deliberate. Another—the reason the Eighth Fleet did not provide support and escort—had little to do with last-minute State Department reluctance to provoke the Soviets. Due to the absence of trained and experienced personnel, the major fleet units that would have been involved were simply incapable of such a deployment. A closer look at the *Missouri* visit reminds us of these important realities.

Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, as Acting Secretary during Byrnes's trip to the Moscow conference on 25 January 1946, suggested to Truman by memo that a mission to return the deceased Turkish ambassador be planned; Truman approved the visit the same day. On 1 February, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), after informing Acheson, signaled Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, the commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, that a cruiser would be provided.⁵ Unfortunately, the Atlantic Fleet had no cruisers to spare; every cruiser had been assigned to Operation Magic Carpet, bringing home soldiers from overseas. OPNAV next considered the two operational Atlantic Fleet battleships. On 9 February 1946 a second message was sent to Hewitt that referred to the *Wisconsin* as the ship designated for the trip. However, close examination of the battleship's schedule revealed that *Wisconsin* was due in port for overhaul on 1 April. By default then, *Missouri* was selected, probably by Vice Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the CNO.

Acheson's original request, while it may have been initiated by Loy Henderson's Near Eastern Affairs office, seems to have been no more than a matter of courtesy. Therefore, that a battleship was sent, much less the legendary *Missouri*, to carry the ambassador's remains was not a premeditated act of geopolitical gunboat diplomacy but merely a coincidence. Once the battleship was selected, however, it took little time for others to support and even expand the mission for reasons of their own.⁶

Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States had become increasingly tense. On 9 February 1946, Joseph Stalin gave a speech that portended sinister Soviet intentions. On 22 February the U.S. chargé d'affaires in Moscow, George Kennan, sent his famous "long telegram," which received wide and immediate attention among most senior administration officials. With calculated timing, Forrestal approached Byrnes on 28 February, just before Byrnes's hard-line speech to the Overseas Press Club, and asked for clearance to augment the *Missouri* with strong units from the Eighth Fleet—which was just forming up under the command of Admiral Marc A. Mitscher. Although this proposal was definitely made by Forrestal, it very likely originated with Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, the U.S. Navy representative to the United Nations Military Staff Committee, by way of the DCNO, Admiral Sherman. In any case, Byrnes promptly approved. Since his return from Moscow, Byrnes had been in Truman's "doghouse" for taking to himself too much presidential authority and "giving away" too much to the Soviets. His political capital with Truman was at a low ebb, and Byrnes sought any means available to reverse his perceived softness toward the Soviets.⁷ The mood in Washington had definitely hardened.

If the selection of the *Missouri* was coincidental, however, Forrestal's proposal to augment the battleship with powerful elements of the Eighth Fleet was a deliberate attempt to send a strong signal to Turkey, Iran, and the Soviets. Byrnes endorsed the proposed increased deployment. Loy Henderson welcomed the harder line with its tangible support for American friends in the Middle East. OPNAV welcomed the idea of showing the Navy's new role and capabilities in a good light.⁸ In the event, however, the heavy escort was cancelled and the *Missouri* was sent alone. Hanson Baldwin of *The New York Times*, in an article entitled "U.S. Fleet Parade in Europe Dropped," credited the State Department with restraint and sophistication in abandoning the proposed naval display.⁹ The story, however, was likely a deliberate plant by either the State Department or the Navy, or both, to cover up a very real weakness in the national defense. In fact, the Navy was virtually unable to steam most of its major Atlantic Fleet units for any sustained period, due to shortages of trained and experienced personnel. Though the Navy hierarchy in Washington was in favor of sending

the augmenting force, sometime between 28 February and 18 March the escort mission was dropped, almost certainly at Mitscher's initiative.

By the time Commodore Arleigh A. Burke, Mitscher's chief of staff, had set up shop in preparation for the activation of the Eighth Fleet on 1 March 1946, the lack of qualified personnel was severely limiting combat readiness. Burke said that the few ships he had could barely steam, much less operate, and that although the senior leaders were sound, the great majority of intermediate commanders, commanding officers of ships, watchstanders, and crews were green. Burke would later recall that if he gave an order during maneuvers—for instance, to shift the disposition of destroyers in the escort screen—the watchstanding officers on those ships would not know what to do. As chief of staff, Burke would have to show them how, train them on the spot. Mitscher also was quick to note his new command's shortcomings; despite a “back-breaking training schedule,” the fleet was barely ready for the major exercise that Mitscher had set for late April.¹⁰ In light of this background, it is most likely that it was Mitscher, through Nimitz, who was responsible for curtailing the Eighth Fleet's proposed escort mission.

And so the *Missouri*, designated by default, steamed to Turkey alone. Contrary to subsequent legend, it neither was specially chosen to signify American political resolve nor sent without escort to convey American restraint. The reality of ships' schedules and naval training requirements had—once again—overtuled political theory.

Notes

1. The Eighth Fleet was activated 1 March 1946 under the overall command of Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Under its new commander, Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, Eighth Fleet would be the heavy striking arm of the Atlantic Fleet. It would consist of the preponderance of Atlantic Fleet aircraft carrier assets, including the new fast carriers *Midway* and *Franklin D. Roosevelt*, their escorts, and support ships. The last did not include the fast battleship division made up of the *Wisconsin* and the *Missouri*, retained under direct command of Atlantic Fleet.

The dispatch of cruisers—fast, practical, and powerful symbols of national power—had precedents. According to David Alvarez, Acheson told Truman that since the remains of the late British ambassador, Lord Lothian, had been transported to Scotland on a cruiser in 1939, Captain Richmond Kelly Turner in the cruiser *Astoria* sailed to Japan to return the ashes of Minister Saito, ambassador to the United States. See David Alvarez, “*Missouri* Visit to Turkey: An Alternative Perspective on Cold War Diplomacy,” *Balkans Studies*, vol. 15, no. 2, Spring 1974 (Thessalonika).

2. Gabriel and Joyce Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 233.

3. Stephen G. Xydis, *Greece and the Great Powers, 1944–1947* (Thessalonika: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963), p. 168.

4. Michael A. Palmer, *Origins of the Maritime Strategy: American Naval Strategy in the First Postwar Decade* (Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1988), p. 22. Palmer's excellent account of this period is balanced and thorough. As with many before and since, his natural inclination was to take at face value an article by Hanson Baldwin, “U.S. Fleet Parade in Europe Dropped,” *The New York Times*, 18 March 1946, pp. 1, 3, describing the State Department's new-found forbearance (see below).

5. Alvarez, pp. 235–6.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 223-4; Command Narrative, *Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet 1 September 1945 to 1 October 1946*, Command File—Post 1 January 1946 (hereafter CINCLANT History), Operational Archives, U.S. Naval Historical Center (hereafter OA), p. 4; War Diary, COMNAVMEDE, February 1946, in COMNAVEUR History, OA; Palmer, p. 22; and Alvarez, p. 234. Alvarez saw four independent interests at work: the NEA and Loy Henderson, Acheson and Byrnes at State, the Secretary of the Navy, and naval factions pressing for favorable publicity. To this list I would add the pragmatists, led by Mitscher and Burke, who stopped the fantasy.

7. Walter Millis, ed., *Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking, 1951), p. 141; and Palmer, p. 22 and notes, pp. 6-7.

8. Palmer, p. 22; and Alvarez, pp. 225-36.

9. Baldwin, *The New York Times*, 18 March 1946, pp. 1, 3; and Alvarez, pp. 225-36.

10. E.B. Potter, *Admiral Arleigh Burke* (New York: Random House, 1990), pp. 268-71. Access to Burke's oral histories is limited by law, but Potter's biography captures their essence.

Ψ

This Issue's Cover

The U.S. Army began offering its best and brightest to the Naval War College even before Stephen B. Luce founded it; Admiral Luce's early conversations with Generals William T. Sherman and Emery Upton strongly influenced his conception of this institution. It was no accident, then, that when the College opened, its only full-time faculty member—teaching strategy—was Lieutenant Bliss.

Since that time, the Army presence at the College has been conspicuous and distinguished. Twenty general officers now on active duty are Naval War College graduates; one of them—General John M. Shalikashvili—is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In recent years, the College has awarded master's degrees to 646 U.S. Army officers. On board today are sixty-four Army students and twelve faculty members, who include two research fellows, a Judge Advocate officer specializing in oceans law, and an advisor to the President.

Tasker Bliss, the subject of this issue's cover, went on to put the Army War College into operation in 1903, quickly establishing close professional interaction with Newport. In 1917, as the Army's second four-star general, he became Chief of Staff of the Army, going to France the next year as a member of the Supreme War Council and thereafter of the Commission to Negotiate Peace. The cover portrait, which shows him as he appeared in those later years, is by George Sottung. It was donated to the College in 1984, and it hangs today in Mahan Hall. Reproduced by the permission, and with the assistance, of the Naval War College Museum.

BOOK REVIEWS

A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge with reason and consistency.

Admiral H.G. Rickover

"A Theme As Old As Politics Itself"

Nolan, Janne E., ed. *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994. 623pp. \$39.95

One would be hard put to describe *Global Engagement* more accurately than as a *manifesto*. Its 593 pages of text in sixteen chapters offer a comprehensive description of the post-Cold War world's political, economic, and security environments, as well as a recommended approach for U.S. security policy in the future. An ambitious undertaking, by Brookings' Dr. Janne E. Nolan, this work represents the culmination of eighteen months of effort by a consortium representing Brookings, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Harvard and Stanford universities. It acknowledges roots in a 1992 Brookings Occasional Paper entitled "A New Concept of Cooperative Security" and features chapters by current and previous government decision makers including, *inter alia*, Ashton B. Carter, Antonia Handler Chayes, Geoffrey Kemp, and, of greatest interest to the readers of the *Naval War College Review*, the current Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry.

Those who believe that the replacement of national security considerations by economic concerns requires scaling back military forces, that new security challenges cannot be met by the same approaches as in the past, that the core security interests of the United States and other nations have become inescapably interdependent, that the key security objectives of national military establishments around the world are fundamentally compatible, and that these premises lead directly to the conclusion that traditional forms of readiness and deterrence will be ineffective to meet future challenges, will find comfort and intellectual nourishment in large measure in these pages. Yet those largely unsurprising postulates do not entirely capture the book's thesis.

“Cooperative security,” a term used interchangeably in the book with “global engagement” and “cooperative engagement,” deliberately “replaces preparations to counter threats with prevention of such threats in the first place and replaces the deterring of aggression with actions to make preparation for it more difficult.” Moreover, “in the process the potential destructiveness of military conflict—especially incentives for the use of weapons of mass destruction—would be reduced.” In brief, cooperation is preferable to competition among states, and much safer and cheaper to boot.

This constitutes an indirect articulation of the three vintage goals of arms control—to reduce the risk of war, to lessen the destructiveness of war should it nevertheless occur, and to lower the economic burden of providing for a state’s security. Indeed, *Global Engagement* is not self-conscious in the slightest about its warm embrace of arms control as the pivot point for U.S. security.

The central theme of the book—as old as politics itself—contrasts international security systems that are based on competition with those that rely on cooperation among states. Chapters are devoted to describing the ideal international architecture, the instruments of cooperative security, the importance and the contributions of political economy, how global institutions interact with global engagement, and to a series of regional applications and analyses.

The contribution by Secretary Perry is provocatively entitled “Military Action: When to Use It and How to Ensure Its Effectiveness.” Perry was coauthor, along with Ashton Carter and John Steinbruner, of the precursor Brookings study. It seems reasonable, therefore, to conclude that it represents Perry’s thinking on the subject and is not merely a brief contribution buried in a long book. Perry’s opening two sentences are in full harmony with the overall theme of *Global Engagement*, and they should be read as an attempt to effect a redirection of U.S. security policy: “A fundamental principle of a cooperative security regime is that each member agrees to limit its military forces to what is necessary for defense of its territory. However, a small number of nations, including the United States, must maintain certain elements of their armed forces beyond that required for territorial defense and make these elements available to multinational forces when needed.”

To elaborate on that opening salvo, Perry describes the “special role” of the U.S. military as providing airlift to bring coalition forces to the scene of action, military intelligence, and “most of the stealth aircraft to suppress enemy air defenses.” Other members of the coalition would join the United States in “achieving air and naval superiority in the theater,” and those partners would “play a dominant role in the ground forces of the coalition.” Noteworthy is the absence of argument about how the United States in this approach might persuade the rest of the world that it was one of those “small number of nations” that could retain *offensive* capability, on what criteria those special states would

be selected, and how the number of such nations would be kept small. A fit between the suggested roles and the forces to accomplish them would be achieved by major restructuring that would include "a significant reduction in the size of the U.S. ground and naval forces," capabilities to provide a "core contribution to the strategic intelligence evaluations that assess the emergence of new threats," and "important elements of the reconnaissance strike military forces."

Perry later defines reconnaissance strike forces as C3I (i.e., command, control, communications, and intelligence), precision-guided munitions, and defense suppression. For a patient—the U.S. military—that is not currently sick, this amounts to strong medicine. For a nation that since World War II has pursued a much more ambitious and active security vision, here is a radical shift of long-term goals.

Global Engagement has been expertly edited and copiously footnoted, and its arguments have been presented with elegance and consistency. Its policy approach and the means to accomplish the objectives it details, however, suffer from a fatal shortcoming. That is, insofar as it mirrors the thinking of the years between World Wars I and II, it helps to ensure that the current post-Cold War phase will become yet another interwar period. Its apparently flawless argument and seamless logic echo the Pact of Paris (or the Kellogg-Briand Pact) of 1928: the contracting powers "agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or origin, which may arise between them shall never be sought except by pacific means." Like Kellogg-Briand, global engagement cannot grapple with the truly malign, the immoral, and the evil forces in the world. As a consequence, again like Kellogg-Briand, it risks catastrophic failure as a policy guide.

In the final analysis, *Global Engagement* offers solutions for a globe on which the sun never ceases to shine. Because its policy approach provides an exercise in virtual reality, readers should be cautioned to remove their helmets at the end of the book.

Roger Barnett
Naval War College

Guertner, Gary L. *The Search for Strategy: Politics and Strategic Vision*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993. 328pp. \$59.95

Gary L. Guertner has expertly consolidated an extraordinary collection of

works written by an exceptional group of scholars and practitioners. The authors address the complex issues confronting United States strategists in the "new world order" and also its capacity to promote its national interests in that

dynamic, uncertain, and unpredictable environment. This aim is effectively achieved in the book's central thesis, that the dominant factor in the search for strategy is the domestic political environment. Guertner then applies the concept to two distinct yet inextricably related areas. Part I, "Strategy as Politics," comprises a series of studies that describe the process of strategy formulation in the contemporary U.S. domestic political environment. It addresses the difficulty of designing a coherent national strategy through a rational, calculating process in a democratic or otherwise politically decentralized system. Not surprisingly, the text postulates that in such conditions strategy formulation does not derive from a single vision but rather from an intensely political process heavily influenced by parochial interests, conflict, bargaining, and ultimately compromise. In short, we do what we can agree to do—usually reduced by consensus to the lowest common denominator. The impact of this state of things is brought home by, among others, Robert Art, Gordon Adams, and Gary Guertner. Art explores two fundamental questions. How well suited is our strategy to the needs of the post-Cold War world? Does the top political and military leadership carry sufficient weight in the defense bureaucracy to make its decisions stick? In the first instance, he contends that critical correctives must be applied before the national military strategy can be fully effective, and second, that a key element in realizing these correctives will be officers capable of subordinating service parochialism to the interests of an effective, coherent,

national military strategy in the wake of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Adams reinforces this concept in his discussion of how difficult the services' job will be in Congress if they fail to speak with one voice. Guertner continues this tack in his exploration of the domestic political environment in which the services must compete for the resources necessary to implement the national military strategy.

Parts II, III, and IV specifically investigate national military strategy, emphasizing elements of greatest value while recognizing both funding constraints and increasingly complex challenges to the evolving U.S. global leadership role, and identifying strategic concepts that appear to be the most prudent. The future of deterrence, technological superiority, and collective security and defense are considered and analyzed.

In Part II, George Quester and Robert Haffa, like Guertner, note theories and strategies of nuclear deterrence that appear adaptable to the conventional side of the equation. Conditions now exist, they argue, in light of the end of the Cold War and the resultant decoupling of nuclear and conventional forces, that are amenable to general, extended conventional deterrence.

Part III consolidates the issues of deterrence and technology, examining our ability effectively to integrate technological benefits at reasonable cost and, perhaps more importantly, without developing strict dependence on those emerging technologies. The authors remind us that we should embrace technology as a potential force multiplier but must avoid the tendency

to view it as a panacea. Additionally, the dilemma involving foreign technology is explored: since the U.S. has no monopoly upon innovation, research, and development, it must strike a balance between access to foreign technological sources and undesired diffusion of its own advances. This topic leads to a discussion of the problems surrounding arms proliferation, of both the conventional and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) genres. Likewise, the growing contradiction between selling arms to allies to preserve longstanding military commitments while simultaneously pursuing multilateral constraints on potentially destabilizing weapons transfers is one of the many policy dilemmas facing the contemporary strategist and decision maker.

Part IV addresses the concepts of collective security and collective defense. As a strategic concept, neither is new. At the conclusion of both world wars and the Cold War, there was hope for some form of collective system that would either prevent or contain future conflicts. The Gulf war reinforced those hopes. The authors remind us that no nation can be consistently relied upon to place collective interests or those of another state above its own. They suggest that nations will not perceive each threat in the same way and as a result will be reluctant to undertake identical risks or costs associated with military action. Therefore, they argue, collective security has its limits and must be supplemented with varying levels of individual defense.

The book concludes that in the political processes of a democracy there

will inevitably be conflicts involving strategy. Three steps are recommended to minimize conflict and obstacles to coherent strategy formulation. First, strategic vision must be clearly articulated at the top to enable the bureaucracy and Congress to stay in focus. Next, the American public and policy makers should reexamine their notions of "victory" as a permanent end-state. Finally, the popular domestic concept of "victory" tends to exacerbate the natural tension between domestic and foreign policy resources. These notions are guaranteed to stimulate debate and discussion in any wardroom, as will the other thoughts, ideas, and proposals offered for consideration by the authors.

The book's final paragraph should more than sharpen the reader's appetite for this collection of writings: "The search for strategy has consequences that are vital to the nation. This volume is not intended to provide a strategy for the new world order, or even an ideal process for formulating strategy. Its purpose is to emphasize the search itself as important and worth our best efforts and attention at a time when familiar landmarks have vanished and no new strategic vision has attracted a national consensus."

I heartily endorse this book to all military officers and their civilian counterparts throughout the U.S. Department of Defense and national security bureaucracy. It will profoundly influence their views regarding the difficult and politically complex process of strategy formulation.

WARREN L. CALDWELL, JR.
Captain, U.S. Navy

Van Ham, Peter. *Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s: Power, Politics, and Policies*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994. 112pp. \$14.95

This slim volume, part of the respected Chatham House Papers series of monographs from the Royal Institute of International Affairs, should be required reading for students of international relations and national security, and for professionals within the military and intelligence communities. In a concise, well organized style, the author addresses what is emerging as perhaps the greatest threat in an increasingly Hobbesian post-Cold War world—the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Van Ham, a research fellow at the Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union, has produced a primer on the current state of the nonproliferation field, with recommendations for evolving strategies in an unstable, multipolar world. Twelve pages of chapter notes provide ready reference to a variety of sources and researchers. After a brief historical overview of current control regimes, from traditional comprehensive agreements such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to more recent “supply-side” initiatives such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the author examines the reasons why nations cooperate to deter the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. He then outlines the post-Cold War strategic, political, and economic dynamics increasingly fostering that same proliferation—specifically the demise of the Soviet Union, the

emergence of new supplier states (especially in the areas of nuclear and ballistic missile technology), and the globalization of dual-use high technology in general.

Quoting Robert Keohane, van Ham states that control regimes “contribute to cooperation not by implementing rules that states must follow, but by changing the context within which states make decisions based on self-interest.” Self-interest based on the bloc politics of the Cold War has now been displaced by the dynamic chaos of the market; the relatively stable East-West confrontation has been supplanted by an evolving, unpredictable conflict between North and South, the industrialized (and frequently nuclear-capable) powers entangled with the striving nations of the developing world, nations that feel marginalized by traditional control regimes and insecure without the military backing of their former Cold War patrons. In such a world, van Ham sees the pursuit of nonproliferation as “the art of the attainable,” requiring a flexible, diversified approach. “It is as important to devise policies which address the supply side of the proliferation problem . . . as to try to tackle the demand side by confronting the causes of the perceived need for non-conventional weaponry.” He concludes that these objectives may best be met by sustaining existing control regimes such as the NPT, due for review in 1995, and addressing regional security needs through linkage with nonproliferation initiatives. Trade in dual-use technologies and materials can best be regulated by economic incentives and sanctions, and in the nuclear

arena by strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Van Ham advocates invigorating the IAEA with the challenge-inspection mandate granted the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and perhaps with its own (and thus unbiased) intelligence gathering capability. Some in the U.S. intelligence community will find this last proposal controversial, while others will see it as merely quixotic. In the aftermath of the Gulf war, though, such an initiative would clearly increase the credibility of the IAEA, even if the actual capability was limited to analysis of information from open sources and other agencies rather than independent collection.

These points are clearly presented and well argued. However, the reader, and especially the military reader, must bear in mind that while van Ham clearly presents the urgent need for preventing proliferation, he does so strictly within the context of international diplomatic and economic control mechanisms, or "regimes." The final option of internationally sanctioned or unilateral military action is not addressed in detail, nor is the increasing evidence of organized international criminal activity and freelance smuggling on the supply side. Furthermore, some key points have been overtaken by events since publication, an unavoidable scholarly risk in the field of international relations since 1989. For instance, the author cites CoCom, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, a cornerstone of Western Cold War supply-side policy, as a useful proliferation control regime desperately in need of

realignment from East-West to North-South. Its members, however, have decided otherwise: CoCom was disbanded in March 1994. These are minor points. The tone of *Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s* is scholarly and never strident, but it speaks with a quiet urgency to all who work and serve to foster security and stability in an increasingly chaotic world. We would do well to appreciate the author's reasoning, consider his ideas, and heed his warnings.

CHARLES C. SWICKER
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Lacy, James L. *A Different Equation: Naval Issues and Arms Control After 1991*. Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Defense Analysis, IDA Paper P-2768, December 1993. 183pp. (No price given)

A Different Equation is an Institute for Defense Analysis technical report prepared for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (Conventional Arms Control and Compliance) in late 1992. In February 1993, the acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Conventional Forces and Arms Control Policy requested that the report not be released for six months. The report itself is dated December 1993, but it was not distributed until March 1994.

The official reason given for the delay was that there were "a number of policy issues raised by the report that are particularly sensitive at this time and that will require review by the new Administration." Given this fascinating introduction, the reader surely must

wonder, exactly which policy issues were so sensitive? Since there are no obvious differences between the October 1992 version of this paper and the final product distributed one and a half years later, the reader must also wonder what impact the study had on the new administration. The revised preface provides no real clues, which is particularly distressing since there have been many changes in the international environment that might have been addressed had the study been continued.

The study first discusses the status of naval arms control, circa 1992, identifying those issues that might again surface in the post-Cold War era. James Lacy takes issue with those who have argued that naval arms control is dead; he uses confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) as the centerpiece for his set of policy issues that are still on the table. The author argues that the U.S. is concerned about the potential growth of regional navies and might therefore find regionally oriented CSBMs and various cooperative frameworks to be of benefit. He also states that many operations other than war will logically grow into CSBMs. Lacy thus provides a good overview of incremental naval arms control that might evolve despite efforts to the contrary.

Probably the only really controversial issue raised in this study is where to draw the line, as the U.S. Navy finds itself enmeshed in a series of measures that are the stepping-stones to more restrictive regulations. The line is not clearly marked; tables would have helped. The issue of where to draw it certainly qualifies as "particularly sensitive," although perhaps it was the entire

subject itself that the administration found contentious. However, there have been many more polemical recommendations in articles, chapters, books, and at conferences that make Lacy's findings and suggestions seem pretty tame.

The author does make a strong case that safety and environmental regulations, and expanded involvement in "nontraditional" pursuits by navies, will likely lead to more CSBM-like activities. It appears obvious that these type of activities will occur in the future. If Lacy is correct that the U.S. Navy views naval arms control as a subject to be avoided, then it may be in the best interest of the Navy to perform comprehensive damage-limitation. On the other hand, perhaps Lacy is trying to tell us that it will be virtually impossible to stop the creeping incrementalism of CSBMs and that true believers in naval arms control need only bide their time before the great U.S. Navy is finally harnessed.

James Lacy is no stranger to naval issues and arms control. Indeed, it is a tribute to his abilities that he has managed to complete this interesting technical report, after having previously published four others at the RAND Corporation in 1990 and 1991 for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. In some ways, Lacy's new report is disappointing, in that it is so modest in its recommendations. Of particular use to the specialist, this study also contains an excellent distribution list, invaluable for any new researcher seeking the names and addresses of the 227 government officials, military officers, and

scholars the author thought would wish to read his report.

JAMES J. TRITTEN
Naval Doctrine Command

Snyder, Frank. *Command and Control: The Literature and Commentaries*. Washington: National Defense Univ., 1993. 167pp. (No price given)

There seems to be an assumption today that since technology precipitates changes in doctrine and tactics, astounding technological advances beget revolutionary leaps in military capabilities. This logic underlies a series of recent articles extolling "Revolution in Military Affairs" or "Military Technical Revolution." Corresponding theses proclaim entire new warfare doctrines, such as Space and Electronic Warfare (Navy), Command and Control (C2) Warfare (the Joint Staff), and Information Warfare (Secretary of Defense). Even the most committed technowork, however, must wonder whether we are truly experiencing a discontinuity in the tactical continuum stimulated by extraordinary developments in digital electronics, or merely suffering from hubris in thinking that our times are unique.

Into this swirl of hype and hyperbole comes *Command and Control*, a concise but profound book that is the product of a joint collaboration between the U.S. Naval War College, Harvard University, and the Institute for National Strategic Studies.

Frank Snyder is a professor emeritus at the Naval War College, where for many years he held the Raymond A.

Spruance Chair of Command and Control. Snyder has produced a jewel of a guide to this complex world. It is a Baedeker for military and civilians alike who either are part of the command and control process or involved in C2-associated systems.

This book was meant to serve as a textbook in a ten-session course of instruction. In that worthy endeavor it falls short, but not for lack of effort. Because command and control is an inseparable joining of humans and technology, the topic is so rich that, to paraphrase Aristotle, the more one learns the more one realizes how little one really knows. However, Snyder's book succeeds in a far more useful way—as an almanac of clear definitions, cogent insights, and pertinent readings within each of the ten principal areas of command and control.

The initial emphasis of Snyder's work is on establishing a framework in which to define, first, command and control itself, and then C2 systems. The official Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02 definition is used, which places equal emphasis on the function of command, the supporting significance of systems, and the commander's use of those systems to control forces in the accomplishment of the mission. The Joint Chiefs of Staff preference for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer systems (C4) establishes the boundary of supporting C2 systems, one that contrasts with the Navy, Armed Forces Communications Electronics Association (C4I), and Marine Corps (C2I2) inclusion of intelligence systems. The central focus, however, of both the

book and the course is that of the C2 process (students would call this a "foot-stomper"), almost as counterpoint to the desire of many, especially Americans, to focus more centrally upon technologies. It is as if the author wishes us to heed Napoleon's caution, "Woe to the commander who arrives on the field of battle with a system."

After an initial look into the functions of command and the nature of warfare, the next five lessons gravitate around the C2 process, and the final four lessons focus on C4 systems. The book contains a chapter for each of the ten lessons, with a discussion, commentary on principal readings, and an annotated list of supplementary readings. The individual readings and the bibliography are each worth the price of the book; they encompass the very best in both historical and contemporary work. The currently fashionable "Information Warfare" appears to be absent, as well as (for the reason noted) intelligence and intelligence systems. Also, Snyder treats modelling, simulation, and wargaming only lightly. I would have included in the bibliography Wayne Hughes' succinct and useful *Fleet Tactics*.

In summary, this is a book to come back to again and again, like a map through a confusing and uncertain territory. While it works better in helping the reader understand the nature of C2, rather than any specific system, that in itself is of more enduring value in this era of instant technological obsolescence. Most of all, the reader comes away appreciating that any discussion of command and control involves an inherent joining of commanders with systems and that such "man-in-the-loop"

conditions make a knowledge of history and human nature as important as of engineering physics.

JOHN R. WOOD
Captain, U.S. Navy

Uhlig, Frank, Jr. *How Navies Fight: The U.S. Navy and Its Allies*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994. 455pp. \$34.95

Probably the best way to begin a review of Frank Uhlig's book is to make clear to the reader what this book is not. It is not a chronologically balanced history of the U.S. Navy, nor is it an examination of policy, strategy, operations, or tactics. It is, however, and was meant to be, a review of the wartime history of the U.S. Navy and those of its various allies—the French in the American Revolution, the British during two world wars and the Falklands campaign, and the Israelis in 1973. Uhlig's focus usually rests at the operational level, although he takes the reader up and down the chain of command as necessary and appropriate.

Uhlig's aim is to set aside the debates about naval strategy and force structure, and use history to unveil the nature of the tasks the nation has called upon the Navy to perform in wartime. Uhlig asks simple and direct questions: How has the Navy actually fought during the last two hundred years? What lessons can be drawn from that experience? He concludes that there are five "ways of naval warfare that have shown themselves to be most robust, most resilient": the "strategic" movement of forces, including land and air; the acquisition of

advanced bases; the landing of armies on enemy shores; blockade; and "the struggle for the mastery of the local sea." As Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., notes in his foreword, Uhlig's account reveals that campaigns are "ten percent about battles for mastery of the sea and 90 percent about unglamorous protection or denial of shipping."

Too often throughout its history, the U.S. Navy has found itself facing crises without sufficient numbers of appropriate fighting platforms—a reality too often overlooked by historians enamored of policy and force-structure debates between navalists and anti-navalists, Mahanians and anti-Mahanians, etc. During one of the first Navy wars, the 1798–1801 Quasi-War against the French, the service discovered for the first, but not the last, time that it needed more small ships than it had on hand. The new, sleek, powerfully built super-frigates (the *Constitution*, *United States*, and *Constellation*) were wonderful ships but ill suited to many of the wartime demands faced by the service. The Navy needed small, quick ships, such as schooners and sloops, to run down weak, shallow-draft privateers and to escort the numerous convoys plying the Caribbean. In yet another quasi-war about two hundred years later, the 1987–1988 "tanker war" in the Persian Gulf against the Iranians, the Navy again found itself armed with powerful ships but lacking minehunters and other small platforms necessary to conduct some of the more critical green-water operations. Uhlig notes that when the reflagged Kuwaiti tanker *Bridgeton* struck an Iranian-laid mine in July 1987, the damaged ship

assumed "the duty of protecting her companions [the U.S. Navy escorts] who sailed humbly in her wake."

The author makes a persuasive case, since, after all, fighting is what navies are supposed to do; but the author's near-total focus on warfighting all but ignores yet another military reality—that navies operate far more during peacetime than in war. During the years of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy was involved in active operation in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf, for nearly fifteen years; notwithstanding, the vast majority of the Navy's post-World War II vessels have already gone, or will eventually go, to the scrap heap without ever having fired a shot in anger. What conclusions would we reach if we posed Uhlig's question somewhat differently: How have navies actually been used, in *peace and war*, during the last two hundred years? Might not such an approach reveal that the wartime problems of the Navy were related to its having been constituted as much, or maybe even more, for a peacetime role than for war? A minesweeper may have been a more valuable asset than a carrier off Wonsan in 1950 or in the Persian Gulf in 1987–1988; but during the long intervening decades of peace, which platform proved more valuable for day-to-day operations?

How Navies Fight is an important work, written by a man who knows more naval history and more naval historians than anyone has a right to know. Uhlig has produced a thought-provoking work that not only challenges the conventional wisdom but, perhaps more importantly, demonstrates the value of history. Two hundred years

ago, the navalists and antinavalists responsible for shaping American policy had little history to review. Policy makers in the fast approaching twenty-first century will have no such excuse, thanks to the efforts of such historians as Frank Uhlig.

MICHAEL A. PALMER
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Greenville, North Carolina

Terzibaschitsch, Stefan. *Submarines of the U.S. Navy*. New York: Sterling, 1993. 216pp. \$45

What can I say! I have somehow established a reputation for being an "objective zealot," as my friend, shipmate, and mentor Jerry Holland calls me, regarding U.S. tradeoffs between "expensive" nukes and "cheap" diesel-electrics. The publisher's "blurb" implies that this book held the answer to my downsizing the Navy and the dilemma about what to build or keep. My initial reaction was that this was going to be just another "diesel boats forever" diatribe that many like my sometimes misinformed friend Norman Polmar might find entrancing. I was mistaken. Although I rate the publisher's "flyer" at 0.1 on a scale of 10, I must admit this book does have value: it contains a totally objective compilation of the specifications and characteristics of *all* nonnuclear U.S. submarines.

It was serendipitous that the book arrived in the mail just as I was struggling to obtain credible reference material regarding post-World War II U.S. exploitation of German V-1 "buzz bomb" cruise missile technology

through such programs as the Loon and the subsequent Regulus. What would surely have resulted in many days of dull and dreary research became a twenty-minute affair in the comfort of my office, as I easily tracked the progress of the V-1 through Loon, *Cusk*, *Barbero*, *Carbonero*, *Tunny*, and Regulus I and II, *Growler*, and *Grayback*. If these names mean little to you, yet you allege to understand the U.S. Submarine Force, then you need this book on your reference shelf. The photographs and silhouettes are superb, and although I can remember seeing most of the material elsewhere, what is a unique characteristic of the work is the facility with which one can trace all of the mostly postwar alterations and modifications to individual units.

The credibility of a favorable report is enhanced by finding something wrong with the product. I found a couple of things, neither the fault of the author. Across the front and back of the jacket is a series of four copies of Bu-Ships-like blueprints (plan and longitudinal views) of *Tang*-class submarines that are still marked CONFIDENTIAL but recently declassified. These drawings are like those that I and others used to study for submarine qualification. The last of them, at least in my copy of the book, "section through platform deck," has a "holiday," a blank or white smudge, through Main Ballast Tanks 4A and 4B and the forward end of the engine room. Also, on page 188, the silhouette of "*Flying Fish* as an AGSS, with sonar equipment around the conning tower," has been double-printed and is out of registration by about an eighth of an inch.

This work deals with the essential facts of the sea stories about diesel boats that I listened to as a nuclear submarine junior officer in the early 1960s from seniors who had been in both types. I never thought that I would forget those lessons "under the olive trees," but I have, and although this was not a book I would once have bought, I would now do so—if I did not already have my reviewer's copy.

JAMES PATTON
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 North Stonington, Conn.

Lin Zhiling and Robinson, Thomas W., eds. *The Chinese and Their Future: Beijing, Taipei, and Hong Kong*. Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1994. 554pp. \$39.75

The Chinese and Their Future is based on a conference organized by the American Enterprise Institute in January 1991, when the world, still in the after-shock of the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, was anxious about developments in that part of the world. Fifteen of the seventeen excellent papers presented are contained in this work. They analyze the political, economic, social, and security dimensions of China (the remaining communist power after the Cold War), Taiwan (known as the "other China," but with a democratic system), and Hong Kong (the last symbol of the British empire).

The essays examine how these societies interact with one another, as well as the factors that might affect their trilateral relationship. It also discusses the relevant trends and forces in the

Asia-Pacific and global arenas which the Chinese are to deal with in the near future.

Every aspect of post-Tiananmen China is scrutinized rationally and intelligently. Readers may find several essays of special interest. "Playing the Provinces: Deng Xiaoping's Political Strategy of Economic Reform," by Susan Shirk, offers an in-depth account of the changing relationship between China's central government and the localities, and of the problems that Beijing authorities must cope with in the future. Chi-ming Hou's "Toward Taiwan's Full Participation in the Global System" correctly points out Taiwan's strengths and weaknesses in the internationalization of its economy. "The Evolution of a Divided China," by Byron Weng, presents a detailed analysis of the theories and formulas that could affect the possibility of unification between Beijing and Taipei. Thomas Robinson puts mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong into regional context in his essay, "Post-Cold War Security in the Asia-Pacific Region." He observes the evolution of regional balance of power through a wide-angle lens, and in the concluding chapter he identifies several domestic and international scenarios and discusses their impact upon the future of these three countries.

One of the editors' most important contributions is their attempt to explore the validity of a "greater China" linking all three countries geographically and economically but remaining politically divided. They point out that Beijing considers that there is only one China and that Taiwan and Hong Kong should rejoin the motherland under the

formula of "one country, two systems." However, Taiwan and Hong Kong are the two indispensable channels for foreign capital and technologies flowing into China. It was the intent of Lin and Robinson neither to conceptualize the term "greater China" nor to provide a definitive answer to whether there will be a "greater China." This book does provide, however, a better understanding of the factors that may affect the nature and direction of the relationship between China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.

It took the editors three years to get their then-timely observations to publication. Since the conference, the Washington-Moscow-Beijing strategic triangle terminated with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Taipei and Beijing have set up semiofficial agencies for bilateral negotiations, and the Chinese Communist Party has carried out several major political-military leadership reshuffles, beginning with its Fourteenth Party Congress in 1992.

Even with the editors' considerable efforts at revision, the book still fails to offer sufficient updated information regarding the developments in the three Chinese societies. Therefore, for China experts and policy makers, the value of this long-overdue material is somewhat reduced. However, the merit and integrity of each essay remain solid, and this book will serve as a useful reference for a general readership as well as for students in their contemplation of contemporary Chinese affairs.

Deng Xiaoping, China's paramount leader, just celebrated his ninetieth birthday; Hong Kong has less than one thousand days before it is formally

returned to Beijing's rule; and Taiwan is conducting an all-out operation to win international recognition. Given these rapid changes in the "greater China," the editors may want to organize another international conference on the same subject, or begin working on a revised edition of this important book.

ALEXANDER C. HUANG
Washington, D.C.

Eftimiades, Nicholas. *Chinese Intelligence Operations*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994. 169pp. (No price given)

This timely book discusses the widespread and expanding espionage operations of the People's Republic of China, the PRC. The author is an Asia specialist and an analyst in the Defense Intelligence Agency's counterintelligence assessment branch; thus, he is amply qualified to address this topic. In addition, his assessments are based in part on interviews of many Chinese dissidents, defectors, and active intelligence officers, which lends his work a credibility not normally found in academic assessments of intelligence operations.

Eftimiades briefly describes China's evolving intelligence needs, focusing on the two central requirements: for intelligence on security threats (internal and external) and for the acquisition of foreign technology. He then shifts to a discussion of Chinese foreign and domestic human source intelligence (HUMINT) operations and how they are organized. Over half of this book has been dedicated to describing the Chinese intelligence

bureaucracy, reflecting, perhaps, the author's area of personal expertise.

He describes in some detail the two largest intelligence organizations in China, the Ministry of State Security and the Military Intelligence Department of the Chinese army's General Staff Department. Both of these intelligence organs are augmented by a wide variety of other nonintelligence organizations that conduct espionage abroad under semiofficial cover. They include such organizations as the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) and the various military research and strategic studies institutes. COSTIND is both a consumer of intelligence, assigning tasks to the other intelligence agencies on issues of technology, and a collector of intelligence, sending scientific delegations on "scholarly exchanges" around the world to collect and identify new technologies having military applications.

These and other examples demonstrate what the author believes to be a unique characteristic of Chinese intelligence operations: the extensive use of commercial, academic, and illegal or nonofficial covers of espionage. Such operations are risky to the participants, but Eftimiades points out that by focusing on the acquisition of mid-level rather than state-of-the-art technology, the Chinese decrease both the chance of exposure and the likely penalties for their agents if caught.

The overarching concern of the Chinese Communist Party for its own security is well illustrated in the author's chapter on domestic operations and in two Chinese documents that appear as

appendices. The documents were provided by a recent defector from the PRC embassy and discuss internal Chinese policy regarding Chinese students overseas. These documents reflect a sophisticated understanding of the need to maintain close surveillance on the activities of Chinese students abroad and to identify and punish dissidents. Both are chilling reminders that despite its appearance of openness the Chinese government remains a totalitarian dictatorship, concerned most with its own survival.

The author concludes that the vastness of the Chinese intelligence bureaucracy and the omnipresence of its operators combine to make the Chinese intelligence services highly inefficient. Whatever successes they have achieved, according to the author, stem from limitations of the Western intelligence and counterintelligence services rather than any sophistication on the Chinese part. Despite what he considers to be their mediocre track record to date, Eftimiades expects that the intelligence operations of the Chinese will become more sophisticated as they gain experience.

This work provides an interesting and unique addition to the literature available on this topic. It is not the overview of Chinese intelligence operations that its title suggests but rather is focused in large part on bureaucratic organization and human intelligence. It does not discuss, even in outline, such other technical sources as satellite imagery, signals intelligence, etc. Furthermore, the author's negative evaluation of China's human intelligence capability seems to ignore the implications of what was arguably the most successful

Chinese espionage operation against the U.S. yet exposed, that of longtime CIA employee Larry Wu-Tai Chin.

With these limitations in mind, this book provides an excellent overview of China's use of espionage in support of its global interests. The best primer for understanding the philosophy behind Chinese intelligence operations is still Sun Tzu's *Art of War*. More recent works have examined the historical development of China's intelligence services. Books such as Flaigot and Kauffer's *The Chinese Secret Service* (William Morrow, 1987) and Richard Deacon's *The Chinese Secret Service* (Taplinger, 1974) focus more on personalities than on organizations. Eftimiades' study adds to our understanding of Chinese intelligence by describing how China's intelligence bureaucracy is organized and by identifying the groups that constitute extensions of that organization. He has done a real service to the national security community.

E.D. SMITH, JR.
 Captain, U.S. Navy, Ret.
 Portsmouth, Rhode Island

Breuilly, John, ed. *The State of Germany: The National Idea in the Making, Unmaking, and Remaking of a Modern Nation-State*. New York: Longman, 1992. 243pp. (No price given)

Jackson, Robert J., ed. *Europe in Transition: The Management of Security After the Cold War*. New York: Praeger, 1992. 224pp. \$47.95

The collapse of communism in eastern Europe and, in particular, the 1989

reunification of Germany overturned political arrangements in Europe that had been remarkably stable for over four decades. The basic security structures and underlying principles that had driven European policy went generally unquestioned among politicians, academics, and analysts alike, for virtually none of them foresaw the scope of the changes or the astonishing speed with which they would occur.

The shattering of the old European bipolar security paradigm has reopened many fundamental questions. Among the most important is the renewed "German Question"—namely, how a disproportionately powerful central European state can prosper and at the same time be a threat to its neighbors. Will Germany continue its pre-1989 support for an increasingly unified Europe, or will a more "purely German" policy emerge as a consequence of Germany's reunification, conflicts in eastern Europe, increased growth of nationalism, and the growing skepticism toward a "United Europe"?

John Breuilly, a lecturer in history at the University of Manchester, England, argues that understanding both the past and present nature of Germany is central to addressing the "German Question." *The State of Germany* is based on a collection of talks given by several academics about various historical periods of Germany. The conference was held during the 1989–1990 academic year and was supported by the Goethe Institute of Manchester and the University of Manchester. Breuilly asked the speakers to address two questions: "What was meant by ideas such as

German, Germany, and nationality" during its different historical periods? "What, if any, were the political consequences of such ideas?"

After an introductory examination of the national idea in modern German history, contributors then discuss Germany during the Holy Roman Empire, the Napoleonic era, the 1848 crisis, the Bismarckian unification, the Second Reich, and the (temporary?) collapse of nationalism following the Nazi debacle. A succeeding chapter devotes itself to the nation, state, and political culture in the divided country, while another addresses "Germany in Europe." In his final chapter, Breuilly concludes that German *nationality*—being German rather than a citizen of East or West Germany—mattered decisively in the events leading up to reunification. He also states that "the character of recent German history has meant that Germans are less politically committed to the idea of the nation-state [not to be confused with nationality] as a hard concentration of sovereignty," implying that Germany remains committed to "Europeanism."

Likewise, *Europe in Transition* is a set of essays based on discussions held at a meeting in the autumn of 1990 of the Nato-financed Committee on Atlantic Studies. Editor Robert Jackson is a professor of political science at Carleton College, Ottawa, and a senior policy advisor to the Canadian Liberal Party. In his introductory chapter he discusses the "Changing Conditions of European Security in the Post-Cold War Era," arguing that there are six broad, changing conditions of security with respect to Europe. These include the position

of a united Germany, the need to consolidate democracy and ensure economic viability in eastern Europe and the ex-USSR, the destabilizing effect of different economic growth rates both globally and in Europe, the loss of Soviet and U.S. hegemony in the East and West respectively, and the new stresses in Europe over German capabilities and potentialities.

The next section discusses the "Economic Bases of European Security," and it argues that a true European security system will in large part be dependent on successful economic integration along the lines of "Europe 1992." Succeeding sections address "North American Perspectives on the New Europe," "European Perspectives on the New Europe," and "Future Models for the New Europe." The latter contains three essays that respectively address an "Emergent Europe" and whether there is a place for the U.S. in it, the future of Nato as a maritime alliance, and a "Lesser Atlanticism."

The State of Germany and Europe in Transition, compendiums of academic discussions held soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, are necessarily somewhat dated by the cascading events of subsequent years. For example, the contributors could not have anticipated the almost immediate irrelevance of the Soviet Union, the virtual stillbirth of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the derailing of European integration just before its culmination, and the growing debate over the relevance of Nato. They showed an excessive optimism concerning the prospects for European integration

and for rapid political and economic development in eastern Europe as well as a correspondingly excessive devaluation of U.S. dominance. These ideas and assumptions were perhaps understandable at the time, but later events have shown them to be substantially misplaced. This is not really a fault of the writers—even Francis Fukuyama was wrong when he predicted that we were at the “end of history.”

Except for a few of the historical essays in *The State of Germany*, which remain topical, these books retain only limited value, and that only insofar as they show how academics tried to understand the upheavals of 1989 as they were occurring. In times of extraordinary change, it would seem that political analysts and academics are condemned to the frustration of rapid obsolescence of many of their products.

JAN VAN TOL
Commander, U.S. Navy

Schweizer, Peter. *Victory*. New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994. 284pp. \$22

Peter Schweizer's account of the Reagan administration's strategy to discombobulate the Soviet Union in the 1980s presents a quandary for both the reader and this reviewer.

The major events Schweizer cites are essentially matters of public record, and he has interviewed the right administration sources. Yet the interpretation he places on these is remarkable. We are asked to accept that the administration

coordinated support for the Afghan rebels, Solidarity in Poland, denial of technical support to Soviet industry, and aggressive defense buildups, all in a comprehensive strategy to roll back Soviet political power on every front.

Schweizer's conclusions are based on his interviews with John Poindexter, Richard Allen, Fred C. Ikle, Robert McFarlane, Edwin Meese, William Clark, George Shultz, Casper Weinberger, other figures from the former administration, and on several National Security Decision Directives. While Schweizer's style is that of a contemporary journalist and not a historian, he does tell a striking story of orchestrated strategy, policy, and action.

According to Schweizer, Ronald Reagan entered the presidency in January 1981 with a deep, visceral conviction that the Soviet political and economic system could not and should not survive. For a number of economic and political reasons, the Soviet Union was already tottering in 1981, although not much of the Western world had noticed. Reagan and his foreign policy advisors decided to press and stress the Soviet Union in all possible ways.

On the industrial technology front, when Reagan took office the Soviet Union was well behind and without funds to acquire the new advances. To rectify this, the Soviets planned to build two great pipelines from their gas fields to Europe, then to sell gas to Europe's energy-hungry economy for hard currency. The technology to extract and recover the gas, as well as the hundreds of miles of large pipe, were to come from the West. The administration undertook a vigorous application and

extension of the U.S. export control laws to cripple these projects. Only one pipeline was eventually built, and it was late, because of serious transmission and pumping problems. Simultaneously, Reagan's people persuaded Saudi Arabia to lower the price of crude oil and expand production, thus saturating the market and reducing the value of Soviet oil and gas exports. Consequently, this attempt by the Soviets to purchase critical modern technology was frustrated.

On the political front, the Soviets were becoming mired in the war in Afghanistan, and Poland's Solidarity movement was threatening the cohesiveness of Eastern Europe. For both symbolic and practical reasons, the Soviets needed to bring these situations under control. William Casey, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, became the peripatetic point man of the U.S. response. The Saudis agreed to supply cash and weapons to the mujahedin and the Pakistanis to give them training and logistical support. The United States undertook to supply cash, intelligence on Soviet targets in Afghanistan, and Stinger anti-air missiles. As a result, well armed mujahedin began to operate with telling effect throughout Afghanistan.

For its part, Solidarity received financial assistance and the tools of "information warfare" (in the form of public relations). Various techniques were used to funnel money into Poland. Offset presses, desktop publishing systems, photocopiers, and fax machines were smuggled into the country, with the evident cooperation of shipping companies and bordering nations. With this support, Solidarity remained alive

and became an above-ground movement, openly challenging the regime.

On the defense front, the Reagan administration embraced the Strategic Defense Initiative, which gave the Soviets serious heartburn because they could not match that technology. Their only counter would have been to build enough nuclear missiles to overwhelm the American strategic defense system; to do so, however, would have been ruinously expensive for a Soviet economy already strained by defense to the breaking point.

In retrospect, the Soviet Union was in serious decline by the 1980s, which raises an important question that the author leaves unanswered. Was Reagan's strategy the key to victory, as Schweizer asserts, or was it just international gamesmanship? Pressuring the Soviet Union on all fronts was a high-risk strategy. Had a more traditional leader than Gorbachev arrived on the scene, the Soviet reaction might have been violent. Today's practitioners of strategy and policy may think that the most important question that Schweizer leaves unanswered is: Would the game be worth the risk again?

FRANK C. MAHNCKE
Washington, D.C.

Dawson, Joseph G., III, ed. *Commanders in Chief: Presidential Leadership in Modern Wars*. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1993. 226pp. \$12.95

The president's roles as chief spokesman for foreign policy and the commander in chief in war has long fascinated the American public. In *Commanders In*

Chief, editor Joseph Dawson explores the multiple dimensions of presidential leadership in modern wars. Based on an April 1990 symposium sponsored by the Military Studies Institute at Texas A&M University, the book is a collection of essays focusing on six twentieth-century chief executives, ranging from William McKinley to Richard Nixon, and their conduct of war from the turn of the century to the Vietnam War. To complete the analyses of presidential leadership, the editor has included George Bush and his role in the Persian Gulf conflict. After surveying the actions of the men who bore the principal responsibilities of wartime leadership, Dawson concludes that each president himself largely determines the extent to which he discharges his responsibility as commander in chief. Also, and not surprisingly, our wartime presidents have tended to be rather controversial, resulting in highly partisan debates over the merits and shortcomings of their respective policies.

What makes this book enlightening is the thoughtful analysis of our chief executives by a team of eminent historians. In their essays, Lewis Gould and Robert Ferrell present highly provocative revisionist interpretations of their subjects. Gould challenges the traditional view that William McKinley divorced himself from military affairs. According to Gould, McKinley was a much more active and innovative executive than conventional impressions indicate, and in many respects the first modern American commander in chief. Ferrell takes a more sobering view of Woodrow Wilson and concludes that Wilson's dogmatic hatred of war itself

led him to abrogate his military responsibilities. The role of commander in chief, states Ferrell, was utterly foreign to his being.

Far more traditional are the verdicts of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman. Noted Roosevelt scholar Warren F. Kimball views his subject as the most dynamic wartime president since Lincoln. No chief executive, argues Kimball, so skillfully combined his roles as president and military commander as did FDR; Roosevelt operated deftly in a realm that balanced his domestic politics, wartime strategies, and postwar goals. Clayton James confers equally high marks on Truman, whom he believes relished his role as commander in chief and whose fate it was to make many critical military decisions. Indeed, James considers Truman to have been comparatively free of skullduggery and deceit, and nowhere more so than during the final four months of World War II and the first two and a half years of the conflict in Korea.

The conduct of the Vietnam War by Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon is the subject of two intriguing essays by Frank E. Vandiver and Stephen Ambrose. Both authors emphasize the diversity of challenges confronting each of these presidents and conclude that whereas Johnson was a "reluctant hawk," Nixon was a "belligerent dove." Johnson, consumed by the primacy of domestic politics, wore his commander in chief's hat with nagging discomfort, says Vandiver, while Ambrose concludes that Nixon was never free to act as he thought best since it was his fate to preside over the retraction of American power from Vietnam. By the time Nixon became

president, escalation of the war was no longer a viable political option; thus he accepted Johnson's decision not to reinforce American armed forces in Vietnam after March 1968.

The editor has compiled a superlative collection of essays that examine what columnist George Will describes as the most significant power of the commander in chief, the presidential role that has come to predominate over all others. Professor Roger A. Beaumont of Texas A&M has stated that these issues require serious scholarship and analysis is still required. In *Commanders In Chief*, he and his colleagues have taken the initial step.

COLE C. KINGSEED
Colonel, U.S. Army

Zaffiri, Samuel. *Westmoreland: A Biography of General William C. Westmoreland*. New York: William Morrow, 1994. 502pp. \$25

This is the first attempt at a postwar biography of General William C. Westmoreland, who, with Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara, was one of the three major American figures permanently marked by the Vietnam War. It was written by Samuel Zaffiri (*Hamburger Hill, May 11-20, 1969*, 1988) in the style of popular history. It is apparently not an authorized biography.

Westmoreland is described in his early years as an extremely ambitious young man, as evidenced by his graduating in the West Point class of 1936 as first captain. His early service was in the field artillery of the brown-shoe army, and in World War II he was

in Europe with the 9th Infantry Division. Subsequent to the war, a transfer to the infantry was followed by four years in airborne duty at Fort Bragg. Increasingly, he was marked as a comer with great ambition.

Beginning with his stint as a brigadier general, commanding the 187th Regimental Combat Team in the last year of the Korean War, Westmoreland's star rose both figuratively and literally. His assignments were, in order, as secretary of the Army General Staff under Maxwell Taylor, commander of the 101st Airborne, Superintendent of West Point, and commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps. All this culminated in his assignment in January 1964 as deputy to Paul Harkins, whom he succeeded as Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COM-USMACV) the following summer. The remainder of the book, about 80 percent of it, is related to Vietnam, directly or indirectly. It is, of course, Westmoreland's connection with that war which makes him a significant military figure of the "American Century."

Early on, Zaffiri attempts to explain why Westmoreland was selected for this major command. His answer is wandering and elaborate, invoking Janowitz's writings and Westmoreland's southern accent. What nonsense. Westmoreland was selected primarily because among those being considered he was the only one recommended by Maxwell Taylor, who was influential because he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Taylor's recommendation was largely based on Westmoreland's reputation as a trainer of troops, particularly at Fort

Campbell from 1958 to 1960. The main problem in Vietnam in early 1964 (when the U.S. troop commitment was still eighteen months off) was to stimulate the training of the South Vietnamese army for combat. I cite this to make a general point about the author: when he leaves the area of chronology or battle description he seems to be "looking through a glass darkly."

Zaffiri depicts Westmoreland in Vietnam as being "really pessimistic" and having "grave doubts" about the war and America's ability to win. That will come as a great surprise to many people who were associated with him during that period. What about his address to a joint session of Congress in April 1967, or his talk before the National Press Club in November of the same year, both predicting victory? What of his testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee in October 1969? There he stated, "It is my opinion that if we had continued to bomb, the war would be over at this time." To counter all this, Zaffiri would need to cite more than a 1970 article by Blair Clark in *Harper's*.

Other examples of inadequate sources are in the area of personalities. Zaffiri asserts that Westmoreland did not want either General Creighton Abrams or General Bruce Palmer (both his 1936 classmates) assigned as his deputies. Palmer served as Westmoreland's deputy secretary of General Staff in 1957-1958, his deputy in Vietnam in 1967-1968, and finally as his Vice Chief of Staff in 1968-1972—in the latter case, the author states, against Westmoreland's desires. This is all possible, of course, but what is the source? Not Westmoreland, it turns out, but an

unnamed two-star retired officer who served in the Joint Chiefs. The author claims to have interviewed Westmoreland (but not Palmer) from 1991 to 1993. If so, why didn't he ask him?

The book is written in a lively fashion and moves along nicely, especially the battle descriptions. There are, however, more factual errors in this book than in any other I have read. To cite just a few: the jacket blurb has a retired Westmoreland running for governor of North Carolina instead of South Carolina; the book places Maryland's Andrews Air Force Base in California; it was not the 101st Airborne that was involved in the invasion of Sicily but the 82nd; Westmoreland returned from Europe as head of the 77th Division, not the 71st; and on and on.

The real failure of this biography, however, is its omission of Westmoreland's involvement with the important issues of Vietnam—at the strategic-political level—areas in which the author clearly is in over his head. Not only does he not know the answers, which is understandable, but he does not seem to know what questions to ask.

Any biography of Westmoreland should concern itself with at least such questions as these: Why did Westmoreland not insist on a greater part in key decisions on the war, at the very least on a theater commander's role? Why did he not insist on operational command of all forces, including the South Vietnamese? Why did he not insist on the force and strategic leeway needed to "win," or else recommend that the U.S. withdraw once South Vietnam was partially stabilized in 1966? This latter point

is not strictly in the realm of civilian leadership, or so those might claim who misread what American civil-military relations are about. To quote Bernard Brodie, "there also has to be at the top, certainly in the civilian and preferably also in the military departments of the government, the basic and prevailing conception of what any war existing or impending is really about and what it is attempting to accomplish. This attitude includes necessarily a readiness to reexamine whether under the circumstances existing it is right to continue it or whether it is better to seek some solution or termination other than victory."

These are the kinds of questions a biography of Westmoreland needs to address. The book being reviewed here does not meet the standards required for a serious or definitive biography of William Westmoreland.

DOUGLAS KINNARD
Richmond, Virginia

Simpson, Howard R. *Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot*. Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1994. 193pp. \$24

Dien Bien Phu ranks as one of history's great battles, both in decisiveness and drama. In 1954, in a remote valley in upper Tonkin, a handful of French imperial soldiers bore the future of French Indochina on their shoulders for fifty-six days, as they struggled to defend their ill fated fortress against a Viet Minh enemy equally determined to exterminate them.

Few authors are more qualified than Howard Simpson to write an account

of that battle. His *Tiger in the Barbed Wire* (1992) supplied a lively firsthand account of his experiences as a United States Information Agency war correspondent assigned to cover the Indochina War. Simpson not only visited Dien Bien Phu prior to the attack, but he knew well many of the French officers whose personalities and heroic acts he describes with deft prose. Although there is no shortage of accounts of the battle, this one is unsurpassed. It is a real page-turner, as the author shifts from the feuding French commanders in Hanoi (Generals Henri Navarre and Rene Cogny), to the paras and Legionnaires grappling to retain a few meters of blasted mud, to the almost superhuman manhandling of huge artillery pieces over roads cut by coolies through nearly impenetrable jungle.

The idea for Operation Castor, for instance, is traced to Navarre's wish to block a Viet Minh invasion of Laos. That is true as far as it goes, but the immediate objective was to save a special operations (GCMA) initiative among T'ai partisans loyal to the French. For this reason, the author's praise for Major Roger Trinquier's GCMA appears excessive and misplaced; special operations gobbled up a disproportionate share of scarce French resources to no apparent benefit and ultimately exercised a fatal influence upon French strategy.

The book also appears to have gone to press before recent revelations of the extent of the influence of the Chinese Military Advisory Group on the strategy, operations, and even tactics of the Viet Minh. For the purposes of Dien Bien Phu, new evidence suggests three things. First, it was the Chinese, not

Giap, who had the major hand in directing the battle. Second, the French came closer to victory than they imagined; had U.S. airpower been used, it might have been the critical event that forced the badly mauled and demoralized Viet Minh to break off the siege. As it was, Chinese intervention was an important, perhaps critical, factor in keeping the Viet Minh in the fight despite horrendous losses. Last, it was the Chinese who emerged the real victors of Dien Bien Phu. Ho Chi Minh had sought a unified Vietnam under the control of the Viet Minh, but in May 1954 the Chinese forced him to agree to a partition at the Geneva Conference, thus achieving their war aim of clearing the French from Tonkin.

Given the contingent nature of the battle, some of the "lessons" of Dien Bien Phu that Simpson believes were ignored by the U.S. at its own peril in Vietnam were hastily drawn. Without a doubt, the French underestimated the Viet Minh. However, what they encountered at Dien Bien Phu was far from "non-conventional units . . . a guerrilla enemy"—few guerrilla armies are armed with Katyusha multitube rocket launchers! While Simpson extols the "flexibility of a guerrilla foe," there are many examples, including Vietnamese, of insurgencies demonstrating a desperate lack of flexibility, an excessive faith in the revolutionary potential of "the people," and a lemming-like eagerness to rush to some Maoist "third phase." No doubt Simpson is correct to point out that airpower offers a talisman in which many are ready to place too much trust. Yet the lack of it constituted a debilitating French weakness at Dien

Bien Phu, as it did for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) in 1975. Also, perhaps the author is too ready to see the ARVN's ultimate defeat as foreordained by its origins as a French colonial force, when the greater problem was the inability of the government of South Vietnam to establish its legitimacy in the eyes of its own people.

Finally, the lack of a bibliography and footnotes is especially unfortunate, inasmuch as Simpson has salted his text with extensive quotations from top secret documents, both American and French.

DOUGLAS PORCH
Naval War College

James, D. Clayton. *Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea 1950–1953*. New York: The Free Press, 1992. 282pp. \$24.95

This is a first-rate history of U.S. decision making during the Korean War, by D. Clayton James with Anne Sharp Wells, his primary research assistant. James is a military historian and instructor at the Virginia Military Institute. He has written, among other works, a three-volume history of General Douglas MacArthur's career, *The Years of MacArthur*.

In the years following World War II, it was important to President Harry S. Truman that his domestic reforms not be hampered by the military burdens imposed by the new global threat of communist expansion. His alternative to military spending was to supply security and economic aid to postwar Europe. While he focused on the Fair Deal at home, the signs of trouble in

Asia went unheeded. So when war suddenly broke out in Korea on 25 June 1950, it came as a complete surprise to both civilian and military leaders. The United States was totally unprepared for war against even a third-rate military power.

James states that it was Secretary of State Dean Acheson who was the most fervent proponent of committing American forces to the Korean front and that it was he who instigated the UN Security Council resolution on 27 June calling upon member states to contribute men and materiel to the defense of South Korea. Moreover, James states that Truman bypassed Congress because of the persistent advice of Acheson, "whose influence on Truman was so strong that none of the military leaders challenged the secretary of state's main ideas, not even on military matters." Nor did they challenge MacArthur's insubordination. Omar Bradley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, put it this way: "Once more we adhered to the custom of yielding to the recommendation of the man on the scene."

In Tokyo, many of MacArthur's staff thought of Truman as a "second rate liberal," whereas in Washington many saw MacArthur as a vain and politically ambitious man who was willing to trigger a third world war to fulfill his dreams. General Matthew B. Ridgway replaced MacArthur as supreme commander of UN forces, Korea, on 11 April 1951. Although James writes that it is unlikely that Ridgway or his successor, General Mark Clark, could have survived the turbulent battles that went on between Washington and MacArthur at the beginning of the war, it is

clear that Ridgway, unlike MacArthur, understood the importance of civilian control over military action.

General J. Lawton Collins, who was Army Chief of Staff during the war, was asked by this reviewer why he did not do anything about MacArthur's method of deploying troops in North Korea. "What could I do?" he replied. "I was only Chief of Staff." But Collins did admit that the biggest mistake of his military career was his failure to pressure the Secretary of Defense, George Marshall, to take action against MacArthur. It is important to note that even after the Korean War, "the senior military colleges offered virtually nothing about the lessons of the Korean conflict and the confusion of military and national strategic objectives to prepare the upcoming senior leaders of America's forces in the Vietnam War."

James skillfully provides a bird's-eye view of what happened in Washington, Tokyo, and Korea. One observes Truman, Acheson, Marshall, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as they deal with their field commanders.

I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in national security. It is rich with information and insight, particularly that we suffered greatly in Korea because of Marshall's belief that the theater commander must be king. Marshall's thinking has now been incorporated into the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, whereby the commanders in chief have vastly increased their power at the expense of the service chiefs. The situation we faced with

MacArthur in Korea may once again confront us.

ROBERT PREVIDI
Long Island, New York

McGibbon, Ian. *New Zealand and the Korean War, Vol. I: Politics and Diplomacy*. Auckland: Oxford Univ. Press, 1992 (in association with the Historical Branch, Dept. of Internal Affairs). 468pp. \$US 59

In relative terms, New Zealand's contribution to the United Nations Command during the Korean War was minor. Wellington's contribution consisted of two frigates, a field artillery regiment, and a transport company. However, New Zealand's quick response to the UN's call for help underscored Wellington's strong support for the United Nations and the emerging Western alliance. Moreover, the government's decision to provide a military contingent has had a far-reaching influence.

This work, by New Zealand's pre-eminent military historian, is the long-awaited first volume of the official history of New Zealand in the Korean War. Like its Australian counterpart, written by Professor Robert O'Neill, McGibbon's work collects all political and diplomatic matters in one volume; a second volume will address military operations. As an official history, the work has had the benefit of heretofore unavailable diplomatic files and official documents. This point is of particular import to students of New Zealand's postwar diplomacy and strategy, because this work is the first that comprehensively employs official sources

dealing with what emerged as New Zealand's postwar security policy.

In addition to providing an interesting perspective—from the standpoint of a small power—of the preliminaries, conduct, and “termination” of the Korean War, this work also surveys the political home front. This reviewer was particularly interested in the treatment of the antiwar efforts of the not inconsequential peace movement and the activities of the New Zealand Communist Party. Those wishing to understand better how the Fourth Labour government, led by David Lange, could in 1985 essentially walk away from the Anzus alliance and its intimate defense relationship with the United States would do well to read this work. While New Zealanders are often referred to as the “Prussians of the Pacific,” McGibbon reminds us that there have long been strong pacifist feelings in the country.

Indeed, one of the lessons of this interesting study is the influence New Zealand diplomats were able to exert at the highest levels of United Nations and allied policy making, despite the small size of their country and of its military contribution. Given the decline of British imperial power and growing disagreements within the Commonwealth, New Zealand officials saw that they must respond militarily to the Korean conflict so that they might continue to “win the peace” for which the nation had fought so hard in World War II. Contrast this approach to foreign policy with the 1986 statement by a leading member of the Fourth Labour government that under Labour's new foreign policy there would be “no more Koreas.” The speaker,

Helen Clark, is now the leader of the Opposition in the New Zealand Parliament.

Upon reading this excellent history, I was struck by how the New Zealand body politic has changed so fundamentally its stance on security policy in such a short period of time. Until the definitive history is written on this radical change in national attitudes, we can be content with this splendid work to appreciate how far New Zealand policy has strayed—or, depending upon one's perspective, evolved—from its historical roots.

THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG
U.S. Army War College

Hoffman, Jon T. *Once a Legend: "Red Mike" Edson of the Marine Raiders*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1994. 434pp. \$24.95

Merritt Austin Edson was a little guy, and like a lot of Marines he was wiry—five foot seven and 140 pounds when in fighting trim. In his foreword General Walter Boomer, the Marine leader in Desert Storm, writes that Edson "didn't fit the Hollywood image of a Marine." Jon T. Hoffman says that only Edson's eyes exposed his willingness to die and to have those who fought with him die. One combat correspondent called his eyes "as purposeful as a killer's and as unemotional as a shark's."

Edson became one of the most versatile and respected Marines of his time: he was among the best combat leaders and most effective staff officers, an expert tactician, and also an artilleryman, a naval aviator, and a preeminent com-

petitive marksman. Hoffman tells all this with candor (though he is a bit prudish about Edson's rambling personal life). This thorough and readable biography covers not only Edson's career but also the evolution of the Marine Corps over thirty crucial years; it won the 1994 Marine Corps Historical Foundation's Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Award.

Edson won his first Navy Cross in 1928 commanding the Coco River patrols in Nicaragua. For months, he and a few Marines chased Augusto Sandino, the nationalist guerrilla whom the Marines insisted on calling a bandit. They never did catch him, but Captain Edson's jungle patrols stretched every man's strength and endurance; they advanced a notch the "science" of fighting "small wars." Edson rewrote the manual for counter-guerrilla operations in the 1930s, and he could well have contributed to the Marine's work in Vietnam had he lived that long.

Six months before the United States entered World War II, Lieutenant Colonel Edson was selected to command 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, and to convert it into that radical innovation, the 1st Raider Battalion. Eight months after Pearl Harbor, Colonel Edson led that battalion in the amphibious assault on Tulagi, across Ironbottom Sound from Guadalcanal. It was there that he won his second Navy Cross. However, he became a legend when he received the Medal of Honor for his defense of the vital ridge behind Henderson Field in an epic night of fighting. In that battle, Hoffman says, Edson "was the catalyst of victory"; for every move the Japanese attempted, he had the right answer, and he "never took cover."

There were bullet holes through his shirt. The hill became known as "Edson's Ridge."

Edson was helping forge the controversial Marine faith that bulling ahead for quick victory minimizes casualties. He repeatedly told Marines hesitant to move forward, "You've got to take a chance on getting hurt." One of the most daring combat leaders of World War II, he never received a Purple Heart.

At Tarawa, Edson, now the 2nd Marine Division's chief of staff, took command of the growing forces ashore for twenty hours, after Colonel David M. Shoup had endured the first thirty-six hours at his command post on Red Beach. Before the landing, Edson had urged seizing other islands of the atoll as artillery bases. He was turned down, and the Marines took unprecedented casualties in the surf and on the beaches. The 2nd Marine Division next assaulted Saipan and Tinian to create airfields from which the Army Air Forces could bombard Japan directly. Now a brigadier general, Edson was named chief of staff, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, the Corps' theater headquarters for the final campaigns of the war. There he took a jealous interest in protecting the Corps from encroachments by the Navy, especially after Admiral Chester W. Nimitz supported the refusal by the Army-led force on Okinawa to land Marines behind the Japanese lines. But Edson would be denied his two greatest ambitions: to command a Marine division in combat and to wear the two stars of a major general.

At the beginning of 1946 he was back in Washington, fighting the Navy

and Marine Corps battle against the unification of the military services. He was the senior Marine on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations and "the primary point of contact between the Marine Corps and the Navy." Edson and the antiunification "termites" won their share of battles, in good part because of Red Mike's personal courage. He went far beyond what Nimitz (now the CNO) or General Alexander A. Vandegrift, the Commandant, were willing to risk to make the case to Congress, the press, and the public. His most persistent argument was that a centralized military command—German style—would end up with an undemocratic nation—German style.

Hoffman writes clearly about that complex and bitter political battle over roles and missions. When President Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947, General Edson felt his official part was finished. Six days later, he retired. But to this day, the battle of roles and missions continues.

Edson missed the Korean War and became the first director of the Vermont state police and then the executive director of the National Rifle Association. In August 1955, when he was 58, he turned on the ignition of his car in his garage—and killed himself. But as Jon Hoffman makes clear, he was one of the bravest and the best of the few good men.

J. ROBERT MOSKIN
Author of
The U.S. Marine Corps Story

Ambrose, Stephen E. *D-Day June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World*

War II. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994. 665pp. \$30

The allied invasion of Normandy was the largest amphibious operation in modern history. On D-Day more than five thousand ships and eleven thousand planes carried and supported 175,000 (mostly inexperienced) troops and tons of equipment across five heavily defended beaches extending almost fifty miles. The invasion was the linchpin of the strategy to defeat Nazi Germany. If the Allies had failed to secure a beachhead, the course of the war would have been vastly different.

Ambrose is the author of numerous books on presidents Eisenhower and Nixon and is currently the director of the University of New Orleans Eisenhower Center, which has compiled nearly 1,400 oral histories from allied and German participants in D-Day. Ambrose describes the D-Day landings from the perspective of those involved. From these and other sources, the author paints a vivid picture of D-Day's progress and how the Allies succeeded despite the breakdown of almost every aspect of their plan. For most of the book, Ambrose simply narrates the story as told by participants, including airborne troops, glider pilots, seamen, infantrymen, medics, engineers, artillerymen, and tank drivers. It is on these accounts that the strength of the book rests. *D-Day* offers a more comprehensive account of the invasion than its precursor, Cornelius Ryan's *The Longest Day*, which Ambrose credits with sparking his interest in the subject.

In the first part, the author sets the political and strategic contexts and discusses allied planning and preparation for the invasion; the second part covers the actual battle. Ambrose describes the initial aerial bombardments of the battle area, the airborne infantry assaults in the early hours of 6 June, the transport of men and equipment by air and sea, the naval barrage conducted prior to the first attack wave, and, finally, the infantry assaults on all five beaches. Much of this section is devoted to the American attack on Omaha Beach, where units of the 116th and 16th Regiments suffered 2,400 casualties, constituting 50 percent of the total allied casualties suffered on D-Day.

D-Day was a gamble. There were inherent risks in secretly sending a large force across the English Channel to a frontal assault upon heavily defended beaches. Eisenhower did not prepare alternative plans; if the assault had failed, Ambrose surmises, the Allies would have been forced to drop the atomic bomb on Germany. Reasons for the success on D-Day include unity of allied command, superior and innovative equipment to carry and land troops and equipment, air power to prepare and isolate the battlefield before the landings, a clever and successful deception plan that ensured surprise, French resistance fighters' cutting the German lines of communication in the hours before the attack, and poor German planning and organization. The Germans were plagued by a split command—it was Hitler, not Rommel, who controlled the panzer divisions and kept them out of the initial battles. Rommel sought to

defend the entire French coastline rather than concentrate defenses inland. However, once the Allies breached the Atlantic Wall, German defenses were thin.

The factor most important for the allied success, however, was training; it enabled inexperienced soldiers to carry out specific missions, sometimes improvised, in the face of unexpected adversity. Ambrose writes that "it all came down to a bunch of eighteen-to-twenty-eight year-olds." Proper training and preparation was vital, because virtually everything planned went wrong. Eisenhower believed that before battle plans are everything, but once the battle is joined they mean nothing. Unfortunately, this was true on D-Day. Air and naval bombings were supposed to silence German shore batteries and create craters that soldiers could use as makeshift foxholes. Instead, allied aircraft had difficulty navigating at night and hit only targets far inland, while naval guns, in the thirty minutes of bombardment before the landings, fired over the seawall. The Allies prepared landing plans and locations for each unit down to the minute; however, because rough seas forced many landing craft off course, many units landed late and on the wrong beaches. Few American airborne infantry units landed in the proper areas, because few pathfinders were able to find and mark the correct landing zones; many airborne troops were lost and unable to rejoin their units. Additionally, infantrymen, especially at Omaha Beach, fought without the support of artillery and tanks, which had either sunk in deep water, been destroyed by beach

obstacles, or could not land because of massive traffic jams.

The Allies' success that day is even more incredible when one considers each soldier's ordeal. Because Eisenhower had to postpone the landing one day due to bad weather, troops spent more than twenty-four hours aboard ships on the rough English Channel. Some were actually willing to land in the midst of artillery and mortar fire rather than remain seasick aboard the landing craft. These ailing troops, laden with heavy equipment, had to wade through deep water, cross exposed beaches through deadly fire, and climb over seawalls to get to safety. Those who did survive lost equipment or became separated from their units and were forced to improvise the rest of the way. Through it all, by the early hours of 7 June the Allies had breached the Atlantic Wall and obtained a small but secure foothold on the European continent. Their successes were products of America's industrial capacity, training, courage, and dedication to the ultimate cause.

This book does have one minor flaw. Reading of so many particular battles fought by individuals and units of varying sizes, one finds it easy to get caught up in the personal stories and lose track of unit numbers, names, locations, and specific objectives. Maps interspersed throughout the book are helpful, but the author describes more action than the maps can detail. Nonetheless, and while Stephen Ambrose may not offer any new information regarding D-Day, the compilation of experiences from its survivors in combination with his analysis provides an excellent and useful

account of the invasion and the reasons for its success.

ROBERT GOLDBERG
Arlington, Virginia

Perret, Geoffrey. *Winged Victory: The Army Air Forces in World War II*. New York: Random House, 1993. 549pp. \$30

Finally, we have a balanced and frank account of the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) during World War II—"the big war"—and big the AAF was—fighting in several theaters, with tens of thousands of planes, striking losses, and immense problems. As a naval historian, this reviewer was totally unprepared for the staggering losses sustained by the Army's air arm. In but one example, Perret's description of General Nathan Twining's year-long bombing campaign against the German oil refineries at Ploesti, Romania, catches the irony of the victory—"A model of its kind: a heavy attack on average once a week until Ploesti was knocked out. The price was nearly three hundred heavy bombers and two hundred fighters shot down or wrecked . . . ; more than a thousand lives lost; and hundreds of young men left limbless, sightless, or crazy." The B-17 and B-24 bombers carried, respectively, crews of ten and twelve.

Based on exhaustive research in both primary and secondary sources, including the ULTRA intelligence, Perret's book gains its greatest insights from oral history transcripts, although he tends to accept most of them too uncritically. Inevitably, he focuses on General

"Hap" Arnold, the utterly humorless and "firm but often erratic" leader of the AAF. Typical of prewar Air Corps leadership, he was a do-it-yourselfer who did not use his staff or even delegate authority. Small wonder Arnold suffered no fewer than four heart attacks during the course of the war! However, thanks to his civilian boss, Robert A. Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of War for Air (and a former naval aviator), the AAF ran efficiently. Perret gives high marks to Carl A. Spaatz, James H. Doolittle, Curtis LeMay, George C. Kenney, and Claire Chennault, but reserves his highest praise for many group and wing commanders who directed the battles, often from the cockpit.

Skeptical of many air power claims (especially those of pilots after battle), the author pulls no punches; he rights the wrongs done by those who insisted that strategic bombing represented the future. The aura of Billy Mitchell had led his heirs to place the strategic bombers above all else, denigrating fighters. Only in 1943 did the horrendous losses of bombers force the use of P-47s and P-51s equipped with auxiliary gas tanks as long-range escorts to and from German air space and, in 1945, over Japan.

Perret gives not only the fighters their due but also troop carriers, gliders, and "attack" aviation: the B-25 and B-26 medium bombers redesignated as "light bombardment" to provide close air support. Given its penchant for bombing, the AAF often defined close air support as interdiction, but when its medium bombers did go in close they sometimes dropped on friendly troops. During 1943-1944, Arnold and his

bomber leaders were sidetracked (in their view) into Operation Pointblank to destroy first the German aircraft industries, then the Luftwaffe, so it could not interfere with the Normandy landings, and the V-weapon sites. In doing so, they destroyed the cream of German fighter pilots, leaving too few to man the new jets and only the flak to defend the factories which finally became the bombers' primary targets.

The author writes of the multi-theater air war in a light, breezy style, marred only by cutesy terms unknown during the war. He also uses no Navy sources, neither for the Doolittle Tokyo raid nor discussions of Admiral Ernest J. King; he gives prewar CNO Admiral William V. Pratt the name of naval writer Fletcher Pratt; and he is mistaken in his assertion that the entire crew of the airship *Shenandoah* perished when it crashed. On the other hand, he does discuss each aircraft, as well as bombs, gas tanks, armor plate, radar, bomb-sights, turrets, and the tactics of aerial gunnery. The China-Burma-India and New Guinea fighting are covered well enough, but not the rest of the Pacific: the Central Pacific's Seventh Air Force is mentioned only once, and the key B-29 aerial mining campaign hardly at all. One of Perret's best chapters covers morale. In Europe the best tonic was Major Glenn Miller's AAF orchestra. Nuggets appear on every page—like the B-17 navigator who fashioned and wore an antiflak armor-plated jock-strap.

Excellent maps, photos, and sixty-seven pages of bibliographic notes complement this excellent book. If they can overlook Perret's ignorance of things

naval, every naval officer should read it for a concise and revealing overview of the Air Force's turbulent but quite glorious roots.

CLARK G. REYNOLDS
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Cowley, Robert, ed. *Experience of War: An Anthology of Articles from MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1992. 574pp. \$35

This book is a fun read. It consists of fifty-one essays by some of the English-speaking world's most capable military historians, including Michael Howard, Geoffrey Parker, Stephen Sears, James McPherson, Stephen Ambrose, and Ronald Spector, as well as such fine writers as Jon Swan, Andrew Ward, and Paul Fussell. The individual essays are arranged chronologically, from Robert O'Connell's investigation of the origins of war to Martin van Creveld's speculations as to its future. The distribution by era is for the most part well balanced, with six treatments of ancient and medieval warfare, five on the American Civil War, and six on the Great War. World War II, however, clearly dominates the collection, with eleven pieces devoted to this watershed event in world history. In "form-critical" terms, there are ten battle or campaign narratives, eight studies of individual leaders, five naval pieces, three assessments each of technological and airpower issues, and two studies focusing on intelligence and deception. Regrettably, there is not a single treatment of that most mundane

but vital aspect of military science, logistics. Despite this gap, the collection covers a broad sweep of the human experience of war, as one would expect from the editors of *MHQ*.

Obviously, a collection of this sort has no central thesis. There are, however, several underlying themes likely to interest those who seek to profit from studying war's variegated past. One of the most striking is its inherently ugly, remorseful, and distasteful seriousness. Paul Fussell, in his essay "From Light to Heavy Duty," notes that "by 1940 the Great War had receded into soft focus, and no one wanted to face the terrible fact that military successes are achieved only at the cost of insensate violence and fear and agony, with no bargains allowed." His description of the evolution of American visions of war, from the well-turned-out Joe Louis of 1942 thrusting a gleaming bayonet captioned "We're going to do our part," to the 1945 poster of a blood-smeared and obviously dead tank crewman above the words "Stay on the Job and Get It Over," graphically portrays the loss of American innocence to the realities of war. Yet if Americans, splendidly secure between two great oceans, went from light to heavy duty, what about the Russians, who began the war with very heavy duty indeed? Here the reflections of Vladimir Lempert, a Soviet artillery lieutenant in the Great Patriotic War, are particularly instructive. "War," he declares, "is violence and does violence to everything: reason, logic, human dignity, and first of all to such a naturally human feeling as self-preservation. . . . War is a creature broken loose from the pack of human feelings and concepts."

The intrinsic inhumanity of war leads the mere mortals who must partake of it to the psychological escape of ironic humor, frequently manifested as disdain for those who compel them to endure war's indignities—the brass hats. This theme is most evident in David Lamb's splendid essay on World War II's most famous cartoonist, Bill Mauldin. "War humor is very bitter, very sardonic," said Mauldin. "It's not ha-ha humor." His cartoon characters, Willie and Joe, deliver it that way. "Just gimme an aspirin," says Willie to the medic, "I already got a Purple Heart." Thus Mauldin's unshaven, irreverent, but very believable GIs became the prototype for Alan Alda's whimsical surgeon in a Korean War *MASH* and Robin Williams' uproarious Vietnam War disk jockey. A third underlying theme is the impact of individual leaders on war. Arthur Ferrill takes us with Alexander to the far reaches of the Punjab; Thomas Fleming illuminates Washington's sagacity, humility, and determination in the American Revolution; Ira Meistrich places us among the *grognards* (soldiers of Napoleon's original Imperial Guard) retreating from Moscow and raising nary a murmur against the emperor on their disastrous march to the Berezina; and Caleb Carr reminds us of the greatness of German General Helmuth von Moltke's vision, the lightness of his touch, in his practice of strategy as an art of expedients and originality in constantly changing circumstances.

Another fascinating aspect of this work is its succession of well turned phrases. Robert O'Connell describes the crossbow as "a veritable stick in the

spokes of Western military history." Thomas Fleming refers to George Washington's disastrous attempt to conduct a positional defense at White Plains as a "bitter pill [that] purged the last vestige of entrenchment-tool illusions from Washington's mind." Robert Utley quotes George Crook on Philip Sheridan: "The adulations heaped on him by a grateful nation for his supposed genius turned his head [and] caused him to bloat his little carcass with debauchery and dissipation." Robert F. Jones gives us T.E. Lawrence on the remarkable Captain Meinertzhagen: He "took as blithe a pleasure in deceiving his enemy (or friend) by some unscrupulous jest, as in spattering the brains of a cornered mob of Germans one by one with his African knobkerrie." Editor Robert Cowley cogently observes that the absence of shell marks from subsequent wars on the resplendent monuments at Gettysburg "may be the most signal difference between European and American history." Finally, in one of the most revealing utterances ever recorded regarding the Italian conception of military effectiveness, Geoffrey Ward recounts the Italian chief of staff's response to Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1918 observation that perhaps the fleet should leave Taranto occasionally for gunnery practice: "Ah, but my dear Mr. Minister, you must not forget that the Austrian fleet has not had any [practice] either."

Experience of War does not offer its reader a solid meal for intellectual development, but its collection of tasty morsels constitutes a very satisfactory dessert cart; the book provides a

number of illuminating insights. This being the case, the hardbound version should be reserved in the main for library collections. The 1993 paperback edition released by Dell Publishing for \$14.95 is, however, a worthwhile investment for both students and practitioners of the art of war.

HAROLD WINTON
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Pipes, Richard. *Russia under the Bolshevik Regime*. New York: Knopf, 1993. 587pp. \$35

This is the third volume of Harvard professor Richard Pipes' trilogy on Russian history, the first two being *Russia under the Old Regime* (1974) and *The Russian Revolution* (1990). This volume limits itself to the period 1918–1924; it begins with the Civil War and ends with the death of Vladimir Ilich Lenin. In Pipes' view, this period constitutes the brutal formative period of Soviet totalitarianism, Stalin's later contributions notwithstanding. Like the earlier studies, this book is filled with highly contentious interpretations and conclusions.

The Civil War (1918–1920) was, in the author's view, the "most devastating event in that country's history since the Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century." The devastation, however, was not merely the consequence of military conflict between the Red and White armies but equally the result of the Bolsheviks' use of violence to effect the socialist transformation of backward Russia. Pipes believes that economic

transformation, "War Communism," to have been "not so much emergency responses to war conditions as an attempt as rapidly as possible to construct a Communist society." Consequently, it was Lenin's economic experiments that, by April 1921, "left Russia's economy in shambles."

The author's interpretation is extreme and has been disputed by many scholars. The late Alec Nove, author of *An Economic History of the USSR, 1917-1991* (Penguin, 1992), cautioned that War Communism was "a process of interaction between circumstances and ideas." R.W. Davies concludes in his book *The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945* (Cambridge, 1994) that each of Lenin's major economic steps under War Communism was "undoubtedly a response to emergency." Similarly, Paul R. Gregory asserts that "War Communism may have been thrust upon the Soviet regime by the civil war of 1918," in his book *Before Command: An Economic History of Russia from Emancipation to the First Five-Year Plan* (Princeton, 1994).

Pipes also overstates the evidence on the effect of the Bolsheviks' war with Poland in 1920. His conclusion is that the Red Army's move into Poland "was but a stepping-stone from which to launch a general assault on western and southern Europe to rob the Allies of the fruits of their victory in World War I." This argument is based largely on one document made available in 1992: a stenographic memorandum of Lenin's 22 September 1920 speech to a closed meeting at the Ninth Conference of the Russian Communist Party. Were one able to put aside the fact that Poland invaded Russia and

to discount the nationalistic fervor it aroused, Pipes would be more persuasive.

Yet, one does find that certain Bolsheviks, such as M.N. Tukhachevskii, believed that revolution could be brought to Europe by the efforts of the Red Army. However, given that the army had already "overreached" itself in Poland, Leon Trotsky's later assessment was probably more realistic—that such thinking was "naive exaggeration." Therefore, Pipes again reads too much into the evidence when he implies that a "culturally much superior" Poland thwarted the Bolsheviks' designs for world revolution.

Even more troubling is the author's comparison of communism, fascism, and National Socialism. He distorts both the genealogy and history of National Socialism and communism when he states that "the origins of the right-radical movement in interwar Europe . . . would have been inconceivable without the precedent set by Lenin and Stalin." Unfortunately, space does not permit the detailed rebuttal which these overwrought and counterfactual assertions merit.

Pipes is more persuasive, however, when he argues that the distinction between Stalinism and Leninism is one of degree, not kind—especially with respect to the use of terror, the assault on religion, and the proliferation of intrusive controls. He would have been even more convincing had he been able to explain why Lenin tolerated independent artistic creativity whereas Stalin demanded stultifying conformity; why Lenin could be at ease with his fellow Bolsheviks but Stalin had them executed; and why Lenin

conceded that "transforming" the peasant would require a cultural change that might take generations but Stalin, hoping to succeed where Lenin had failed—and establish his place alongside Lenin in the pantheon of revolutionaries—unleashed a revolution that resulted in the second enserfment of the peasant.

These criticisms notwithstanding, Pipes is a serious and influential scholar. His impressive ability to unearth evidence is apparent. But if the evidence does not always fully support his conclusions, it is probably because the author has consciously eschewed disinterested and dispassionate scholarship in favor of passing judgment upon the Soviet debacle. Who can deny that it was a debacle? Pipes should also be given credit for returning our attention to the role played by individuals, especially among Russia's intelligentsia, in bringing about a revolution—even if his emphasis ends with Lenin and he ignores the extensive attention given by the so-called "revisionist" historians to the role played by social forces.

Perhaps this work's most serious flaw is the author's belief that "Soviet totalitarianism" (itself a dubious concept) is somehow the consequence of "Russian patrimonialism"—even more dubious. The author believes that Russia's tsars treated everybody and everything as personal property to be used and disposed of at will. This Russian patrimonialism, "which underpinned the Muscovite government and in many ways survived in the institutions and political culture of Russia to the end of the old regime," contained "unmistakable affinities" with the "Communist

regime as it looked by the time of Lenin's death." Not only do such conclusions constitute a sweeping, and erroneous, indictment of most of Russia's history, but naive readers of Pipes might be excused were they to conclude that Russian patrimonialism, through Lenin's totalitarianism, was responsible for Hitler's National Socialism. More to the point, as Robert Conquest has recently noted in *The New York Review of Books* (14 July 1994), "it can hardly be maintained that Communism was no more than a continuation of Russian history."

It is precisely such conclusions that undermine Richard Pipes' formidable scholarship and place him perilously close to what Nicholas V. Riasanovsky called the historical "school of extreme and blind hatred."

WALTER C. UHLER
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Noble, Dennis L. *That Others Might Live: The U.S. Life-Saving Service, 1878-1915*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994. 177pp. \$27.95

Dr. Noble, a retired U.S. Coast Guardsman with a Purdue University Ph.D. in history, is the first to place the unique humanitarian federal agency, the U.S. Life-Saving Service (USLSS), within a national context. Previous works dealt merely with single lifesaving stations or those of one geographical region. Only Noble's painstaking, decades-long research could document so faithfully the evolution of organized lifesaving in the United States.

The author's fast-paced and lavishly illustrated narrative describes the transformation of the service: from the earliest (1785) privately funded efforts along the coast of Massachusetts to the first federal aid for shore-based volunteer rescues; to subsequent federal funding for stations and their boats, equipment, and provisions; to the establishment of the USLSS with paid professionals in place of volunteers; and finally to the merger in 1915 with the U.S. Revenue Cutter Service to form the U.S. Coast Guard. Although designated by law as "a military service and a branch of the armed forces at all times," the Coast Guard is also tasked, in the USLSS tradition, with lifesaving; the media routinely recount the stirring rescues and other humanitarian activities of U.S. Coast Guardsmen.

That Others Might Live covers every aspect of the art of lifesaving. Particularly valuable are the author's explanations of the service's organization, administrative procedures, stations (primarily lifesaving, lifeboat, and houses of refuge), life cars, surfboats, beach apparatus, Lyle guns, Coston signals, breeches buoys, and the everyday routine of the lifesavers rescuing those in distress.

Noble highlights the growth, activities, and heroic deeds of the USLSS under its first and only superintendent, Sumner I. Kimball. The daring small-boat skippers and brave oarsmen were soon referred to as "storm warriors" and "soldiers of the surf" by the print media and became "as popular as the U.S. Cavalry" in the public's mind. In time, there were lifesaving stations located on the Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico, Great Lakes, and Pacific coasts, as well as at Nome, Alaska.

Noble's valuable, pioneering sociological work dispels many of the popular myths surrounding the lifesavers. The "average" surfman in a Lake Michigan station, for instance, was a U.S. citizen and a resident of the state containing the station. He was a twenty-seven-year-old with a background in fishing and would probably serve only two years before leaving the USLSS to seek better employment. The "average" station keeper was foreign-born 40 percent of the time, a thirty-nine-year-old with several years of maritime experience; he would probably serve no more than ten years and be transferred at least once before departing for higher pay.

These hired men could look forward only to extremely limited disability compensation, almost nonexistent promotional opportunities, forced resignation when no longer physically able to withstand the rigors of rescue work, and no retirement pay. Despite these crippling employment drawbacks, the lifesavers never failed to push out into gale-whipped waters, risking life and limb to rescue shipwrecked victims.

I highly recommend this book. Its only weakness is its brevity, for which blame most likely rests with its publisher, not its author. Many readers, like myself, prefer a longer narrative, but Noble's dramatic coverage of shipwrecks, sailors under extreme stress, and daring rescues should appeal to most readers. Even the naval specialist will be satisfied by the author's meticulous portrayal of an aspect of maritime heritage too long overlooked.

TRUMAN R. STROBRIDGE
U.S. Coast Guard Historian, 1970-1976

Recent Books

Breuer, William B. *Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993. 263pp. \$24.95

Joining the flood of volumes commemorating Operation Overlord, *Hoodwinking Hitler* fills a niche as a popular account of Operation BODYGUARD. This allied campaign coordinated all available instruments of subterfuge to mislead the German High Command about the actual objectives for the invasion of Fortress Europe. Breuer admirably illuminates the contribution made by BODYGUARD to attaining the perilous foothold secured on D-Day. His narrative focuses on the penetration and deception contest waged between Axis and allied intelligence organizations, including Germany's Abwehr and Sicherheitsdienst; America's OSS, FBI, and Signals Security Agency; Britain's SOE, MI5, MI6, Double-Cross Committee, London Controlling Section, and Bletchley Park; SHAEF's Committee on Special Means; and Russia's NKVD. Breuer examines the roles played by espionage, intelligence disciplines, operational cover and deception techniques, propaganda, and diplomacy—all coordinated for maximum effect.

The emphasis here is on strategic deception. *Hoodwinking Hitler* is thin on discussion of espionage tradecraft, intelligence techniques, and military tactics. It is based almost entirely on secondary sources and is structured as a patchwork of events and notable characters, stitched together to keep the narrative exciting. Readers may sometimes find themselves disoriented when individuals and operations are introduced and dispatched like mere stage props. Those requiring a comprehensive, authoritative treatment of these topics and events will wish to turn elsewhere, but Breuer provides a "good read" on the orchestration of the D-Day deception campaign.

Central Intelligence Agency. *The World Factbook, 1994-95*. McLean, Va.: Brassey's, 1994. 512pp. \$32

It has long been the case that one of the most useful and frequently consulted publications in any U.S. defense department intelligence library—no matter how exotically classified the collection's holdings—was an unclassified annual, the CIA's *World Handbook*. The Agency, as part of its *glasnost* of recent years, has made the reference commercially available; here is the new edition. Like the earlier versions, it offers in readable format everything you might imagine (and much more) about every country (or dependency) you can think of (and again, more—see Wallis and Fortuna, p. 416). Entries offer an astonishing amount of factual and statistical data, from line maps, thumbnail histories, and summaries

of current disputes and politics, to the flags and adjective forms of the names. (Quick now, a citizen of the UAE is called. . . ? See page 400.) The appendices (UN and other international bodies, with abbreviations and cross-references to variant names) are invaluable. Don't bother trying to write on world issues or edit a public policy quarterly without these works, and do hold on to them when they are superseded—they will be as useful for historical reference as they were for current data.

Friedman, Norman. *The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons Systems: 1994 Update.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994. 159pp. \$40

New editions of Norman Friedman's reference work, first published in 1989, are published biennially, in alternate years with those of A.D. Baker III's *Combat Fleets of the World*. Therefore, 1994 is a *Naval Weapons Systems* off-year. For two reasons, however, Friedman decided to produce an update to the last proper edition, published in 1993 for 1991–1992. First, there have appeared a number of new Western systems, especially in over-the-horizon targeting, and important new data for existing hardware has become available. Secondly, and more strikingly, recent Russian weapons marketing has placed in the open literature a remarkable amount of information about new and formerly Soviet systems—more, Dr. Friedman suspects, than used to be available even at high classifications. The book is arranged, accordingly, in two parts: an update to the previous edition, in the usual informative and interpretive format, and a separate section for the "Soviet/Russian Navy." The index embraces both this update and the previous edition. By no means skip over the introductory essay, which is characteristically perceptive and hard-edged.

Hudson, Alec. *Up Periscope! and Other Stories.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1992. (Originally published as six novellas in the *Saturday Evening Post*, 1938–1941.) 248pp. \$19.95

"Alec Hudson" was the pen name of a medically retired submarine officer, Jasper Holmes, who wrote six naval adventure stories in this little book (five of them about submarines) in the years just before World War II for the then-ubiquitous American weekly, the *Saturday Evening Post*. In his insightful foreword, Captain Edward L. Beach, USN, Ret., makes plain that the author's stories tell us "how things worked as he knew them. . . . This is how it was back then. This is how he expected to function, and how his training led him to believe his weapons would perform. Not once, in any of his stories, did a gun, or torpedo, or bomb, fail to function as it was supposed to. . . . What actually comes across is that Commander Jasper Holmes, USN, was simply describing the faith he had in the Navy and in his weapons, the faith he had every right to have. Thus Alec

Hudson, besides being a top-notch writer about our Navy, is among many other things a perfect mirror of the past."

Who can now imagine a column of destroyers steaming at 30 knots in the dark without radar and with only 300 yards between ships? Holmes's navy really did that, and that is what he writes about. What that navy did not do—and he could only write about imaginatively—was fire its weapons with their warheads on. Thus it was that when American submarines and destroyers shot their torpedoes at real enemies, it was not the enemy's fleet that was devastated when the weapons failed to do what they were intended to do, but ours. Captain Beach's own famous novels tell us about those days, when the shooting was for real.

So in this small volume the reader gets not only well written adventure but also an inside view of how, before being put to the long-anticipated test, the old Navy saw itself. It is worth the price, and more.

Lewis, Emanuel Raymond. *Seacoast Fortifications of the United States: An Introductory History.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993. 145pp. \$15.95

The Naval Institute Press has reissued this 1970 Smithsonian Institution classic in an attractive paperback version. Lewis' work has long served as the basic introduction and overview of American coastal defense history. *Seacoast Fortifications* deserves a place on the bookshelves of anyone interested in coastal defense or military architecture. A quick read, this well illustrated book can serve as a useful adjunct to a sight-seeing trip to any of the old forts along the U.S. coasts.

Mawdsley, Dean L., M.D. *Cruise Books of the United States Navy in World War II: A Bibliography.* Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1993.

144pp. (Available from Supt. of Documents, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.)
 With this second volume of its "Naval History Bibliographies" series, the Naval Historical Center opens new and unusual, but potentially valuable, ground: ship and unit "cruise books," prepared by crew or unit members not as histories but as informal and unofficial (though sanctioned) souvenirs of voyages or periods in their unit's life. Dr. Dean C. Allard, the Director of Naval History, believes that such books—generally full of photographs, sketches, and materials meant to evoke memories in later years—can be valuable for historians as sources of data and evidence available nowhere else. Accordingly, the Center was a natural publisher for the work of the man Allard believes to be the "national authority" on the subject as it applies specifically to World War II—a period of great interest for which such works are now rare. Dean L. Mawdsley, a retired physician residing in California, had updated the work of a previous hobbyist, Charles E. Dornbusch; the result is a listing of some eight hundred American cruise books

from 1941 to 1945. The entries give, in condensed format, data as to features, type, and location; they are organized by type of unit (ships, construction battalions, etc.). An index is provided of commands whose cruise books are listed.

Reed, Rowena. *Combined Operations in the Civil War*. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1993. 468pp. \$17.95

Republished fifteen years after its debut, *Combined Operations in the Civil War* remains the preeminent examination of this complex and important subject. This Bison Book edition adds a thoughtful new introduction by John Milligan that helps to place Reed's work within Civil War historiography. In *Combined Operations*, Reed (who died in the late 1980s) presents not only an account of Army-Navy operations but also a provocative reevaluation of many of the Civil War's leaders. Contrary to almost all other scholars, for instance, Reed strongly praises George B. McClellan's generalship. While perhaps overstated, Reed's case deserves consideration. Reed's book remains a must-read for Civil War buffs and a should-read for anyone interested in the history of amphibious operations or joint operations.

Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. *In Defense of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy 1889-1914*. New York: Routledge, 1993. 377pp. \$19.95

This is a paperback reissuance of Professor Sumida's highly innovative and influential 1989 work, published in hardback by Unwin Hyman. While, of course, navies have long been the subject of administrative histories and technological studies, *In Defense of Naval Supremacy* uses economics, finance, technology, and bureaucratic organization as lenses through which to examine a period and decisions—this was the period of the advent of the dreadnought—that proved pivotal for the Royal Navy and thereby for naval warfare. As a distinct departure from the classic admirals-and-kings mode of naval historiography, and as a work whose subjects, methods, and apparatus cause (as the author warns) “hardships” for readers, this has been a controversial contribution to an already vexed subject, but it has also become a central one. Part of the price of admission of a useful opinion today on the subjects of naval innovation, technology, and the turn-of-the-century Royal Navy is to have read Sumida's book—now more readily available in paperback.

Van der Vat, Dan. *The Pacific Campaign: The U.S.-Japanese Naval War, 1941-1945*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992. 432pp. (No price given)

Dan van der Vat is already well known for previous books on naval subjects, including *The Atlantic Campaign*, *The Ship That Changed the World*, and *The Grand*

Scuttle. His latest work is a serviceable account of the war in the Pacific, though his account contains nothing particularly new or startling. He purports to tell "the tale as it has not been told before—from both viewpoints, with the accounts of participants set in a framework of historical analysis and narrative. . . ." But the accounts of participants are few in number and do not materially aid the narrative. Van der Vat pays lip-service to the Japanese viewpoint of the war, but the bulk of the book is still heavily from the American perspective. On a positive note, the first two chapters on the "views from" East and West, respectively, offer clear and concise accounts of the period and issues leading up to the war. In summary, a reader new to this subject will enjoy *The Pacific Campaign*, but those familiar with the war will find themselves only replotting old ground.

Ψ

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