DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION FORCE
7970 DIVEN STREET
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23505-1498

3980
Ser 01A/718
12 Oct 11

POLICY AND INFORMATION NOTICE (PIN) 11-03

Subj: Operational Test Deficiency Sheets and Report Construct

Ref: (a) COMOPTEVFORINST 3980.1, Operational Test Director's Manual of 23 Apr 08
(b) COMOPTEVFOR Policy Information Notice 10-01 of 2 Mar 10

Encl: (1) System Deficiency Documentation Procedures
(2) Sample Risk/Deficiency Sheets
(3) Potential Deficiency Tool

1. Purpose. This notice provides policy on the use of deficiency sheets for continuous documentation of all System Under Test (SUT) and System of Systems (SoS) performance issues and their use for Operational Test (OT) reports.

2. Background. Formalized System Evaluation Review Boards (SERB) have improved the rigor, defendability, and repeatability of our Operational Assessments (OA) and evaluations. SERB spreadsheets, as outlined in references (a) and (b), have facilitated the presentation of data for vetting by senior leadership to gain Commander's guidance for finalizing the evaluation report. However, the SERB spreadsheets have failed to encapsulate all the information necessary to grasp the entirety of the issue. The Six-Part Paragraph (6PP) style of deficiency writing has proven to be the most effective means for communicating all aspects of the SUT/SoS deficiency for vetting and final report construct. Additionally, SUT/SoS issues rarely remain stagnant. An issue typically matures over time. Often program corrective action or factors associated with the issue necessitate a recharacterization. Our current methodology does not allow for continuous assessment of the issue.

3. Guidance. The methodology described in enclosure (1) provides a continuous method to assess SUT/SoS performance issues. The procedure modifies reference (b) by replacing the SERB spreadsheet with individual deficiency sheets, enclosure (2). A single deficiency sheet shall be provided for each SUT/SoS performance issue assessed/evaluated. Performance

issues relating to the SUT shall be referred to as a Blue Sheet. Performance issues relating to the SoS shall be referred to as a Gold Sheet. If the issue is pre-Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E), it shall be categorized as a risk using the Early Operational Assessment (EOA)/OA report template methodology. If it is IOT&E or later, it shall be identified as a deficiency categorized per the deficiency definitions (Severe, Major 1, Major 2, Major 3, or Minor) contained within the IOT&E report template. New report formats using the Blue and Gold Sheets have been developed and posted in the OT&E Reference Library as well as the COMOPTEVFOR Web site. All Blue and Gold Sheets shall be continuously updated as new data are obtained. All Warfare Divisions shall follow the procedures provided in enclosure (1) and use the formats of enclosure (2).

4. Implementation. This policy is effective immediately for the documentation and continuous update of all SUT and SoS performance issues and for use in SERBs and Executive SERBs (ESERB). The new report format is mandatory for all reports published on or after 17 October 2011.

5. This PIN will be incorporated into the revision of reference (a).

DAVID A. DUNAWAY

Distribution: (COMOPTEVFORINST 5216.2P)
List I
List III

System Deficiency Documentation Procedures

1. Introduction. SUT and SoS risks/deficiencies shall be documented using Blue Sheets (SUT) and Gold Sheets (SoS). These sheets will use the 6PP style of writing as provided in enclosure (2). There will be a single Blue or Gold Sheet for each performance issue identified during testing. A unique number shall be assigned to each issue. The issue shall be updated as new OT-qualified data are acquired using the same Blue or Gold Sheet, and the unique number will take on a modifier. These stand-alone risk/deficiency sheets shall be used for initial performance issue identification and continuously updated through verification of correction (cradle to grave). These sheets shall be used in the SERB and ESERB for risk/deficiency level categorization. Finally, the Blue and Gold Sheets shall be included in the Operational Test Agency Assessment (OAR) or Evaluation Reports (OER).

2. Procedures. The following steps shall be used by the Warfare Division for SUT/SoS risk/deficiency documentation:

a. Initial Performance Issue Identification:

(1) Upon identification of an issue, enclosure (2) Blue and Gold Sheet templates shall be used to document all SUT and SoS performance issues. There shall be a single issue per sheet. These sheets use the 6PP format style of writing to present all information in a clear and concise manner. Specific guidance is provided in the templates. The intent is for the reader to gain a comprehensive understanding of the issue by reading this single sheet.

(2) There are two types of deficiency sheets. The Blue Sheet is for SUT performance issues and the Gold Sheet is for SoS (Warfighting Effects (WE)) performance issues. Each sheet shall have a unique issue number to track the issue from its identification to its correction. The numbering scheme shall be the program Test and Evaluation Identification Number (TEIN) with a three digit modifier (i.e., 1420-001, 1420-002, 3000-371-001). In addition, as the same issue is updated, the number shall include a modifier for the revision (i.e., 1420-001, 1420-001 Rev 1; 1420-001 Rev 2 (see paragraph 2d).

b. Categorization. SUT and SoS performance issues shall be categorized as either draft, initial observation, risk, deficiency, or closed. The following is the categorizations descriptions and what reporting product it supports:

(1) Draft categorization shall be used for issue discovery. Draft is used during data collection to document the current information, when there is not enough data to know if there is a performance issue. It is also used to update a Risk/Deficiency with new data between ESERBs and official Flag recategorization. Draft categorizations do not support any product.

(2) An Initial Observation categorization is for documenting performance issues when enough data has been gathered and preliminary analysis determines that there is a SUT or SoS performance issue. Initial Observation designation can be made by the Division Director. Initial Observation categorization supports Letters of Observation (LOO) and anomaly messages.

(3) A Risk categorization, per reference (a), shall be used for performance issues identified during Developmental Testing (DT) or Integrated Testing (IT) up to the beginning of IOT&E that have been through the SERB/ESERB process and has official Flag approval of the Risk categorization (i.e., 4x4 High). The Risk sheets shall also include the potential deficiency level if the issue is not mitigated. Enclosure (3) shall be used for identifying potential deficiency levels using the standard risk matrix. No change to the assigned ESERB risk “score” (i.e., 4x4 High) can be made until additional data are reviewed through the SERB/ESERB process and has official Flag recategorization. Risks categorization supports EOA/OA and Quick Reaction Assessment Reports.

(4) A Deficiency (Severe, Major 1/2/3, Minor) categorization shall be used during IOT&E, Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation (FOT&E), and Verification of Corrections of Deficiencies (VCD). No change to the assigned ESERB deficiency level can be made until additional data go through the ESERB process and have official Flag recategorization. Deficiencies support IOT&E/FOT&E/VCD Reports.

(5) A Closed categorization shall be used to document an initial observation, risk, or deficiency that has been corrected and is no longer an issue. Closed can only be approved by the Admiral (Division Director for initial observations). Closed is used to record data and analysis of corrected SUT or WE issues in FOT&E and VCD Reports.

c. SERB/ESERB. Enclosure (2) Blue and Gold Sheets shall be used for SERB and ESERB vetting. SERB spreadsheets are no longer required.

d. Continuous Risk/Deficiency Revisions. As the SUT progresses through its development and additional OT-qualified data are obtained, continuously update the original Blue/Gold Sheet to represent the current status of the risk/deficiency. Updates to a Risk/Deficiency shall be annotated by the use of a “Draft” watermark across the sheet as well as the addition of a “Rev” modifier to the issue number followed by the word Draft (i.e., 1420-001 Rev 1 Draft). Once the revision has been approved by the Admiral via the ESERB process, the draft labeling will be deleted. In summary, when documenting the update using the Blue or Gold sheet, include the following:

- New data
- Add or update the revision number with a Draft watermark and “Rev # Draft” modifier and date of the update
- Once officially recategorized by the Admiral during an ESERB, remove the Draft watermark and update the date
- For Risks or Deficiencies, conduct Analysis Working Group (AWG), SERB, and ESERB.

e. Sharing Blue and Gold Sheets. Initial Observation, Risk, and Deficiency categorization Blue and Gold Sheets shall be provided to the Program Manager.

f. AWG. PIN 11-01, Analysis Working Group Guidance and Procedures, outlines the AWG process. Divisions may elect to use OA/IOT&E template data, appendix A, to present data to the AWG or continue to use the AWG template.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

COMMANDER OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
RISK NO. TEIN#-XXX Rev**X (1, 2, as required))(Draft - if applicable)**

Blue Sheet*(SUT Issue)*

Date: DD MMM YYYY

SUT: Specified ___ ***(Cite capability document para#)***
Derived ___ Sponsor Agreement Y/N ***(Circle one)***
SERB Agreement: Y/N ***(Circle one)***
(For COTF Use Only - Delete for copy to publish/share)

1. System Under Test (SUT) Risk: The SSM-X missile experienced Mk 50 booster Thruster Vector Assembly (TVA) uncommanded oscillations during flight ((4x3)Moderate).

(This is the short name of the risk and short description if necessary to amplify. The problem should be clearly articulated here. See example above.)

a. Primary COI:

b. Other(s) affected COIs:

c. Previously Identified: ***(Indicate what phase of test the issue was identified. If it has not been included in a test report yet, then indicate the date the issue was identified)***

2. TEST CONDITIONS, RESULTS, AND ANALYSIS. The SSM-X missile's capability to acquire, track and intercept various targets was evaluated during seven at-sea live firing events. Test telemetry data revealed uncommanded Mk 50 booster TVA nozzle oscillations in 5 of 7 missile firing events. Typical uncommanded TVA oscillations are shown in figure 1 below.

Risk No. TEIN-XXX Rev X

(Choose One: Draft, Initial Observation, Risk, or Deficiency depending upon the maturity of the issue.)

Note: This is based on limited initial analysis of the available data. Further data may refine and/or modify the final characterization of the preliminary deficiency, and will be addressed in the final operational test report. ***(This note is removed after the publishing of the OER.)***



Figure 1. TVA uncommanded oscillations

The uncommanded TVA or nozzle oscillations varied from a "nervous nozzle" behavior observed in previous missile firings to several other instances of actual nozzle position divergence from the Autopilot (AP) commanded nozzle position and a single case of a growing oscillation in the Booster/Pitchover (BPO) AP during the last 2 seconds of boost flight. The BPO AP oscillation had not been observed on any other missile flight tests. While the oscillations slightly degraded boost phase missile performance, mission success was not impacted. Post-test root cause analysis indicated foreign matter/debris within the nozzle position feedback potentiometers as a probable cause for the divergence between actual and commanded positions but did not explain the BPO AP oscillations. The BPO AP oscillations were large and grew to near the limits of the AP capability to

Risk No. TEIN-XXX Rev X

(Choose One: Draft, Initial Observation, Risk, or Deficiency depending upon the maturity of the issue.)

Note: This is based on limited initial analysis of the available data. Further data may refine and/or modify the final characterization of the preliminary deficiency, and will be addressed in the final operational test report. ***(This note is removed after the publishing of the OER.)***

maintain controlled flight during and after booster separation. Failure analysis of the BPO AP oscillations is ongoing.

(This is parts 1 (test conditions/past tense), 2 (data/results and discussion/past tense), and 3 (data/results analysis/past tense) of the six part paragraph structure. Parts 2 and 3 shall include the mission consequence discussion and the likelihood discussion. Attempt to use the same words or as close as possible to the same words used in the consequence and likelihood definitions when discussing your consequence and likelihood analysis. See example above.)

3. MISSION RELATION. During surface to air target engagements, uncommanded TVA oscillations during the latter stages of boosted flight could lead to instability of the AP, uncontrolled flight, or large Angles of Attack (AOA) and body roll rates at booster separation resulting in a failure of the midcourse AP to properly stabilize the missile and mission failure(target miss).

(This is part 4 (mission relation/future tense) of the six part paragraph structure. See example above. The mission relation should be one sentence (no more than two) and, while not mandatory, is highly recommended to follow the boilerplate example below.

Mission Relation Boilerplate Example:

During [mission/task/subtask as appropriate], the [problem] will cause [impact to system/operator/task completion] resulting in [impact to mission].)

4. MITIGATION ASSESSMENT FOR IOT&E. Based on communication with the PM, the technical solution for this issue is not completely known but is being actively pursued. Concerns for foreign objects within the nozzle feedback potentiometers are being mitigated by a detailed review of the history and pedigree of IOT&E boosters and TVAs as well as special all up round (AUR)

Risk No. TEIN-XXX Rev X

(Choose One: Draft, Initial Observation, Risk, or Deficiency depending upon the maturity of the issue.)

Note: This is based on limited initial analysis of the available data. Further data may refine and/or modify the final characterization of the preliminary deficiency, and will be addressed in the final operational test report. ***(This note is removed after the publishing of the OER.)***

TVA screenings and inspections of all IOT&E missiles. Very limited additional time is available for further investigation of the BPO AP issue prior to IOT&E start. There is a moderate likelihood uncommanded TVA oscillations during boosted flight will occur during IOT&E, but should not impact the mid-course and terminal phases of flight.

(This discussion should be centered on COTF's assessment of the program manager's (PM) mitigation plan for the issue. Several aspects should be covered in the discussion such as: 1) PM's awareness of the issue and intent to correct 2) Is a technical solution known/possible, being investigated or is it beyond current technology? 3) Is there time between now and IOT&E to correct? and, 4) Is there funding available to correct? See example above. In determining the High /Moderate/Low possibility of the issue not being corrected at IOT&E, use the following guidance:

> ***High = Will not get corrected due to any or all of: PM does not intend to correct, will not get corrected by IOT&E due to time, money or technology or any combination of the three.***
>
> ***Low = Will get corrected prior to IOT&E…there is a plan, PM is committed…has id'ed time, money and effort to correcting and has a good track record of doing so.***
>
> ***Moderate = everything else between High and Low.)***

5. CONCLUSION. The SSM-X Mk 50 booster TVA uncommanded oscillations is of moderate consequence and likely to occur. Additionally, there is a moderate possibility the oscillations will not be corrected or substantially mitigated at IOT&E. If this risk is unmitigated, it will potentially be a Major 2 Deficiency.

Risk No. TEIN-XXX Rev X

(Choose One: Draft, Initial Observation, Risk, or Deficiency depending upon the maturity of the issue.)

Note: This is based on limited initial analysis of the available data. Further data may refine and/or modify the final characterization of the preliminary deficiency, and will be addressed in the final operational test report. ***(This note is removed after the publishing of the OER.)***

(This is part 5 (conclusion/present tense) of the six part paragraph structure. Three discrete sentences are required. The first should capture the conclusion (number word definition) of the consequence and likelihood discussion (the x-y axes of the risk matrix), the second should capture the mitigation discussion (the possibility the risk will not be corrected at IOT&E) and the third sentence should address the potential deficiency level if left unmitigated. See example above.)



(The number plotted in the matrix is the issue number (less the TEIN) and the H/M/L modifier for PM mitigation assessment)

6. RECOMMENDATION. *Choose one:* [Correct prior to IOT&E.][Correct to achieve full mission capability.][Correct for full mission accomplishment of the SUT in its intended operating environment.]

(This is part 6 (recommendation/present tense) of the six part paragraph structure.)

Risk No. TEIN-XXX Rev X

(Choose One: Draft, Initial Observation, Risk, or Deficiency depending upon the maturity of the issue.)

Note: This is based on limited initial analysis of the available data. Further data may refine and/or modify the final characterization of the preliminary deficiency, and will be addressed in the final operational test report. *(This note is removed after the publishing of the OER.)*

COMMANDER OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUTION
DEFICIENCY NO. TEIN#-XXX Rev**X (1, 2, as required**))(Draft -- if applicable)

Blue Sheet ***(SUT Deficiency)***

Date: DD MMM YYYY

SUT: Specified ___ ***(Cite capability document para#)***
Derived ___ Sponsor Agreement Y/N ***(Circle one)***
SERB Agreement: Y/N ***(Circle one)***
(For COTF Use Only - Delete for copy to publish/share)

1. System Under Test (SUT) DEFICIENCY. Improperly configured Access Control Lists (ACL) (Minor).

(This is the short name of the deficiency. See example above. Use Severe, Major 1, 2, 3, and Minor characterizations.)

a. Primary COI:

b. Other(s) Affected COIs:

c. Previously Identified: ***(Indicate what phase of test the issue was identified. If it has not been included in a test report yet, then indicate the date the issue was identified)***

2. TEST CONDITIONS, RESULTS, AND ANALYSIS. During the 12-day test period, the team performed a cooperative evaluation of the Automated Digital Network System (ADNS) Increment (INC) III Information Assurance (IA) capabilities aboard USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN. IA vulnerability scans discovered improperly configured ACL and no port security. Analysis of the ADNS ciphertext router ACLs identified that filters were not configured to only allow packets with legitimate destinations to pass within the ADNS router. Additionally, there was no port security or media access control address filtering configures, thereby allowing a new device to be plugged into an existing port and gain access to the network.

(This is parts 1 (test conditions/past tense), 2 (results/data and discussion/past tense), and 3 (results/data analysis/past tense) of the six part paragraph structure.)

3. MISSION RELATION. During underway operations, the improperly configured ACLs will allow potential for a malicious insider or an unwitting user to cause a breach of security by plugging in a potentially harmful system to gain access to the network resulting in system degradation.

(This is part 4 (mission relation/future tense) of the six part paragraph structure. See example above. The mission relation should be one sentence (no more than two) and, while not mandatory, is highly recommended to follow the boilerplate example below.

Mission Relation Boilerplate Example:

During [mission/task/subtask as appropriate], the [problem] will cause [impact to system/operator/task completion] resulting in [impact to mission].)

4. CONCLUSION. The improperly configured ACLs and no port security is a minor deficiency.

(This is part 5 (conclusion/present tense) of the six part paragraph structure. The [problem] is a [Use Severe/Major 1, 2, 3/Minor characterizations] deficiency.)

5. RECOMMENDATION. ***Example:*** Correct as soon as practicable. ***Choose one:*** [Correct prior to ship or system deployment.][Correct prior to Fleet introduction.][Correct prior to the next software release (or APB/ACB, etc.)][Correct as soon as possible.][Correct as soon as practicable.][Correct for full mission accomplishment of the SUT in its intended operating environment.]

(This is part 6 (recommendation/present tense) of the six part paragraph structure.)

COMMANDER OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
RISK NO. TEIN#-XXX Rev**X (1, 2, as required)) (Draft -- if applicable)**

Gold Sheet ***(SoS Issue)***

Date: DD MMM YYYY

SERB Agreement: Y/N ***(Circle one)***
(For COTF Use Only - Delete for copy to publish/share)

1. WARFIGHTING EFFECT (WE) Risk: There is no plan to train Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) operators prior to operations with the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ((4x2)Low).

(This is the short name of the risk and short description if necessary to amplify. See example above.)

a. Affected COIs:

Primary: S-7 Training

Other(s): E-1 Maritime Prepositioning Support Operations

b. Previously Identified: ***(Indicate what phase of test the issue was identified. If it has not been included in a test report yet, then indicate the date the issue was identified)***

2. TEST CONDITIONS, RESULTS, AND EVALUATION. The training of Fleet LCAC crews to operate with the MLP was assessed during the OT-B1 design review. No plan existed to train LCAC operators in MLP launch and recovery operations. LCACs currently maneuver in and out of well decks from the stern of all LCAC-capable ships, but the MLP will require athwartship launch and recovery operations. Current Fleet LCAC operators are not familiar with athwartship launch and recovery.

(This is parts 1 (test conditions/past tense), 2 (results and discussion/past tense), and 3 (data evaluation/past tense) of

Risk No. TEIN-XXX Rev X

(This should match the categorization type and number)

Note: This is based on limited initial analysis of the available data. Further data may refine and/or modify the final characterization of the preliminary deficiency, and will be addressed in the final operational test report. ***(This note is removed after the publishing of the OER.)***

the six part paragraph structure. Parts 2 and 3 shall include the mission consequence discussion and the likelihood discussion. See example above.)

3. MISSION RELATION. During transfer and deliver operations, not having a realistic training plan will impact LCAC crew proficiency levels for launch and recovery from the MLP.

(This is part 4 (mission relation/future tense) of the six part paragraph structure. See example above.)

4. MITIGATION ASSESSMENT FOR IOT&E. Based on communication with the Program Manager (PM), the technical solution for this issue is known and being resolved. A Fleet LCAC crew training, qualification and skill retention program is required. The PM is engaged in working level discussions with the LCAC community to determine the operator training necessary to operate LCACs with MLP. Additionally, PMS 377 has requested funding through the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 14 process that will be used to implement LCAC operator training with MLP. There is enough time to correct this risk prior to IOT&E. It is assessed there is a low possibility Fleet LCAC crews will not receive MLP familiarization training prior to IOT&E.

> ***(This is part 2 (results and discussion/past tense of PM mitigation plan) and 3 (data evaluation/past tense of PM mitigation plan) of the six part paragraph structure. See example above.)***

5. CONCLUSION. Not having a plan to train LCAC operators prior to operations with the MLP is of significant consequence and has a low likelihood of occurrence. Additionally, there is a low possibility Fleet LCAC crews will not receive MLP familiarization training prior to operating with MLP or substantially mitigated at IOT&E. LCAC crews will not operate from MLP prior to receiving platform specific training. If this

Risk No. TEIN-XXX Rev X

(This should match the categorization type and number)

Note: This is based on limited initial analysis of the available data. Further data may refine and/or modify the final characterization of the preliminary deficiency, and will be addressed in the final operational test report. ***(This note is removed after the publishing of the OER.)***

risk is unmitigated, it will potentially be a Major 2 Deficiency.

(This is part 5 (conclusion/past tense) of the six part paragraph structure. See example above.)



(The number plotted in the matrix is the issue number (less the TEIN) and the H/M/L modifier for PM mitigation assessment)

6. RECOMMENDATION. ***Choose one:*** [Correct prior to IOT&E.][Correct to achieve full mission capability.][Correct for full mission accomplishment of the SUT in its intended operating environment.]

(This is part 6 (recommendation/present tense) of the six part paragraph structure.)

Risk No. TEIN-XXX Rev X

(This should match the categorization type and number)

Note: This is based on limited initial analysis of the available data. Further data may refine and/or modify the final characterization of the preliminary deficiency, and will be addressed in the final operational test report. ***(This note is removed after the publishing of the OER.)***

COMMANDER OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUTION
DEFICIENCY NO. TEIN#-XXX Rev**X (1, 2, as required))(Draft -- if applicable)**

Gold Sheet *(SoS Deficiency)*

Date: DD MMM YYYY

SERB Agreement: Y/N ***(Circle one)***
(For COTF Use Only - Delete for copy to publish/share)

1. WARFIGHTING EFFECT (WE) DEFICIENCY. Improperly configured Access Control Lists (ACL) (Minor).

(This is the short name of the deficiency. See example above. Use Severe, Major 1, 2, 3, and Minor characterizations.)

a. Primary COI:

b. Other(s) Affected COIs:

c. Previously Identified: ***(Indicate what phase of test the issue was identified. If it has not been included in a test report yet, then indicate the date the issue was identified)***

2. TEST CONDITIONS, RESULTS, AND ANALYSIS. During the 12-day test period, the team performed a cooperative evaluation of the Automated Digital Network System (ADNS) Increment (INC) III Information Assurance (IA) capabilities aboard USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN. IA vulnerability scans discovered improperly configured ACL and no port security. Analysis of the ADNS ciphertext router ACLs identified that filters were not configured to only allow packets with legitimate destinations to pass within the ADNS router. Additionally, there was no port security or media access control address filtering configures, thereby allowing a new device to be plugged into an existing port and gain access to the network.

(This is parts 1 (test conditions/past tense), 2 (results/data and discussion/past tense), and 3 (results/data analysis/past tense) of the six part paragraph structure.)

3. MISSION RELATION. During underway operations, the improperly configured ACLs will allow potential for a malicious insider or an unwitting user to cause a breach of security by

plugging in a potentially harmful system to gain access to the network resulting in system degradation.

(This is part 4 (mission relation/future tense) of the six part paragraph structure. See example above. The mission relation should be one sentence (no more than two) and, while not mandatory, is highly recommended to follow the boilerplate example below.

Mission Relation Boilerplate Example:

During [mission/task/subtask as appropriate], the [problem] will cause [impact to system/operator/task completion] resulting in [impact to mission].)

4. CONCLUSION. The improperly configured ACLs and no port security is a minor WE deficiency.

(This is part 5 (conclusion/present tense) of the six part paragraph structure. The [problem] is a [Use Severe/Major 1, 2, 3/Minor characterizations] deficiency.)

5. RECOMMENDATION. ***Example:*** Correct as soon as practicable. ***Choose one:*** [Correct prior to ship or system deployment.][Correct prior to Fleet introduction.][Correct prior to the next software release (or APB/ACB, etc.).][Correct as soon as possible.][Correct as soon as practicable.][Correct for full mission accomplishment of the SUT in its intended operating environment.]

(This is part 6 (recommendation/present tense) of the six part paragraph structure.)

Potential Deficiency Tool

Likelihood of Occurrence					
5	M/3	2/3	1/2	1/2	S/1
4	M	2/3	2/3	1/2	1/2
3	M	2/3	2/3	2/3	1/2
2	M	M	M	2/3	2/3
1	M	M	M	3/M	2/3
	1	2	3	4	5

Mission Impact Classification

This is a starting point for the vetting/identification of potential deficiency level in a Blue or Gold Sheet Risk conclusion for a risk. The following is the legend:

S-- Severe Deficiency
1-- Major 1 Deficiency
2-- Major 2 Deficiency
3-- Major 3 Deficiency
M-- Minor Deficiency

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK